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Abstract 
Infrastructure is an important factor that contributes to economic growth. Energy, 
telecommunications, roads, rails, sea ports, airports, and drinkable water are important elements 
which determine the ease of doing business in a country. Among these various types of 
infrastructure, energy is essential, as it contributes to the development of other infrastructure. 
Energy is important for the construction of roads, telecommunication lines, sea ports, airports, and 
even the transportation of potable water. Among the different types of energy, electricity is 
essential as it plays a vital role in the functioning of all sectors of the economy. Electricity is used in 
industry, the health sector, at schools, in the transport sector, in the agroindustry, in the 
construction sector, in banks, in public administration, and in houses, amongst other things. 
Because of this, electricity is an important factor that contributes to economic growth and the 
improvement in the standard of living.  
However, the situation of sub-Saharan Africa regarding access to and consumption of electricity is 
very alarming. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest access to and consumption of electricity in the 
world. Benin is one of the countries with low access to and consumption of electricity in sub-
Saharan Africa. In addition, the Beninese electricity sector faces three major challenges: a high 
level of dependency on the importation of electricity, high losses of electricity, and high reliance on 
oil for domestic electricity production. Benin is the only sub-Saharan African country which figures 
simultaneously among the top 10 countries for heavy dependence on importation of electricity in 
2015, for the high proportion of electricity losses in 2015, and for the heavy reliance on oil for the 
domestic electricity generation in 2014 (most recent year for which data was available at the time 
of analysis). Other countries in sub-Saharan Africa figure in either one or two of these lists of top 
10 countries. This indicates that in sub-Saharan Africa, the Beninese electricity sector is one of the 
most vulnerable. This was among the main reasons that the focus of this study is on the Beninese 
electricity sector. 
First, the country imports more than 70% of its electricity supply from neighbouring countries such 
as Ghana and Nigeria. Hence, it is very vulnerable to any electricity shortages occurring in these 
neighbouring countries. Such import dependency has resulted in electricity crises, which occurred 
in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s in Benin due to shortages of electricity in Ghana. This is therefore 
one of the causes of disruption to the electricity supply in Benin. Second, the Beninese electricity 
sector encounters significant amounts of electricity loss during transmission and distribution. Such 
losses exceed the international target of electricity losses defined by ECA (2008). These electricity 
losses reduce the quantity of electricity supplied to consumers and are therefore sources of 
disruption to the electricity supply. Third, Benin relies heavily on oil to produce its electricity 
domestically, while the country is a net importer of oil. More than 90% of the domestic electricity 
production is based on oil. Hence, the Beninese electricity sector is exposed to fluctuation in oil 
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prices. Increases in oil prices limit the country’s domestic capacity of electricity production, and 
therefore are a source of disruption to the electricity supply.  
The World Bank (2016) has reported that these disruptions to electricity supply have resulted in 
losses of sales by firms in Benin. The national policy framework for electricity (République du 
Bénin, 2008) also reported that these disruptions to electricity supply have negatively affected 
economic growth. However, there is no empirical evidence which has verified that disruptions to 
electricity supply have caused reductions in economic growth. In addition, the World Development 
Indicators (2018) reported that the share of electricity consumption in total primary energy 
consumption is very low, and has never exceeded 2.07% over 44 years (1971-2014). It is thus 
possible that disruptions to the electricity supply do not cause any reduction of economic growth. It 
is therefore important to investigate empirically the effect of disruptions to the electricity supply on 
economic growth. This was the main objective of the current study. Such an objective has been 
decomposed into three specific objectives. The first is to construct a composite index of disruption 
risk to the electricity supply in order to measure the performance of the Beninese electricity sector 
concerning the disruption of electricity. One of the goals of the national policy framework for 
electricity is the definition and improvement of performance indicators for the electricity sector and 
the national distribution company. Constructing a composite index of disruption risk to the 
electricity supply to measure the performance of the electricity sector, aligns with this goal. A 
composite index of disruption risk to electricity will be a useful tool for the monitoring of Benin in 
regard to electricity supply security.  
 
The second specific objective is to assess the effect of electricity losses on GDP. Such an 
objective aligns with another goal of the national policy framework for electricity, which is to use an 
indirect financing mechanism to fund the costs associated with the reduction of electricity losses. 
Such a mechanism suggests using funds from donors or the national budget to finance the costs 
associated with the reduction of electricity losses. It then proposes using the gain in GDP resulting 
from the reduction in electricity losses to reimburse the donors or the national budget. It is 
therefore important to understand the effect of electricity losses on GDP. Understanding the effect 
of electricity losses on GDP will help to assess the gain of GDP resulting from a reduction in 
electricity losses. It will therefore contribute to assessing the feasibility of the indirect financing 
mechanism proposed by the national policy framework for electricity. It will also contribute to 
advancing policy on electricity supply efficiency in Benin.  
The third specific objective is to assess the causal effect of negative shocks to electricity supply on 
negative shocks to GDP as is the general belief. As said previously, the national policy framework 
for electricity reported that disruptions to electricity supply have caused a reduction in economic 
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growth, while there is no empirical evidence showing that negative shocks to electricity supply 
have caused negative shocks to GDP. It is therefore important to investigate empirically the causal 
effect of negative shocks to electricity supply on negative shocks to GDP. Such an investigation 
will contribute to verifying the conclusions of the national policy framework for electricity. It will also 
contribute to advancing the formulation of policy on electricity supply security in Benin. Two 
different approaches have been used to conduct these investigations and assessments: a 
symmetric and an asymmetric approach. 
The objectives of the study have been organized into three different empirical papers. The first 
paper constructed a composite index of disruption risks to electricity supply. Depending on the 
level of disruption risk, the values of such an index fall in the following ranges: [0.5, 1[ (low level of 
disruption risk), [1, 1.5[ (medium level of disruption risk), [1.5, 2[ (high level of disruption risk), [2, 
2.5[ (very high level of disruption risk), 2.5 and above (extremely high level of disruption risk). The 
paper established that Benin’s performance concerning its effort to avoid disruptions to electricity 
supply is very low. Benin is among the countries of the world that have a very high level of 
disruption to electricity supply. The average values of the composite index of disruption risks to 
electricity supply for Benin over the periods 2002-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2015 are 2.157, 
2.036 and 2.132 respectively. Benin was ranked fourth in the world with a very high level of 
disruption to electricity supply over the periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2010. Over the period 2011-
2015, the country was ranked third in the world with a very high level of disruption to electricity 
supply.  
The second paper has established that on average Benin loses 0.16% of its GDP because of 
electricity losses. In other words, on average, Benin would have gained 0.16% of its GDP for a 1% 
reduction in electricity losses. This loss of GDP constitutes an inefficiency in the economy. This 
result confirms that the indirect financing mechanism proposed by the national policy framework for 
electricity is feasible.  
The third paper established that negative shocks of electricity supply cause negative shocks to 
GDP, while positive shocks of electricity supply have no causal effect on positive shocks to GDP. 
This result ascertains the conclusion of the national policy framework stating that shortages of 
electricity supply have caused reductions in economic growth. It also indicates that electricity 
supply is still low in Benin, and has not yet reached the threshold at which it will start having a 
positive effect on economic growth. 
Based on the results of these three empirical papers, it is recommended first that Benin must 
improve its electricity efficiency policy by for instance leaving the postpaid system and adopting the 
prepaid system. In the postpaid system, consumers have the option of not paying their electricity 
bills, resulting in a loss of revenue for the national distribution company and therefore for the 
government. Losses of government revenues constitute losses of GDP, because government 
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revenues are included in the calculation of GDP. In the prepaid system, consumers purchase the 
amount of electricity they will consume and there is no option for them but to pay for their 
electricity, which makes the prepaid system more efficient than the postpaid system. Second, in 
order to reduce losses of electricity, it is strongly recommended that the country implement the 
indirect financing mechanism proposed in the national policy framework for electricity. Such a 
mechanism aims to finance the costs of activities that will promote the reduction of electricity 
losses.  
Third, it is recommended that Benin must try to avoid disruptions of electricity, because they have 
a negative impact on economic growth. Disruptions of electricity are caused by several factors 
including dependency on the importation of electricity and heavy reliance on oil for the domestic 
production of electricity. Benin must reduce both its dependency on importation of electricity and its 
heavy reliance on oil to produce electricity domestically. Fluctuations in oil prices have a negative 
impact on Benin’s capacity to produce electricity domestically. In many cases, shortages of 
electricity occur in the country because of sudden reductions of the available quantity of electricity 
to be exported by Ghana toward Benin. One way for Benin to reduce its heavy reliance on oil for 
the domestic production of electricity is to increase the share of electricity produced based on 
renewable sources in the total domestic production of electricity. Therefore, the production of 
electricity using renewable energy, such as solar and wind energy, must be explored. The country 
should increase access to electricity via the off-grid system with solar electricity. Other factors 
which cause a disruption of electricity are the low quality of the governance system and rapid 
urbanization. Poor governance has a negative impact on the delivery of electricity. The insufficient 
control of corruption and the weak rule of law have led to thefts of electricity on the transmission 
and distribution lines in Benin. Therefore, Benin must improve its government effectiveness, the 
rule of law, the quality of its regulatory system, and the control of corruption. When the growth rate 
of urbanization evolves more rapidly than the growth rate of urban access to electricity, there is a 
supply gap of electricity in urban areas because the urban demand of electricity exceeds the urban 
supply. Such a supply gap is a source of disruption of electricity. This is the case in Benin. In order 
to slow down massive migration from rural to urban areas, the country must provide rural areas 
with social and economic infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, paved roads, and so on, which 
will create an incentive for the rural population to continue residing in rural areas and not migrate to 
urban areas on a large scale. 
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CHAPTER 11 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1.1 Importance of infrastructure for economic development  
The availability and access to infrastructure such as energy/electricity, water sanitation, rails, 
roads, and telephone lines, in a country stimulates economic growth by improving the productivity 
of the economy, while enhancing the standard of living and the quality of life for residents (Ajakaiye 
and Ncube, 2010; Egert, Kozluk and Sutherland, 2009; Sanchez-Robles, 1998). According to 
Mbaku (2013), public infrastructure improves trade and many other commercial activities within 
countries and between countries. It also contributes significantly to the alleviation of poverty and 
inequality (World Bank, 2006; Ndulu, 2006).  
Three main schools of thought emerge in the theoretical literature on the link between 
infrastructure development and economic growth. The first considers infrastructure to be included 
in the physical stock of capital of any given country and is, therefore, a factor of production 
(Gramlich, 1994; Aschauer, 1993). It argues that change in the available stock of infrastructure will 
directly influence economic growth. The second considers infrastructure as a complement to other 
factors of production. It argues that infrastructure development may lower input costs, and expand 
the production frontier for different remunerative ventures (Barro, 1990). The third considers 
infrastructure to be an economic variable causing an accumulation of production factors. It argues 
that infrastructure development influences economic growth indirectly by stimulating the 
productivity and accumulation of production factors. Access to roads and affordable electricity, 
health and education facilities contributes to building skilled labour and improving labour 
productivity (Fedderke and Garlick, 2008).  
When examining the relationship between infrastructure and economic growth different 
infrastructure indicators can be used: energy supply or consumption, kilometres of telephone lines, 
and so forth. Alternatively, a composite index of infrastructure development such as the AIDI 
(Africa Infrastructure Development Index), developed by the African Development Bank (2013) for 
African countries, can also be used. In a cross-country analysis of sub-Saharan Africa, Kodongo 
and Ojah (2016) established that countries which have a high level of infrastructure also have a 
high level of income, and countries which have a low level of infrastructure also have a low level of 
income. Specifically, they established a positive and high correlation (0.66 for the correlation 
                                               
1
 An article based on this chapter, titled “The vulnerability of the electricity sector in sub-Saharan Africa: who 
is the most vulnerable”, has been presented at the First International Conference on Energy, Finance, and 
the Macroeconomy (ICEFM), held in November 22, 2017, at Montpelier Business School, in France. 
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coefficient) between income and energy consumption, and a positive and low correlation (0.37 for 
the correlation coefficient) between income and kilometres of telephone lines. Their results 
illustrate the existence of a positive relationship between infrastructure development and economic 
growth, and an especially strong positive relationship between energy consumption and economic 
growth in Africa. Energy remains essential for the development of other types of infrastructure such 
as school and health facilities, roads, seaports, airports, telecommunication capacity, railways, 
water and sanitation. In other words, without energy it will be difficult to develop other types of 
infrastructure. This makes energy an important infrastructure necessary for economic 
development.  
1.1.2 Importance of energy and electricity for economic development in the world and 
Africa 
Energy/electricity is essential for technical progress and the productivity of an economy. According 
to Templet (1999) and Ebohon (1996), energy plays a key role in complementing capital and 
labour for production. A lack of energy is a limiting factor for economic growth and progress in 
science and technology. Energy/electricity is necessary for factory production in the industrial and 
agricultural sectors, and is vital for the daily performance of the tertiary sector (public 
administration, banks, schools, hospitals).  
The IEA (2002) compared the effects of access to different forms of energy (coal, gas, oil, 
biomass, electricity, and so forth.) on the welfare of the poor and concluded that access to 
electricity has the greatest effects on those living in poverty. Ferguson, Wilkinson and Hill (2000) 
argue that the correlation between electricity consumption and wealth creation is stronger than that 
of other forms of energy consumption (such as coal, oil, gas, biomass). This indicates that amongst 
all forms of energy, electricity plays a crucial role in economic growth and the improvement of 
welfare within countries. As argued by Ebohon (1996) and Rosenberg (1998), electricity is a driver 
of economic productivity and is the main source of energy used in new sectors such as the digital 
industry. Without electricity, such industry cannot exist. In addition, the IEA (2002) argued that the 
economic and social development of countries cannot be achieved in the absence of different 
types of energy, particularly in the absence of electricity. It went further and stipulated that a strong 
correlation exists between the consumption of electricity and wealth; and additionally, between a 
lack of access to electricity and poverty (as a percentage of the population living with less than 2 
US Dollars per day). All these studies demonstrated the important role of energy in economic 
development and poverty reduction, and particularly highlighted access to electricity as having a 
great positive effect.  
No country has ever moved from a state of poverty with a developing economy to a state of wealth 
and a developed economy without access to energy (World Bank, n.d.). In alignment with such a 
statement, Toman and Jemelkova (2003) argued that improvements in the quality of energy 
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services will contribute to increased economic productivity. Further, Toman and Jemelkova (2003) 
and Burney (1995) argued that for any country, the interrelations between energy and other 
production factors evolve according to the level of economic development. Low development 
stages correspond to a low level of energy usage, while high development stages require a high 
level of energy usage. They also highlighted the increasing role of fossil fuels and electricity in a 
country as it moves to higher stages of economic development. Ferguson et al. (2000) illustrated 
this using the example of developed countries. They argued that increases in wealth in developed 
countries are highly correlated to increases in energy consumption. In alignment with them, 
Rosenberg (1998) stipulated that in developed countries, the supply of electricity has been an 
important determinant of both industrial development and an improved standard of living. In the 
case of developing countries, the Economic Comission for Africa (ECA) (2004) argued that export 
diversification is highly correlated with per capita electricity consumption and access to electricity. 
This indicates that countries where access to electricity is high, also have lower energy costs and 
more diversified exports; conversely, countries where electricity consumption per capita is low, also 
have high energy costs. This implies that sufficient investments in energy infrastructure are 
necessary for export diversification and for a strong and sustainable economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Theoretically, there is consensus on the important role of energy or electricity 
consumption to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction, and there are many diverse 
channels through which energy or electricity contributes to promoting economic growth and poverty 
reduction. 
Stern (2011) argued that in the pre-industrial era, people used human physical strength, then 
animal traction, for production, and in the industrial era, people started using energy from water, 
wind, hydrocarbon and lastly, electricity. This indicates that energy/electricity, when combined with 
the appropriate technology, increases human capacity to produce. In the post-industrial era, all 
sectors of the economy continue using energy/electricity to function. Government, households and 
firms buy energy or electricity on energy markets where producers are composed of energy 
companies (in liberalized energy markets) or public monopolies (in non-liberalized energy 
markets). Government uses energy or electricity to produce public goods and services such as 
roads, bridges, public schools and hospitals, national security (police digital checking at airports 
and seaports, digital identity) aiming to improve the common welfare of society.  
Households use energy or electricity for lighting, air conditioning, cooking, and for the functioning 
of different electrical appliances such as televisions, computers, cell phones, and so forth. 
According to Slutsky (1915), Allen (1934), Houthakker (1961), Chipman, Hurwicz, Richter and 
Sonnenschein (1971) and Samuelson (1974), commodities purchased in the market influence the 
consumer’s welfare. Energy or electricity is also among commodities purchased by households. 
Dubin (1985) and Flaig (1990) have argued that the purchased electricity is combined with a stock 
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of electrical appliances to produce an electric composite good, which then influences the 
households’ welfare. Without electricity, students at home cannot easily review their daily courses 
at night. With electricity, households save time in using electricity for cooking rather than using 
biomass, which can be harmful for their health and for the natural environment. Moreover, with 
electricity at home, households can safely conserve food by refrigeration. Electricity significantly 
contributes to the improvement of welfare and the standard of living within households.  
Firms use energy or electricity as an input for production. According to Stern (2010), energy or 
electricity is a production factor in the same way as are labour and capital. The industrial sector 
uses these production factors as inputs to produce manufactured goods purchased by households, 
government and the rest of the world. The industrial sector also uses electricity for air conditioning 
and lighting. The transportation sector (sea, rail, air, road transportation), and the IT (information 
technology) and telecommunication sectors, rely heavily on energy or electricity. Accessible and 
affordable energy or electricity reduces production costs for firms.  
While energy, including electricity, has been one of the main drivers of technological progress, 
economic development and improvements in the standard of living in developed countries, it is still 
not very accessible in many developing regions of the world. According to the World Development 
Indicators (2016), sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the world where the lack of access to energy, 
including electricity, is most observed. Between 1990 and 2014, the consumption of electricity per 
capita has remained stagnant in sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions of the world (see 
Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1: History of electricity consumption per capita in some main regions of the world 
(1990-2014)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (2004) and Karekezi and Kimani (2002) argued that 
the consumption of energy, including electricity, is very low in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the 
IEA (2002), electricity consumption per capita in 2000 in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South 
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Africa) was only 112.8 kWh and represented only 5% of the total consumption of the world, and 
access to electricity in that same year was very low: only 23% of the population of sub-Saharan 
Africa used electricity in 2000. According to the World Development Indicators (2016), on average, 
access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa was only 33.33%, while the total access for the world 
was around 83.08% for the period 2005-2014 (Figure 1.2). Compared to other regions of the world, 
sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest average rate of access to electricity in the period 2005-2014. In 
North America and the European Union, access to electricity is 100%. Energy consumption per 
capita in sub-Saharan Africa is, by contrast, the lowest in the world in the period 2005-2014 (Figure 
1.3).  
 
Figure 1.2: Access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa and the world (average 2005-2014; in 
percentage of the total population)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
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Figure 1.3: Energy consumption per capita in sub-Saharan Africa and the world (average 
2005-2014; in kg of oil equivalent) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
There is a huge disparity between urban and rural access to electricity in Africa compared to other 
regions (Figures 1.4 and 1.5). Of the 33.33% of total population who had access to electricity in the 
period 2005-2014, only 16.22% of the rural population had access to electricity, while 68.85% of 
the urban population had access to electricity. Over the period 2005-2014, sub-Saharan Africa still 
had the lowest electricity consumption per capita compared to other regions of the world (Figure 
1.6).  
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Figure 1.4: Rural access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa and the world (average 2005-
2014; in percentage of the rural population) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
 
Figure 1.5: Urban access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa and the world (average 2005-
2014; in percentage of the urban population) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
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Figure 1.6: Electricity consumption per capita in sub-Saharan Africa and the world (average 
2005-2014; in kWh) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
In summary, sub-Saharan Africa has both the lowest access to, and consumption of, energy or 
electricity compared to other regions of the world. Davidson and Sokona (2002) argued that the 
energy used by the average sub-Saharan African was lower than the energy used by the average 
person in England a century ago. According to the IEA (2002), Africa will remain by 2030 the 
continent where most of the population does not have access to electricity, and it will take almost 
80 years for Africa to make electricity accessible to its entire population; while in Asia achieving 
this will take only half the time. This is the main reason why this research is focused on a case 
study of energy consumption within the African context. 
While there is a huge deficit in electricity supply in Africa, studies have shown that, for the 
economic and social development of the continent, access to electricity is fundamental. The ECA 
(2004) argued that export diversification is highly correlated to both electricity production per 
worker and electricity consumption per capita on the African continent. It further suggested that 
adequate and reliable energy infrastructure would enable export diversification and lead to 
sustained economic growth in Africa. However, the continent’s supply capacity for energy, 
including electricity, is very limited and constitutes one of the constraints on its export 
diversification.  
In addition to a very limited supply capacity for electricity, sub-Saharan Africa is among the regions 
facing huge technical and non-technical electricity losses (Figure 1.7). Electricity losses occur 
mainly during the transformation, the transmission, and the distribution phases. Because of a lack 
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of data, this study does not focus on transformation losses: rather the focus is on transmission and 
distribution losses. According to the World Development Indicators (2017), electricity losses 
include transmission losses which occur between sources of production and sources of 
distribution, and distribution losses which occur between sources of distribution and consumption 
sites. Losses of electricity are measured as a percentage of total electricity generated or total 
output. According to the World Development Indicators (2016), in the period 2005-2014, losses of 
electricity in sub-Saharan Africa were on average around 11.38%, far above averages of the world 
(8.41%), OECD (6.38%), North America (6.38%), Europe and Central Asia (8.15%), East Asia and 
Pacific (5.82%), the European Union (6.46%), and below the average of the Middle East and North 
Africa (13.18%). According to Camos, Bacon, Estache, and Hamid (2017), the huge losses of 
electricity observed in the Middle East and North Africa are the results of inefficiencies observed in 
their power sectors, due to, for example, inefficiencies in terms of electricity bills’ collection. Not the 
total electricity consumed is billed to consumers because of a poor management of the billing 
system. This poor management of the billing system leads to important commercial losses of 
electricity, which adds to the existing technical losses of electricity. 
 
Figure 1.7: Electric power transmission and distribution losses of different regions of the 
world (as percentage of total electricity generated) (average 2005-2014)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
Technical losses occur because of the technology used during the distribution and transmission, 
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default in electricity bill payments, and so forth. Developed nations have strong institutions which 
can enforce laws in order to avoid non-technical losses. Moreover, they are finding ways of saving 
energy by using energy-efficient technology during transmission and distribution. In Africa, the rule 
of law still has a long way to go in many countries. Due to political instability, ethnic conflict and 
corruption, the quality and the capacity of many institutions remain weak. In addition, the 
technology used for transmission and redistribution of electricity is not always energy-efficient. All 
this results in a higher proportion of losses of electricity compared to many regions of the world. 
While the economic and social development of the African continent is already constrained by its 
limited supply of and access to electricity; energy is one of the inputs for production, and losses in 
electricity represent losses in significant production factors and GDP.  
According to Turkson and Wohlgemuth (2001), if sustainable economic growth and poverty 
reduction is to be achieved in sub-Saharan Africa, access to reliable and efficient electricity 
supplies within African countries is a requirement. The IEA (2002) argued that total access to 
electricity is vital in sub-Saharan Africa, in order to reduce the consumption of biomass that 
generates deforestation, desertification and health disorders due to the use of charcoal: 89% of the 
population use biomass as their primary source of energy. The IEA (2017) reported that 90% of the 
world’s population cooking with biomass live in 25 countries and 20 of these countries are located 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  
According to the World Development Indicators (2016), only 37.38% of the population of sub-
Saharan Africa had access to electricity in 2014. This indicates that in 2014, more than 60% of the 
population of sub-Saharan Africa were still using biomass (charcoal, animal waste, wood) as their 
primary source of energy for cooking and were thus exposed to lung diseases as they breathed in 
the toxic smoke coming from burnt charcoal or wood. The IEA (2017) also reported that globally 
2.8 million people, mostly women and children, die from these lung diseases every year. Every day 
1.4 hours are dedicated by households (mostly women) to collect firewood and cook using 
biomass as the sole energy source, and many more hours are dedicated by them for cooking with 
inefficient ovens (IEA, 2017). In addition, statistics from the World Development Indicators (2016) 
and the World Health Organization (2016) indicate that there is a negative correlation between 
access to electricity and the consumption of biomass or waste (Figure 1.8), and a negative 
correlation between electricity consumption per capita and deaths attributable to household air 
pollution (Figure 1.9). On average, countries which have a high rate of access to electricity have a 
low consumption of biomass or waste, and countries which have a low rate of access to electricity 
have a high consumption of biomass or waste. In the same way, countries which have a high 
consumption of electricity per capita, have a low number of deaths attributable to household air 
pollution on average, and countries which have low electricity consumption per capita, have a high 
number of deaths attributable to household air pollution on average. Access to electricity therefore 
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constitutes a precondition for the sustainable development of sub-Saharan Africa. All these 
constitute important reasons why this study specifically focuses on electricity among energy types 
in Africa. 
 
Figure 1.8: Classification of countries based on access to electricity and consumption of 
combustibles renewable and waste, including biomass in 2014  
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Classification of countries based on electricity consumption per capita and 
deaths attributable to household air pollution in 2012  
Source: World Health Organization (2016) and World Development Indicators (2016) 
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While access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest in the world, there are some 
disparities in terms of electricity supply and consumption per capita from one country to another.  
1.1.3  Cross-country stylized facts on the electricity sector within sub-Saharan Africa 
In 2014, South Africa’s electricity consumption per capita was above the sub-Saharan African and 
the world’s average electricity consumption per capita and remains the highest in the region 
(Figure 1.10), followed by Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Gabon and Zambia where electricity 
consumption per capita was far below the world average, but above the sub-Saharan average. 
Benin, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Niger, South Sudan and Tanzania, had the lowest 
electricity consumption per capita in the region (Figure 1.10).  
 
Figure 1.10: Electricity consumption (in kWh) per capita in sub-Saharan African countries in 
2014  
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
There are three major causes of the vulnerability of the electricity sector across countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. First, some countries are heavily dependent on imports of electricity in order to fill 
their supply gap (Table 1.1). Imported electricity can be defined as the proportion of electricity that 
is purchased from abroad. It is added to the domestically generated electricity to constitute the total 
electricity generated. Net imported electricity is defined as imported electricity minus exported 
electricity. If the value of net imported electricity is positive, it indicates that the country has a deficit 
of electricity supply; if it is negative, this indicates that the country has a surplus of electricity 
supply. Benin and Togo imported 77.575% and 94.034% (net import) of their electricity supply 
respectively in 2015. According to the world ranking in 2015, Togo and Benin were respectively the 
first and the fifth net importer of electricity, and in sub-Saharan Africa, they were respectively the 
first and the second net importer of electricity in 2015 (Table 1.1). Other countries such as Ghana 
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and Zambia generate domestically the main proportion of their electricity supply. Their proportions 
of electricity imported (net import) were respectively -2.907% and -2.779% in 2015. This indicates 
that these two countries had a surplus of electricity and are able to export it. According to the world 
ranking, Ghana and Zambia were respectively the 193rd and the 192nd net importers of electricity in 
2015. In sub-Saharan Africa, they were respectively the 50th and the 49th net importers of electricity 
in 2015 (Table 1.1). Figure 1.11 depicts the share of net imports of electricity in the total supply of 
electricity for African countries over the period 2006-2015 (most recent past 10 years for which 
data was available at the time of analysis). The vertical axis shows averages of net imports of 
electricity (as a percentage of total supply of electricity) over the period 2006-2015. The abscissa 
line shows the countries. According to the figure, Benin and Togo are among the top net importers 
of electricity on the African continent with a high positive net import of electricity every year, while 
countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique are among the rare exporters (negative net import) of 
electricity. 
Table 1.1: Ranking of African countries as net importers of electricity in 2015  
Countries 
Net imports of electricity 
in 2015 (as a percentage of 
total electricity supply) 
World 
ranking  
in 2015 
Africa ranking  
in 2015 
Togo 94.034 1 1 
Benin 77.575 5 2 
Swaziland 71.476 6 3 
Namibia 61.203 9 4 
Niger 61.028 10 5 
Botswana 34.484 14 6 
Burkina Faso 31.939 16 7 
Burundi 28.125 19 8 
Lesotho 25.466 21 9 
Cameroon 17.622 26 10 
Morocco 15.027 30 11 
Gabon 14.146 32 12 
Rwanda 12.464 37 13 
Tanzania 1.165 56 14 
Libya 0.248 62 15 
Kenya 0.228 63 16 
Angola 0.000 68 17 
Cape Verde 0.000 68 18 
Central African Republic 0.000 68 19 
Chad 0.000 68 20 
Comoros 0.000 68 21 
Djibouti 0.000 68 22 
Equatorial Guinea 0.000 68 23 
Eritrea 0.000 68 24 
Gambia, The 0.000 68 25 
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Guinea 0.000 68 26 
Guinea-Bissau 0.000 68 27 
Liberia 0.000 68 28 
Madagascar 0.000 68 29 
Malawi 0.000 68 30 
Mali 0.000 68 31 
Mauritania 0.000 68 32 
Mauritius 0.000 68 33 
Nigeria 0.000 68 34 
São Tomé and Principe  0.000 68 35 
Senegal 0.000 68 36 
Seychelles 0.000 68 37 
Sierra Leone 0.000 68 38 
Somalia 0.000 68 39 
Sudan 0.000 68 40 
Algeria -0.047 167 41 
Congo (Brazzaville) -0.236 173 42 
Tunisia -0.518 174 43 
South Africa -0.636 176 44 
Egypt -0.649 177 45 
Zimbabwe -0.950 181 46 
Ethiopia -1.605 188 47 
Uganda -2.224 190 48 
Zambia -2.779 192 49 
Ghana -2.907 193 50 
Congo (Kinshasa) -4.531 195 51 
Mozambique -7.731 198 52 
Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) -10.248 205 53 
Source: US Energy Information Administration (2018) 
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Figure 1.11: Net imports of electricity (as a percentage of total supply of electricity) for 
African countries (average 2006-2015)  
Source: USEIA (2018) 
A heavy reliance on imports of electricity puts countries at risk whenever energy or electricity crises 
occur in exporter countries, especially within the African context, where even countries that export 
electricity are also facing a growing demand for electricity. This has been the case with Benin and 
Togo, which import electricity from Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. Benin and Togo have been 
facing consecutive electricity crises, because the countries from which they import electricity, have 
been facing a growing demand, and have had to reduce the amount of electricity they export in 
order to increase their domestic supply. Benin, for instance, has encountered several electricity 
shortages due to sudden cuts in the quantity of electricity available to import from Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire. These cuts resulted in severe electricity shortages in 1984, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2012 and 2013. The Beninese and Togolese electricity sectors are thus very vulnerable to external 
shocks, which can at any time lead to electricity shortages in these two countries and thus slow 
economic production. 
Second, some countries are particularly inefficient in their supply of electricity due to a high amount 
of electricity losses. As can be seen in Table 1.2, Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Gabon, Kenya, Mozambique, Benin, Sudan and Tanzania are the sub-Saharan African 
countries with the highest losses of electricity during the transmission and distribution phases in 
2015. Congo (Brazzaville) is the most electricity-inefficient country in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
second most electricity-inefficient country in Africa, and the fourth most electricity-inefficient 
country in the world, totalling a 46.160% loss of its total supply in 2015. Benin is the 20th most 
electricity-inefficient country, totalling 19.358% loss of its total supply in 2015. The most electricity-
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efficient countries in Africa are Swaziland, Burkina Faso and Burundi (Table 1.2). Swaziland for 
instance, totals only 1.997% loss of its total supply, is the 212th most electricity-inefficient country in 
the world and the 54th most electricity-inefficient country in Africa, in 2015. Figure 1.12 represents 
the averages of electricity losses in African countries over the period 2006-2015 (the most recent 
10 years for which data was available at the time of analysis). The vertical axis shows averages of 
electricity losses (as a percentage of the total supply of electricity) over the period 2006-2015, and 
the abscissa shows the countries. The figure shows that over the period 2006-2015, Benin and 
many other African countries experienced electricity losses in excess of 12%, while the ECA 
(2008) stipulated that the international target for maximal energy losses should range between 
10% and 12%.  
Table 1.2: Ranking of African countries with respect to percentages of electricity losses in 
2015 
Countries 
Losses (as a percentage of total 
electricity supply in 2015) 
World ranking 
in 2015 
Africa ranking 
in 2015 
Libya 77.120 1 1 
Congo (Brazzaville) 46.160 4 2 
Cameroon 28.938 8 3 
Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 23.527 12 4 
Ghana 22.182 13 5 
Gabon 19.939 16 6 
Kenya 19.855 17 7 
Mozambique 19.635 19 8 
Benin 19.358 20 9 
Sudan 19.093 21 10 
Tanzania 18.372 24 11 
Senegal 17.943 26 12 
Zimbabwe 17.816 27 13 
Nigeria 17.627 28 14 
Ethiopia 17.415 29 15 
Tunisia 17.366 30 16 
Algeria 17.317 31 17 
Morocco 16.742 35 18 
Niger 16.311 38 19 
Congo (Kinshasa) 14.911 47 20 
Eritrea 14.071 54 21 
Botswana 12.567 62 22 
Egypt 11.944 66 23 
Angola 11.655 70 24 
Zambia 9.881 86 25 
South Africa 8.686 93 26 
Togo 8.177 97 27 
Uganda 7.162 108 28 
Cape Verde 7.106 109 29 
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Central African Republic 7.000 112 30 
Djibouti 7.000 112 31 
Guinea 7.000 112 32 
Guinea-Bissau 7.000 112 33 
Madagascar 7.000 112 34 
Mali 7.000 112 35 
Seychelles 7.000 112 36 
Chad 7.000 112 37 
Comoros 7.000 112 38 
Equatorial Guinea 7.000 112 39 
Gambia, The 7.000 112 40 
Liberia 7.000 112 41 
Malawi 7.000 112 42 
São Tomé and Principe 7.000 112 43 
Sierra Leone 7.000 112 44 
Namibia 6.981 161 45 
Somalia 6.980 162 46 
Mauritania 6.503 171 47 
Mauritius 6.195 178 48 
South Sudan 6.123 180 49 
Rwanda 6.122 181 50 
Lesotho 5.217 188 51 
Burundi 5.031 191 52 
Burkina Faso 4.764 195 53 
Swaziland 1.997 212 54 
Source: US Energy Information Administration (2018) 
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Figure 1.12: History of electricity losses (as a percentage of total supply of electricity) for 
African countries (average 2006-2015)  
Source: USEIA (2018) 
As mentioned in previous sections, losses of electricity can be technical or non-technical. Non-
technical losses, due to theft and defaults in electricity bill payments, are very common in sub-
Saharan African countries because of the weak institutions and the ineffective law enforcement 
system. In a country such as Benin, theft of electricity is common, especially in the suburbs. 
Default in electricity bill payments is also an important issue: the main distribution company (SBEE) 
has been bankrupt several times. One of the reasons for this bankruptcy was related to defaults in 
electricity bill payments. In order to minimize these defaults the SBEE and the regulatory authority 
(Ministry of Energy) are considering substituting the current system with that of a prepaid electricity 
system, where customers must purchase the quantity of electricity they want to use prior to 
consumption. As long as sub-Saharan African countries do not improve the quality of their 
institutions, reduce corruption and enforce laws, non-technical losses of electricity will remain a 
challenge and will add to the vulnerability of their electricity sectors. As mentioned earlier, technical 
losses also contribute to overall electricity loss. These are due to the technology used for the 
transmission and distribution of electricity. Improving the technology used requires important 
investment in energy-efficient infrastructure, but most sub-Saharan African countries are unable to 
finance such investments due to a lack of resources. 
Third, some countries are highly dependent on oil for their domestic generation of electricity. As 
can be seen in Table 1.3, South Sudan, Eritrea and Benin were respectively the second, third and 
fourth countries in the world and first, second and third in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of oil 
dependency for domestic electricity generation in 2014. South Sudan relied on oil to generate 
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99.590% of its electricity internally, while Eritrea and Benin relied on oil to generate 99.459% and 
99.457% respectively of their electricity internally in 2014. Other countries such as South Africa 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (also called Congo (Kinshasa)) have the least reliance on 
oil for their domestic electricity generation. Figure 1.13 represents African countries’ reliance on oil 
for domestic electricity production over the period 2005-2014 (most recent past 10 years for which 
data was available at the time of analysis). The vertical axis shows the proportion of domestic 
electricity generated based on oil (average 2005-2014) as a percentage of the total domestic 
electricity generated. The abscissa shows the countries. The figure shows that on average, 
countries such as Benin and Eritrea had the highest reliance on oil (close to 100% of total domestic 
electricity generation) for their domestic electricity generation over the period 2005-2014. A heavy 
dependency on oil for domestic electricity generation exposes countries’ electricity supply to 
external shocks related to fluctuations in oil prices.  
Table 1.3: Ranking of sub-Saharan African countries with respect to the share of electricity 
production from oil sources in 2014 (most recent year for which data was available at the 
time of analysis) (as a percentage of total domestic production of electricity) 
Country  
Share of electricity production 
from oil sources in 2014 (as a 
percentage of total domestic 
production of electricity) 
World rank in 
2014 
Africa rank in 
2014 
South Sudan 99.590 2 1 
Eritrea 99.459 3 2 
Benin 99.457 4 3 
Senegal 83.588 12 4 
Angola 46.825 20 5 
Niger 27.826 31 6 
Gabon 26.996 32 7 
Sudan 21.651 35 8 
Kenya 18.514 36 9 
Ghana 17.072 37 10 
Tanzania 15.485 38 11 
Cameroon 12.800 44 12 
Togo 11.972 46 13 
Côte d’Ivoire 6.131 56 14 
Botswana 4.190 62 15 
Zambia 2.837 65 16 
Namibia 0.868 91 17 
Zimbabwe 0.509 97 18 
Ethiopia 0.094 119 19 
South Africa 0.076 120 20 
Congo (Kinshasa). 0.045 122 21 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
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Figure 1.13: Share of electricity produced based on oil (as a percentage of total domestic 
production of electricity) in African countries (average 2005-2014)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018)  
Among sub-Saharan African countries, Benin is the only one, which figures simultaneously in the 
list of the top 10 countries for heavy dependence on importation of electricity in 2015, for the high 
proportion of electricity losses in 2015, and for heavy reliance on oil for domestic electricity 
generation in 2014 (Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 above). Other sub-Saharan African countries figure in 
either one or two of these lists of top 10 countries. According to Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 above, 
some countries such as Togo rely heavily on the importation of electricity but very little on oil for 
their domestic electricity production. Other countries, such as Congo (Brazzaville), encounter huge 
losses of electricity but rely less on the importation of electricity. South Sudan and Eritrea rely 
heavily on oil for their domestic electricity generation, but encounter lower quantities of electricity 
losses compared to Benin. All this indicates that the Beninese electricity sector is one of the most 
vulnerable in sub-Saharan Africa. It is simultaneously vulnerable to three types of uncertainty or 
risk which have a negative effect on its supply of electricity: fluctuation in the quantity of electricity 
available to import from neighbouring countries, fluctuation in oil prices, and losses of electricity. 
These risks have caused significant disruption to the electricity supply in the country. These are 
among the main reasons that this study focuses specifically on the Beninese electricity sector. 
1.1.4 An overview of electricity sector challenges in Benin 
Benin is among the sub-Saharan African countries which had the lowest electricity consumption 
per capita in 2014, as shown previously in Figure 1.10 (previous section). The average electricity 
consumption per capita is around 100.23 kWh per capita and is far below the sub-Saharan 
average of 483.12 kWh per capita (Figure 1.14) and the world average of 3,128.40 kWh per capita 
in 2014. The rate of access to electricity is also very low: 34.1% (Figure 1.15) when compared to 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
A
n
go
la
B
e
n
in
B
o
ts
w
an
a
C
o
te
 d
'Iv
o
ir
e
C
am
er
o
o
n
C
o
n
go
 (
K
in
sh
as
a)
C
o
n
go
 (
B
ra
zz
av
ill
e
)
A
lg
er
ia
Eg
yp
t
Er
it
re
a
Et
h
io
p
ia
G
ab
o
n
G
h
an
a
K
e
n
ya
Li
b
ya
M
o
ro
cc
o
M
o
za
m
b
iq
u
e
M
au
ri
ti
u
s
N
am
ib
ia
N
ig
e
r
N
ig
e
ri
a
Su
d
an
Se
n
eg
al
To
go
Tu
n
is
ia
Ta
n
za
n
ia
So
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
Za
m
b
ia
Zi
m
b
ab
w
e
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
21 
 
the sub-Saharan average of 37.38% (Figure 1.16) and the world average of 85.34% in 2014. As 
shown in Figure 1.15, access to electricity has been growing in Benin since 1990; however, from 
2012 to 2013 and 2014, access to electricity has decreased because of the severe electricity crises 
of 2012 and 2013. As explained by Hounkpatin (2013), such crises have significantly reduced rural 
electrification and slow down the connection to the national grid of several remote districts of 
Benin’s municipalities. This situation has led to a reduction of access to electricity in 2013 and 
2014 when compared to 2012. Even among those countries identified by the UN as the least 
developed in the world, electricity consumption per capita remains higher than that of Benin (Figure 
1.14). The consumption for the least developed countries was 182.07 kWh per capita, 195.39 kWh 
per capita, and 205.66 kWh per capita in 2012, 2013, and 2014 respectively compared to 93.12 
kWh per capita, 96.76 kWh per capita, and 100.23 kWh per capita respectively for Benin in these 
same years (Figure 1.14). There is a huge gap between urban and rural access to electricity: only 
16% of the rural population had access to electricity in 2014, while around 57.6% of the urban 
population had access to electricity in the same year (Figure 1.17). The transmission and 
distribution lines are also short, offering only 5,620 km for domestic lines and 618 km for trans-
national lines (World Development Indicators, 2016).  
 
Figure 1.14: Electric power consumption (kWh per capita) in Benin and some regions of the 
world over the period 2012-2014 
 Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
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Figure 1.15: Access to electricity in Benin (% of population), 1990-
2014  
Source: World Development Indicators, (2016) 
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Figure 1.16: Access to electricity in Benin in 2014 compared to other regions of the world 
(% of population) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
 
 
Figure 1.17: Urban and rural access to electricity in Benin, (1996-2014)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
In Benin, the transmission and distribution of electricity are state monopolies. Four government 
institutions are in charge of the electricity generation, transmission, distribution and policy: the 
Beninese Electrical Community (CEB) (Communauté Électrique du Benin), the Beninese Electrical 
Energy Company (SBEE) (Société Béninoise d’Énergie Électrique), the Beninese Agency for Rural 
Electricity Distribution and Regulation (ABERME) (Agence Béninoise d'Electrification Rurale et de 
Maîtrise d'Energie), the Directorate General of Energy (DGE) (Direction Génerale de l’Énergie), 
and the Ministry of Energy. The CEB supplies the distribution companies in Benin and Togo. The 
SBEE is the main distributor of electricity throughout Benin and also ensures the transmission of 
electricity. ABERME is in charge of managing electricity access in rural areas, while the DGE and 
the Ministry of Energy are in charge of the energy sector policy, regulations and reforms. Two main 
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pieces of legislation regulate the Beninese electricity sector. The first is an agreement between 
Benin and Togo, the Beninese-Togolese Act for Electricity (“Code Bénino-Togolais de 
l’Électricité”), which explicitly states the conditions by which electricity may be imported (from 
Ghana) and transported between the two countries. This act was established on July 27th 1968 and 
gave a monopoly on the importation and transportation of electricity to the CEB (République du 
Bénin, 2008). However, on April 13th, 2018, the Beninese parliament amended this act by 
liberalizing the importation and transportation of electricity. The amended act is called “The bill 
authorizing the ratification of the international agreement on the amended Beninese-Togolese Act 
for Electricity” (“projet de loi portant autorisation de ratification de l’accord international sur le Code 
bénino-togolais de l’électricité amendé”). It denies the monopoly of importation and transportation 
of electricity to the CEB and opens the electricity market to private firms, allowing competition 
among them within the electricity sector. Such an amendment might be expected to improve 
Benin’s capacity to import and transport electricity. However, it is a very recent legislation and has, 
as yet, had no effect on the sector (République du Bénin, 2018).  
The second is the Beninese Act for Electricity (“Loi portant Code de l’Electricité au Bénin”) and 
regulates the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in the country. This act also 
regulates the application of international norms in terms of electricity efficiency for both producers 
and consumers (République du Bénin, 2008). Yet, despite these various institutional and legal 
capacities, Benin is unable to meet the national demand for electricity and remains dependent on 
other nations for its electricity supply (République du Bénin, 2008).  
Figure 1.18 summarizes the history of net electricity consumption and generation in Benin. It can 
be seen that from 1980 there has been a growing consumption of electricity in the country. 
Between the years 2005-2010, the need for electricity has greatly increased due to service sector 
and industrial development, as well as greater access to electricity in many rural and urban areas. 
There is also a strong overall growth in net electricity generation since 1980. However, a huge gap 
remains between the consumption and generation of electricity due to the growing electricity 
demand from the residential, industrial and service sectors. To fill this gap, the country has to rely 
on imported electricity. Figure 1.19 summarizes the history of imported electricity compared to 
consumption and generation. There has been a growing dependence on imported electricity since 
1980. As of 2015, Benin imports about 77.575% of its electricity supply from neighbouring 
countries such as Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria (USEIA, 2018).  
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Although Benin has imported electricity from neighbouring countries for many years, this has not 
averted several energy crises occurring in 1984, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013. 
These crises were due to repeated electricity shortages from its two suppliers, Ghana and Ivory 
Coast, which were both facing a growing demand. Other contributing factors to these crises 
included the weakened capacity of the SBEE to distribute electricity, and the droughts faced by 
Ghana in 1983, 1994 and 1998. One of the main risk factors with importing electricity from Ghana 
is drought, which can reduce the volume of water in the Akosombo hydroelectric dam. As a result, 
the quantity of electricity produced by the dam decreases, and Ghana’s domestic supply and 
export of electricity also decrease, hence the quantity of electricity imported from Ghana by Benin 
is reduced significantly. This has been the cause of severe electricity shortages in Benin. This was 
the case with the Ghanaian drought of 1983, which caused the country to reduce its exports of 
electricity to Benin and Togo by 50%. A similar situation occurred in 1994 and caused Ghana to 
limit its exports of electricity to Benin and Togo to 40 Mw that year, while the initial agreement 
Figure 1.19: History of electricity imports compared 
to consumption and generation in Benin (1980-
2012) 
Source: USEIA (2016) 
Figure 1.18: Benin net electricity consumption and net 
electricity generation (1980-2012) 
Source: USEIA (2016) 
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stipulated an expected export of 50 Mw of electricity. A similar situation occurred in 1998 but the 
impact was far worse than during previous droughts because the volume of water in both 
Akosombo and Nangbeto dams was reduced. The Nangbeto hydroelectric dam is owned by Benin 
and Togo and produces a limited quantity of electricity for these two countries. The production of 
electricity by the Nangbeto dam contributes to the domestic production of electricity for Benin and 
Togo. Hence, the situation in 1998 was extreme due to the simultaneous reduction of imported 
electricity from Ghana as well as a reduction in the domestic production from the Nangbeto dam. 
The resulting energy shortage was severe: the initial quantity of electricity supplied to Benin and 
Togo by the CEB dropped from 40 Mw to 16 Mw in February and to 4 Mw in April 1998. Between 
2004 and 2007, another drought occurred, limiting Ghana’s capacity to export electricity to Benin. 
Again, this resulted in Benin experiencing severe shortages in 2006 and 2007 (République du 
Bénin, 2008; Hounkpatin, 2013). The electricity shortages faced by Benin in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s, illustrate the fact that a high level of dependence on imported electricity creates a 
significant electricity supply disruption risk in the Beninese context. 
The resulting reduction in the consumption of electricity during these periods of supply shortage 
negatively affected trade: according to the World Development Indicators (2016), Benin lost 6.2% 
and 9.4% of sales value in 2009 and 2016 respectively because of electricity outages. However, 
whether the resulting decrease in the consumption of electricity (the negative shocks to electricity 
consumption) caused negative shocks to economic growth during the period 1971-2014 (period for 
which data was available for both electricity consumption and economic growth at the time of 
analysis) is still a question to be investigated, as electricity constitutes only a very small share of 
total primary energy in Benin. Figure 1.20 represents the history of the share of electricity 
consumption, biomass consumption (biofuel and waste), and fossil fuel consumption in the total 
energy consumption for Benin over the period 1971-2014. It is important to observe that although 
the share of electricity consumption in the total energy consumption has been growing slowly since 
the 1990s, it is still very low, and has remained below 2.07% over the entire period. At the same 
time, it can be seen that the shares of biomass (biofuel and waste) and fossil fuel consumption are 
very high: 53.41% in 2016 for biomass consumption (the lowest value over the period 1971-2014), 
and 44.38% in 2016 for fossil fuel consumption (the highest value over the period 1971-2014). It 
can also be seen that there is a trade-off between the consumption of biomass and the 
consumption of fossil fuel (their graphs follow almost the same patterns but move in opposite 
directions). In the 1970s and 1980s, biomass consumption has an upward trend, while fossil fuel 
consumption has a downward trend. In the mid-1990s and in the 2000s, biomass consumption has 
a downward trend, while fossil fuel consumption has an upward trend. All this indicates that Benin 
has been making efforts to lower its consumption of biomass and replace it by the consumption of 
another type of energy, which does not involve the use of vegetation products and deforestation. 
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Unfortunately, such a substitute to biomass is not electricity, rather it is fossil fuel, which also has 
environmental consequences.  
 
Figure 1.20: Energy balance comprising the share of electricity consumption, biomass 
consumption and fossil fuel consumption in total energy consumption in Benin over the 
period 1971-2014  
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
According to the IEA Statistics (2018), electricity supply (electricity consumption added to electricity 
losses in the case of Benin) constituted only 2.04% of the total share of primary supply of energy 
(energy consumption added to energy losses) in 2015, while biomass supply (biofuels and waste), 
oil supply, and coal supply constituted respectively 60.8%, 38.6%, and 0.6% of the share of total 
primary energy supply in 2015. According to the World Development Indicators (2018), access to 
electricity and to clean cooking (including electricity) has been growing, but is still very low: they 
remained respectively below 42% and 6.5% over the period 2000-2016 (period for which data was 
available for both access to electricity and access to clean cooking at the time of analysis; see 
Figure 1.21 below).  
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Figure 1.21: History of access to electricity and clean cooking in Benin over the period 
2000-2016  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
All this indicates that the use of electricity is very low in Benin compared to the use of other types 
of energy such as biomass and fossil fuel. Even though the national policy framework for the 
electricity sector (République du Bénin, 2008) emphasized that electricity supply disruptions 
related to outages have impeded economic growth in Benin, there is no empirical evidence which 
demonstrates that negative shocks to electricity supply have caused negative shocks to economic 
growth over the period 1971-2014 (period for which data was available for both electricity supply 
and GDP at the time of analysis). It is, therefore, important to investigate empirically if negative 
shocks to electricity supply have caused negative shocks to economic growth. In addition, with the 
very low use of electricity in Benin, it is not obvious that a causal relationship can exist between 
electricity supply and economic growth. Hence, an empirical investigation of the causal relationship 
between these variables is necessary in order to verify the conclusion of the national policy 
framework for the electricity sector. 
The total electricity generated domestically and through imports does not reach consumers in 
Benin. Although the Beninese Act for Electricity requires a high level of efficiency during the 
transmission and the distribution of electricity as well as the use of energy efficient materials for the 
construction of public and private buildings, electricity losses remain high. These electricity losses 
can be technical or non-technical. As indicated in previous sections, the technical losses are 
mostly due to the technology used during the distribution and the non-technical losses are due to 
theft, default in payments, and so forth. On average 10 to 22% of the electricity supply in Benin is 
lost during distribution (République du Bénin, 2008). Antmann (2009) reported that losses of 
electricity can cost between 0.5% and 1.2% of GDP in many sub-Saharan countries. These losses 
of electricity greatly increase the burden on the Beninese economy, which already has to cope with 
consecutive electricity outages due to shortage in supply. Total losses of electricity have been 
increasing since 1980; such an increase has become huge from 2001 (Figure 1.22). This situation 
is due to an important increase in both the imports and the domestic production of electricity in the 
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2000s compared to the 1980s and the 1990s (see USEIA (2016)), while the distribution system of 
electricity has remained ineffective (see République du Bénin (2008 & 2014)). 
 
Figure 1.22: History of electricity losses in Benin (1980-2015; in billion of kWh)  
Source: USEIA (2018) 
According to the World Development Indicators (2017), losses of electricity in Benin have remained 
above 50% of total domestic generation (electricity produced exclusively in Benin, not imported 
electricity) in the periods 1996-2000, 2006-2008 and 1994 (periods for which data was available on 
the World Development Indicators website at the time of analysis). These electricity losses are far 
above the international maximal target of 12% for energy losses suggested by ECA (2008). Benin 
also has a huge proportion of electricity losses (as a percentage of total domestic generation) 
compared to other regions of the world in 2006, 2007 and 2008 (Figure 1.23 below). According to 
the World Development Indicators (2017), electricity losses as a percentage of electricity 
generated domestically for these years were respectively 81.81%, 56.81% and 61.13%. Figure 
1.24 below represents the history of the share of electricity losses in the total electricity supply 
(total electricity supply is equal to domestic electricity plus imported electricity, or electricity 
consumption added to electricity losses). It can be seen that the value of electricity losses (as a 
percentage of total electricity supply) has ranged from 9.35% to 25.14% over the period 1980-
2015. The percentage in 2015 was 19.35%, far above the international target of 12% maximum 
energy losses. In order to reduce non-technical losses of electricity due to default in payment of 
electricity bills, distribution companies are currently focusing on replacing the current billing system 
with a prepaid system. 
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Figure 1.25 below describes the history of electricity consumption intensity compared to that of 
electricity losses intensity. The vertical axis shows the measurement of electricity intensity (both 
electricity intensity and electricity losses intensity) in Kw/US$, and on the horizontal axis shows the 
years (from 1980 to 2014). Electricity consumption intensity (in Kw/US$) is an expression of the 
amount of electricity consumed in order to produce US$1 (of GDP), and electricity losses intensity 
(in Kw/US$) is an expression of the amount of electricity lost when producing US$1 (of GDP). It 
can be seen in Figure 1.25 that both electricity consumption intensity and electricity losses intensity 
have been increasing on average since 1980 (as shown by their overall upward linear trends). As 
electricity consumption is essential to increase total factor productivity, these electricity losses 
could represent total factor productivity losses and as a result losses in terms of economic growth. 
However, as mentioned previously, empirical evidence is necessary in order to ascertain such an 
assumption.  
According to Antmann (2009), electricity losses represent the amount of grid electricity which 
transits through the transmission and distribution system, and for which consumers (both legal and 
illegal consumers) do not pay. Therefore, electricity consumption is the amount of grid electricity 
that transits through the transmission and distribution system and for which consumers pay. As 
indicated in previous sections, electricity losses include technical losses and non-technical losses: 
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Source: World Development Indicators 
(2017) 
Figure 1.24: Electricity losses in Benin 
over several years (% of total electricity 
supply (domestic production and imports); 
1980-2015)  
Source: USEIA (2018) 
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stolen electricity is a non-technical loss that occurs during the transmission and distribution of 
electricity, and therefore is not included in the calculation of electricity consumption. Increases in 
losses of electricity reduce the quantity of electricity supply that reaches consumers. Therefore, 
losses of electricity create an additional electricity supply disruption risk. 
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Figure 1.25: History of electricity consumption intensity and electricity losses intensity in 
Benin (1980-2014) 
Source: USEIA (2017); World Development Indicators (2016) 
These losses of electricity undermine one of the pillars of the second objective defined in the 
national strategy for access to electricity: the promotion of electricity efficiency on both the supply 
and demand side. Supply side policies aim to reduce transmission and distribution losses. In an 
effort to reduce technical losses, the focus is to modernize the distribution lines and networks by 
replacing old equipment with new, more energy-efficient equipment that aligns with international 
norms. This should be done in the form of a five year project. Regarding the reduction of non-
technical losses, an emergency plan has been established to fight corruption and electricity theft, 
and to verify and improve the electricity billing system. The plan is expected to be implemented 
over a period of two to three years maximum (République du Bénin, 2008).  
The national policy framework for the electricity sector acknowledged that electricity losses 
constitute loss of GDP and are a burden to the Beninese economy. It also emphasized that a 
reduction in electricity losses will allow the economy to gain in terms of GDP. One of the financial 
mechanisms of the development of the electricity distribution network, stated in the national 
strategy for access to electricity, is described in two steps (see République du Bénin, 2008: page 
65). The first step is to reduce electricity losses by 1.5% every year, over the period of five years. 
The second step is to use the gain in GDP that has resulted from a reduction in electricity losses, 
as a contribution to reimburse the cost related to improvements made in the electricity distribution 
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network. However, to date there has been no empirical assessment of the gain in GDP resulting 
from a reduction in electricity losses. It therefore becomes important for policy reasons to 
empirically assess the gain in GDP resulting from the reduction in electricity losses, or in other 
words the losses of GDP resulting from electricity losses.  
As mentioned previously, apart from challenges such as electricity losses and dependence on 
imported electricity, Benin also bears the burden of a high dependency on oil for its domestic 
electricity generation. Figure 1.26 below compares the share of domestic electricity produced 
based on oil in Benin to that of the rest of the world over the period 2005-2014. The vertical axis 
shows the averages of the share of domestic electricity produced based on oil as a percentage of 
total electricity produced domestically, over the period 2005-2014. The abscissa shows the regions 
of the world (including Benin). It can be seen that, compared to other regions of the world, Benin 
depends mainly on oil for its domestic electricity production.  
 
Figure 1.26: Comparison of the share of electricity produced based on oil (as a percentage 
of total electricity produced domestically) in Benin to that of the rest of the world (average 
2005-2014) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Figure 1.27 describes the history of the dependency on oil for domestic generation of electricity in 
Benin. It can be seen that up to 1994 the dependency on oil for domestic electricity generation was 
100%. After 1997, the rate of dependency went below 100% as the country could also rely on other 
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sources of domestic electricity generation such as the hydroelectric dam of Nangbeto. However, as 
of 2014, the rate of dependency on oil for the domestic generation of electricity was still high: 
around 99.46%.  
 
 
Figure 1.27: Electricity production from oil sources (as a percentage of total electricity 
produced domestically) in Benin over the period (1973-2014) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
This dependency situation is also confirmed in Figure 1.28 where the history of domestic electricity 
generation by source is represented over the period 1973-2014. The vertical axis shows electricity 
generated by sources: electricity production based on oil sources (‘oil’ here represents petroleum 
products and crude oil, see IEA statistics (2014)), electricity production based on hydroelectric 
sources, electricity production based on other renewable sources (sources such as solar, wind, 
geothermal, biofuels, tides, and biomass) this excludes hydroelectric sources (see IEA statistics 
(2014)). Electricity generated based on different sources is expressed as a percentage of total 
domestic production of electricity on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis shows years. It is clear 
that the share of electricity produced from oil sources is very high compared to the share of 
electricity produced from other sources. This indicates that the production sources for electricity 
are not well diversified. There is a huge dependency on oil to produce domestic electricity. This 
high dependency on oil is caused by the limited capacity of Nangbeto’s hydroelectric dam, and the 
very weak use of other renewable energy such as solar electricity. A high dependency on oil 
indicates that any increase in oil prices will generate additional costs for domestic electricity 
generation. As stipulated in the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 
2008, pp. 21-22), increases in oil prices have limited the capacity of Benin to promote rural access 
to electricity using electric generators, which consume oil. This situation has slowed rural access to 
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electricity, as the use of other alternative sources of electricity generation (renewable sources such 
as solar energy, wind energy, etc.) is still very weak. Increased oil prices result in budget 
constraints, which can limit the quantity of domestic electricity generated. This, in turn, reduces the 
overall electricity supply in the country. Therefore, it is demonstrated that a heavy dependence on 
oil for the production of domestic electricity results in additional electricity supply disruption risks.  
The reduction in overall supply of electricity can impede economic growth. As stipulated in the 
national policy framework for electricity, supply disruption can negatively affect economic growth. 
However, there has not been any empirical evidence to demonstrate that negative shocks to 
electricity supply can cause negative shocks to economic growth. It becomes therefore important 
to empirically verify whether or not negative shocks to electricity supply do, in fact, cause negative 
shocks to economic growth. 
 
Figure 1.28: Domestic electricity production by sources (as a percentage of total electricity 
produced domestically) in Benin over the period (1973-2014) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017); IEA statistics (2014)  
With all the uncertainties faced by the Beninese electricity sector, the capacity for electricity 
consumption/supply to play its role in sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction becomes 
questionable. Electricity shortages, losses of electricity, dependency on imported electricity, and 
increases in oil prices, all constitute significant electricity supply security risks related to supply 
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disruption in Benin. They have economic costs and influence the performance of the electricity 
sector in the country. The national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, pp. 
68-69) stated different sub-objectives which will contribute to the achievement of its fourth strategic 
goal: the “Development of institutional and legal capacities and the building of human resource 
capacity in the electricity sector”. Several of these sub-objectives aim to define and improve 
performance indicators for the electricity sector and the national distribution company.  
The current state of the electricity sector in Benin, as described in the national policy framework for 
electricity, revealed that high dependency on imported electricity, increases in electricity losses, 
increases in oil prices and lack of diversification of sources of electricity production, all introduce 
major supply disruption risks, however, there is currently no index or framework which can be used 
to assess the performance of the electricity sector taking these risks into account. Therefore it 
becomes important to construct a composite index which will measure these electricity supply 
security risks and thus contribute to the assessment of the performance of the Beninese electricity 
sector. Before assessing the performance of the electricity sector in Benin, it is important to have a 
retrospective view on the different policies which have been implemented in the electricity sector, 
their success, and their failures. 
1.1.5  Overview of past and present electricity policies in Benin 
Prior to March 2004, no national policy framework for the Beninese energy sector had been 
designed. The existing documentation on energy and electricity policies in Benin were Benin’s 
energy strategy (République du Bénin, 1996), the SBEE’s master plan for production, 
transportation, and distribution of electricity (SBEE, 1992), and the CEB’s action plan for 
investment over the period 1988-2003. The CEB operates for both Benin and Togo based on a 
mutual cooperation between these two countries. Each of these countries has some geographic 
advantages that are beneficial to the other. Togo is located at the western frontier of Benin. Both 
countries import electricity from Ghana and Nigeria. Benin uses the Togolese territory and 
electrical lines to import electricity from Ghana, which is located at the western frontier of Togo. 
Togo uses the Beninese territory and electrical lines to import electricity from Nigeria, which is 
located at the eastern frontier of Benin.  The CEB is in charge of managing these importations and 
distribution of electricity for both Benin and Togo, and thus plan for both countries. Both the CEB’s 
action plan and the SBEE’s master plan have focused on supply side policies. Their final goal was 
to enable Benin and Togo to increase their capacity of electricity supply. The lack of a national 
policy framework for the Beninese energy sector translated into the absence of national objectives 
for the electricity sector before March 2004. The electricity sector was regulated and managed 
based on the action plans of the CEB and the master plan of the SBEE before that date. Because 
there were no predefined objectives at the national level before that period, it has been impossible 
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to accurately evaluate the effectiveness of the electricity sector. Evaluations that have been done 
were based on the existing documents of the CEB and the SBEE (République du Bénin, 2008).  
The first objective of the CEB’s action plan for investment over the period 1988-2003, was to see 
both Benin and Togo achieve an electricity supply self-sufficiency rate of 70% by 2003. In other 
words, by 2003, Benin and Togo would ideally import only 30% of their electricity supply. Such an 
objective was established based on the potential future increase of Benin’s domestic capacity of 
electricity production: the construction and commissioning of the hydroelectric dams of Adjarala 
and Ketou. The Adjarala dam was expected to operate by 1995. The second objective was to 
increase the transmission and distribution lines and ensure total access to electricity in the capitals 
of all administrative regions of both Benin and Togo (République du Bénin, 2008).  
The third objective was to build an electrical interconnection with neighbouring countries such as 
Nigeria, in order to facilitate easier electricity trade between countries. The evaluation of the CEB’s 
action plan for investment revealed that most objectives were not achieved. Particularly, the plan 
for the construction of hydroelectric dams to increase domestic electricity production was not 
executed. The goal of a 70% self-sufficiency rate in electricity supply was not achieved. The 
capacity of production has only been increased by 20 Megawatt (Mgw) with the construction of two 
gas turbines. This was far below the objectives. In addition, the electrical interconnection with 
Nigeria, which was planned for 2002, was delayed for five years because of a lack of funding, and 
only started in 2007. Moreover, the objective to ensure total access to electricity in the capitals of 
all administrative regions for both Benin and Togo was delayed. This goal was only achieved in 
2008 when an electrical interconnection was established between North Benin and North Togo 
(République du Bénin, 2008). 
Apart from its action plan for investment over the period 1988-2003, the CEB also undertook other 
initiatives aimed at increasing the production of electricity in Benin and Togo using thermal power 
plants. Two companies were appointed for the production of electricity from thermal sources. The 
first was West Coast Energy Limited (WEL), which was appointed for the construction of a thermal 
power plant at Krake in Benin, and was to supply the CEB with an annual quantity of electricity of 
570 Gigawatt GW) beginning no later than April 15th 2004. The second was the Electrotogo 
Company, which was appointed to repair and use the thermal power plant of Lome in Togo, and to 
supply the CEB by January 1st 2005 with an annual quantity of electricity of 350 GW. Neither of 
these initiatives were successful. The failure of these initiatives can be attributed to the inability of 
the two companies to fulfil the requirements of their appointment. In summary, the CEB did 
undertake different interventions to increase the capacity of electricity supply in Benin and Togo; 
however, lack of financial resources was a major cause of the failure of these interventions 
(République du Bénin, 2008). 
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The SBEE’s master plan for production, transportation and distribution of electricity was to develop 
several thermal power plants in order to complement the quantity of electricity supplied by the 
CEB, which fluctuates due to the amount of electricity it imports. In addition to its domestic 
production, the CEB imports electricity from neighbouring countries, which themselves have been 
facing a growing demand for electricity. Whenever these countries decide to reduce their exports 
due to this internal demand, the quantity of electricity supplied by the CEB is reduced. The goal of 
the SBEE’s master plan for production, transportation and distribution of electricity was to enable 
Benin to fill the electricity gap caused by sudden reductions in the quantity of electricity supplied by 
the CEB, in order to avoid electricity shortages in the country. However, because of the growing 
demand for electricity in Benin, both the supplies of electricity of the SBEE and the CEB were not 
able to fill the electricity supply gap of the country (République du Bénin, 2008).  
Many other reasons explain the electricity deficit or electricity supply gap observed in Benin. First, 
compliance to international norms in terms of distribution line extension is very costly for the SBEE. 
This has limited its efforts to extend the distribution lines in rural areas, and resulted in a high 
proportion of the rural population being left without electricity. In addition to this situation, there 
were very few initiatives related to rural access to electricity using an off-grid system based on 
renewable energy. Moreover, projects for rural access to electricity were not profitable because of 
the low purchasing power of the rural population and a dispersed rural habitat. While there is a 
need to extend distribution lines across the rural habitat, the expense related to this extension is 
very high due to the distance between rural homes and villages; this expense is not offset by the 
purchase of electricity in rural areas because purchasing power in the these areas is very low. This 
situation has been one of the constraints which hinders the nation’s ability to reduce its electricity 
supply gap (République du Bénin 2008).  
The combination of reduction in electricity imports and the existing gap between consumption and 
domestic production of electricity has accentuated the electricity deficit and outages observed in 
Benin. The national strategy for the development of the electricity sector, as stated in the national 
policy framework for electricity, is based on several principles. The first principle is to make the 
Beninese economy very competitive. The second principle provides the necessary tools required to 
achieve the goal. The second principle was established to ensure the availability of production 
factors, including electricity, at an affordable cost in order to see the Beninese economy become 
more competitive. As mentioned in the national policy framework for electricity, outages or supply 
gaps of electricity have affected the Beninese economy (République du Bénin, 2008). However, as 
stated previously, to the best of the writer’s knowledge, there is (prior to this study) no empirical 
evidence on Benin that has ascertained that negative shocks to electricity supply caused negative 
shocks to GDP. As the electricity consumption has never exceeded 2.07% of total primary energy 
consumption in Benin for over 44 years (1971-2014) (World Development Indicators, 2017), it is 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
possible that negative shocks to electricity supply (electricity consumption added to electricity 
losses; see IEA statistics (2018)) have no causal effect on GDP. Hence, empirical evidence is 
necessary to verify if negative shocks to electricity supply have caused negative shocks to GDP in 
Benin. As explained previously, the current study aims to provide such empirical evidence by 
investigating if negative shocks to electricity supply cause negative shocks to GDP in Benin. This 
information will contribute to the understanding of electricity supply security risks and policy in 
Benin. 
While the extension of transmission and distribution lines requires additional cost in rural areas 
compared to urban areas, an assessment revealed that in major urban cities, the distribution lines 
built are insufficient compared to the need for extension of transmission and distribution. This 
situation has resulted in illegal extension of distribution lines by a proportion of the population, who 
though living in urban areas remain without access to electricity. The result has been a saturation 
of distribution lines and low electrical voltage. Such illegal distribution lines have increased the 
non-technical losses of electricity. The Beninese Ministry of Energy had planned to reduce 
electricity losses by 18% from 2005 to 2010, by 15% in 2015, then by 14% from 2020 to 2025 (see 
Table 1.4 below) (République du Bénin, 2008). However, the losses of electricity encountered in 
Benin during the years 2010 and 2015 were above the targets (see Table 1.4 below). 
Table 1.4: Targeted electricity loss reduction for the period 2005-2025 and actual electricity 
losses in Benin during the period 2005-2015 
Years 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
Targeted electricity losses (as a percentage of 
total supply) 18 18 15 14 14 
Actual electricity losses (as a percentage of total 
supply) 16.24 18.56 19.35   
Source: République du Bénin/Ministry of Energy (2008), USEIA (2018) 
As mentioned previously, modernizing distribution lines to be more electricity-efficient is part of 
Benin’s electricity efficiency target aimed at reducing technical losses. Benin has an emergency 
plan to fight electricity theft and corruption, and to improve the electricity billing system, in order to 
reduce non-technical losses. The national policy framework for electricity acknowledged that 
reductions in electricity losses would lead to gains in terms of GDP. It also emphasized that one of 
the strategies for reimbursing part of the cost to modernise distribution lines is to capture the gain 
in GDP resulting from a reduction in electricity losses (République du Bénin, 2008). It is therefore 
relevant to assess the effect of electricity losses on GDP. Benin has also attempted to meet its 
electricity efficiency target by making changes to demand side policies. Firstly, these policies 
encourage the use of electricity-efficient equipment in the construction and usage of public 
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buildings, and in the installation of public lampposts. In addition, they encourage the use of 
electricity-efficient appliances (lamps, air conditioners, refrigerators) and devices using solar 
electricity within households. The implementation of an electricity-efficient policy in public buildings 
has helped the public sector reduce its electricity consumption costs by 402 million CFA in 2007 
(currently, approximately equivalent to US$ 687336.33; according to the exchange rate of April 
30th, 2019) (République du Bénin, 2008).  
The most recent assessment of the energy efficiency policy in Benin revealed that the country has 
a national action plan for energy efficiency called “Feasibility study document for the 
operationalization of the National Agency of Renewable Energy Development and Energy 
Efficiency (ANADER)” (“Étude de faisabilité pour l’opérationalisation de l’Agence Nationale pour le 
Développement des Énergies Renouvelables et de l'efficacité énergétique (ANADER)”) 
(République du Bénin, 2014). This action plan includes targets for electricity efficiency already 
specified in the national policy framework for electricity. The national plan contains energy 
efficiency targets to reduce energy intensity, including electricity intensity, by 4% every year. Its 
objective is to reduce energy consumption, including electricity consumption by 20% in 2025. 
However, there are no sectoral targets in terms of energy and electricity efficiency at the 
residential, commercial and industrial level. One of the strategies for electricity efficiency is to 
diversify the sources of electricity generation by increasing the share of renewable electricity that 
contributes to the total electricity supply, and to limit electricity losses. The national target for such 
a strategy is to increase the share of renewable electricity in the total electricity produced to at 
least 25% by 2025, while reducing electricity losses in transmission and distribution networks 
(Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy, 2018). 
The DGE is in charge of defining the energy/electricity efficiency strategy for the country, while the 
ANADER regulates energy/electricity efficiency for suppliers and consumers of energy/electricity. It 
also certifies compliance with energy/electricity standards in Benin. Recently, a law called Decree 
Number 2018-050 of February 15th, 2018 (“DÉCRET No 2018- 050 du 15 Février 2018 portant 
création et mise en place de l'Unité Chargée de la Politique de Développement des Energies 
Renouvelables (UC/PDER)”; see République du Bénin, 2019) was issued by the council of 
government ministers in Benin to establish the Unit in Charge of Policy for the Development of 
Renewable Energy (UC-PDER), in replacement of ANADER. Although Benin has established 
these institutions (DGE, ANADER, and UC-PDER) to implement its energy efficiency policy, and 
demand side policy has made progress in saving electricity through more efficient construction of 
public buildings, there is still a legislative gap to be filled in terms of creating a binding obligation for 
electricity/energy efficiency in public buildings (Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy, 
2018). Although the implementation of electricity-efficient policies in public buildings by the Ministry 
of Energy has helped the public sector to significantly reduce its electricity consumption costs 
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(République du Bénin, 2008), there is still no binding electricity/energy saving obligation for public 
buildings. There is, however, a public procurement guideline for energy/electricity efficiency, and a 
public budgeting regulation for energy/electricity efficiency. However, there is neither a public 
recognition of electricity/energy efficiency performance for large scale users of electricity/energy, 
nor are there tax incentives or financial incentives for large consumers to invest in 
electricity/energy efficiency. Electricity/energy efficiency targets and electricity/energy efficiency 
audits are not required for large consumers. In addition, there are no penalties in place for the 
violation of electricity/energy efficiency regulatory obligations by large consumers (Regulatory 
Indicators for Sustainable Energy, 2018).  
Figure 1.29 represents a measurement of the energy efficiency policy framework in Benin 
according to a set of 12 indicators (indicator 1: national energy efficiency planning; indicator 2: 
energy efficiency entities; indicator 3: information provided to consumers about electricity usage; 
indicator 4: energy efficiency incentives from electricity rate structures; indicator 5: incentives and 
mandates: large consumers; indicator 6: incentives and mandates: public sector; indicator 7: 
incentives and mandates: utilities; indicator 8: financing mechanisms for energy efficiency; 
indicator 9: minimum energy efficiency performance standards; indicator 10: energy labelling 
systems; indicator 11: building energy codes, and indicator 12: carbon pricing). On the vertical axis 
are the indicators’ scores measured on a scale of 0 to 100, and on the abscissa line are the 
indicators. The scoring system uses a set of questions to collect some information about each 
indicator. Each response to these questions receives a score based on its importance. The score 
of an indicator is the sum of the scores allocated to the responses to questions related to such 
indicator. All the indicators are equally weighted, and the overall score of the Beninese energy 
efficiency policy framework is the arithmetic mean of the indicators’ scores (Regulatory Indicators 
for Sustainable Energy, 2018).  
It is clear that Benin’s energy sector performs well concerning indicators 1, 2 and 4, while its score 
for indicators 3 and 6 are below the average of 50. This indicates that Benin has an energy 
efficiency plan in place. This plan is described in the “Feasibility study document for the 
operationalization of the National Agency of Renewable Energy Development and Energy 
Efficiency (ANADER)”. Benin also has legal institutions in charge of its energy efficiency policy 
such as the Ministry of Energy, the DGE and ANADER (currently replaced by the UC-PDER). The 
country does have some energy efficiency incentives built into electricity rate structures for 
residential and industrial consumers (Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy, 2018). 
At the same time, the scores for indicator 5 (incentives and mandates: large consumers), indicator 
7 (incentives and mandates: utilities), indicator 8 (financing mechanisms for energy efficiency), 
indicator 9 (minimum energy efficiency performance standards), indicator 10 (energy labelling 
systems), indicator 11 (building energy codes) and indicator 12 (carbon pricing) are zero. This 
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indicates that there are no incentives or mandates for large consumers or utilities to invest in 
energy-efficient goods (tax reduction or other financial incentives for large consumers to invest in 
energy-efficient equipment, no penalties to utilities for non-compliance to energy efficiency 
standards in terms of equipment, etc.). There are no minimum energy efficiency performance 
standards and there is no labelling system for energy-efficient appliances or machinery (energy 
efficiency standard and energy labelling system for refrigerators, lighting equipment, air 
conditioners, industrial electric machinery, etc). Although there is an energy efficiency bill which 
describes energy efficiency standards related to public buildings, there are no building codes 
requiring that residential and commercial buildings are constructed in an electricity-efficient 
manner. In addition, there is no incentive for energy efficiency in the construction and usage of 
residential and commercial buildings. Benin does not have a carbon pricing mechanism (carbon 
tax, etc.). This can be explained by the fact the country still has a low consumption of energy per 
capita and the level of greenhouse gas emissions is still low. Finally, there is no direct financing 
mechanism for energy efficiency in Benin, and the overall score of the Beninese energy efficiency 
policy framework is low (23.51) (Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy, 2018). 
 
Figure 1.29: Measurement of Benin’s energy efficiency policy framework according to a set 
of indicators  
Source: Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (2018) 
The indicators respectively refer to: 
Indicator 1: national energy efficiency planning;  
Indicator 2: energy efficiency entities;  
Indicator 3: information provided to consumers about electricity usage;  
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Indicator 4: energy efficiency incentives from electricity rate structures;  
Indicator 5: incentives and mandates: large consumers;  
Indicator 6: incentives and mandates: public sector;  
Indicator 7: incentives and mandates: utilities;  
Indicator 8: financing mechanisms for energy efficiency;  
Indicator 9: minimum energy efficiency performance standards;  
Indicator 10: energy labelling systems;  
Indicator 11: building energy codes, and 
Indicator 12: carbon pricing 
The absence of a direct financing mechanism for energy efficiency in Benin calls into question the 
ability of the country to implement its electricity efficiency policy. The implementation of an 
electricity efficiency policy is costly, the reduction of technical and non-technical losses in particular 
is expensive to rectify. As mentioned previously, reductions in technical losses of electricity require 
Benin to purchase electricity-efficient equipment, while reductions in non-technical losses of 
electricity require some monitoring costs (monitoring of billing systems, monitoring of the legal 
distribution network, etc.). According to the Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (2018), 
there is no direct financing mechanism in Benin to fund these costs. To solve this situation, the 
national policy framework for electricity proposed an indirect financing mechanism, which consists 
of borrowing funds from donors or the national budget to finance the costs related to the reduction 
of electricity losses, and reimbursing the donors or national budget with the anticipated gains in 
GDP that will result from the reduction in electricity losses. Assessing the actual effect of electricity 
losses on GDP is therefore necessary, and will contribute to advance electricity efficiency policy 
implementation in Benin. It will help to forecast the gain in GDP resulting from electricity losses, 
and it will also help to assess the feasibility of the indirect financing mechanism proposed in the 
national policy framework for electricity.  
As stated previously, losses of electricity and electricity shortages limit the available supply of 
electricity to consumers. Therefore, they constitute electricity supply security risks or, more 
precisely, electricity supply disruption risks, and affect the performance of the Beninese electricity 
sector. As also explained previously, there is currently no indicator or index measuring the 
performance of the Beninese electricity sector in terms of the risk of non-occurrence or disruption 
of the electricity supply. The national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, 
pp. 68-69) has defined several sub-objectives aiming to contribute to the accomplishment of its 
fourth strategic goal: the “Development of institutional and legal capacities and the building of 
human resource capacity in the electricity sector”. As mentioned before, the definition and 
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improvement of performance indicators for the Beninese electricity sector and the national 
distribution company (SBEE), are among these sub-objectives. The African Development Bank 
(2013) has established an infrastructure index (“Africa Infrastructure Development Index”) for 
African countries, including Benin, which includes an “electricity composite index”. However, this 
electricity index focuses only on net generation of electricity and does not capture risk as it relates 
to the disruption of electricity supply, which is one of the major issues faced by the electricity sector 
in most African countries. The current study aims to fill that gap by constructing a composite index 
which will measure risk as it relates to disruptions in the electricity supply. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Compared to types of energies such as fossil fuel, biomass and coal, electrical energy is clean and 
easy to use in many different applications such as telecommunications, refrigeration, lighting, 
heating, cooking and transportation. A sufficient and accessible quantity of electricity in a country is 
an indicator of a high standard of living and economic development, as the presence of electricity 
improves the ease of doing business, the standard of living of households, and the productivity of 
all sectors of the economy (Hounkpatin, 2013). Ferguson et al. (2000) argued that wealth is more 
strongly correlated with electricity consumption than it is with total energy consumption. The IEA 
(2002) argued that an electricity service is the most effective way of improving the welfare of the 
poor. Hence, the supply of electricity is a requirement for the social and economic development of 
Africa. According to Turkson and Wohlgemuth (2001), there is consensus on the fundamental role 
of access to electricity for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in African countries. 
Hounkpatin (2013) stipulated that investment in electricity supply capacity should be Benin’s first 
priority if this country aims to pursue sustainable economic growth and reduce its poverty rate.   
However, in Benin, the electricity sector is vulnerable because of three main uncertainties. First, 
there is a huge gap between supply and consumption. Hence, the country has to rely on importing 
electricity from neighbouring countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire for 77.57% as of 
2015. The resulting consequences for Benin have been severe electricity shortages in 1984, 1994, 
1998, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013, because Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire have also 
been facing a growing demand and a limited generation capacity due to droughts. Second, Benin 
encounters significant losses of electricity during transmission and  distribution, and as of 2015, 
these losses of electricity were 19.35% of the total supply. Such losses reduce the available 
quantity of electricity supplied to consumers, and therefore constitute a disruption risk for the 
electricity supply. Thirdly, the country is highly dependent on oil for its domestic generation of 
electricity (Hounkpatin, 2013; World Development Indicators, 2017; USEIA, 2018). Whenever oil 
prices rise, there will be additional costs in the process of generating domestic electricity. This 
constitutes a factor of risk and can limit the domestic capacity of electricity generation. According to 
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République du Bénin (2008), the disruptions to electricity supply had a negative impact on the 
Beninese economy.  
Many studies  have investigated the relationship between electricity consumption and economic 
growth:  Niu, Ding, Niu, Li and Luo (2011), Ozturk and Acaravci (2011), Solarin (2011), Shahbaz, 
Tang and Shahbaz Shabbir (2011), Mozumder and Marathe (2007), Jamil and Ahmad (2010), 
Hsiao (1981), Acaravci, Erdogan and Akalin (2015), Apergis and Payne (2009a&b); Ozturk (2010), 
Payne (2010), Shiu and Lam (2004), Chen, Kuo and Chen (2007), Narayan and Prasad (2008), 
Yoo and Kwak (2010), Tang (2008 & 2009), Chandran, Sharma and Madhavan (2010), Yoo and 
Kim (2006), Ho and Siu (2007), Georgantopoulos (2012), Akpan and Akpan (2012), Bouoiyour and 
Selmi (2013), Shahbaz and Feridun (2012), Acaravci and Ozturk (2012) Narayan and Smyth (2005 
& 2009), Narayan, Smyth and Prasad (2007), Narayan and Singh (2007), Jumbe (2004), Wolde-
Rufael (2006), Squalli (2007), Kebede, Kagochi and Jolly (2010), Ekpo, Chuku and Effiong (2011), 
Zamani (2007), Acaravci and Ozturk (2010), Altinay and Karagol (2005), Ghosh (2002), Yoo 
(2005), Yuan, Zhao, Yu and Hu (2007), Ciarreta and Zarraga (2010), Khobai, Abel and Le Roux 
(2016). Depending on the methodology, the data used, and the countries’ specific context, authors 
have established different results.Very few studies have focused on the Beninese context. Most of 
them are in the form of a cross-country analysis. The most comprehensive of them is the work of 
Wolde-Rufael (2006) on Benin and other sub-Saharan African countries. Such a study is very 
limited in terms of country-specific policy recommendations. In addition, it was done in 2006, and 
the context of Benin has evolved considerably since then. 
To date, no empirical study on Benin has investigated the effects of disruption to electricity supply 
on economic growth. This study will fill that gap by investigating the effects of disruption to 
electricity supply on economic growth. First, this study will contribute to the definition and 
improvement of performance indicators in the Beninese electricity sector by constructing a 
composite index of risks that disrupt the electricity supply. Risk in the context of this study, is 
defined as any factor that can cause disruptions to electricity supply.  As mentioned previously, in 
order to implement its fourth strategic goal (the “Development of institutional and legal capacities 
and the building of human resource capacity in the electricity sector”), one of the sub-objectives 
defined by the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008) is the definition 
and improvement of performance indicators for the Beninese electricity sector and the national 
distribution company (SBEE). A composite index of risks that disrupt electricity supply constitutes a 
performance indicator for the electricity sector.  
With the construction of such a composite index, the current study will contribute to the 
achievement of one of the sub-objectives (mentioned earlier) defined by the national policy 
framework for electricity, and will advance the formulation, monitoring and measurement of 
electricity policy in Benin, especially policies related to the security of the electricity supply. It will 
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also contribute to the body of knowledge as no study in the world (to the best of the writer’s 
knowledge) has established a composite index related to risks that can disrupt the electricity 
supply, which takes into account all the following dimensions of the security of energy supply: 
affordability, acceptability, accessibility and availability of energy. As stated previously, the 
electricity composite index developed by the African Development Bank (2013) does not capture 
risks that can disrupt electricity supply, which are the major cause of electricity crises in Benin, 
Africa and many other developing countries. In addition, it focuses mostly on net generation of 
electricity. The electricity index developed by the World Bank (2018a) is built upon a survey where 
respondents are asked to rank the reliability (absence of voltage fluctuations or lack of disruption) 
of electricity supply based on scores ranging from 1 to 7. Respondents’ allocation of the score can 
be subjective as it is not necessarily based on a quantitative assessment of shortages of electricity 
supply. In addition, such an index only focuses on the availability of electricity supply. Aspects 
related to the use of renewable electricity to ensure the sustainability of electricity supply, and 
issues related to the affordability of electricity are not considered. Affordability of electricity can 
become an issue for many reasons. For instance, increases in oil price can lead to high production 
costs of electricity in countries which depend on oil to generate domestic electricity. High 
production costs of electricity can lead to high prices of electricity both domestically and 
internationally. Hence, importing electricity can become more costly. Disruption to electricity supply 
can occur in poor economies as they may no more afford to import the total quantity of electricity 
that will fill their supply gap.  
Second, the current study will contribute to advancing the electricity efficiency policy in Benin by 
evaluating the effect of electricity losses on GDP. As noted previously, one of the pillars of the 
second objective of the national strategy for access to electricity is the promotion of electricity 
efficiency on both supply and demand sides. In alignment with that pillar, the Beninese Ministry of 
Energy has planned to reduce electricity losses by 14% from 2020 to 2025 (République du Bénin, 
2008). As also mentioned previously, the national policy framework for electricity recognized that 
electricity losses result in loss of GDP, and suggested a financing mechanism to fund the cost of 
activities aimed at reducing electricity losses. As mentioned by the Regulatory Indicators for 
Sustainable Energy (2018), there is no direct financing mechanism to fund the costs of activities 
aimed at reducing electricity losses. The mechanism described in the national policy framework for 
electricity is an indirect financing mechanism. The policy suggested that donors or a portion of the 
national budget can be used to finance the cost of creating a reduction in electricity losses; in turn, 
the resulting gains in GDP once losses are reduced can be used to reimburse the donor or national 
budget. Therefore, it becomes important to assess the effect of electricity losses on GDP. No 
empirical study on Benin thus far has carried out such an assessment. This study aims to fill that 
gap by investigating the effect of electricity losses on GDP. It will help to evaluate the possible 
gains in GDP resulting from reductions in electricity losses, and contribute to assessing the 
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feasibility of the indirect financing mechanism proposed in the national policy framework. It will also 
add to the existing literature on energy efficiency in Benin. 
Third, the current study will contribute to the understanding and formulation of an electricity 
security policy in Benin by investigating if negative shocks to electricity supply cause negative 
shocks to GDP. As already mentioned, the first principle of the national strategy of the 
development of the electricity sector, described in the national policy framework for electricity, is to 
promote the competitiveness of the Beninese economy. In order for the economy to be 
competitive, it needs access to affordable production factors, including electricity. The second 
principle is therefore to ensure the availability and affordability of production factors, including 
electricity. As stated previously, there have been several outages of electricity in Benin due mainly 
to a sudden reduction in electricity imports. The World Development Indicators (2016) reported that 
firms have lost some of their sales values in that country because of electricity outages. The World 
Bank (2016) also reported that 95.6% of firms established in Benin have experienced electricity 
outages. Based on these reports it is possible that outages of electricity have negatively affected 
the Beninese economy. However, the share of electricity consumption in the total primary energy 
consumption is very low in the country. This suggests that it is also possible that outages of 
electricity have no causal effect on GDP. All these justify the necessity to empirically verify if, in 
fact, outages of electricity have caused reductions in GDP. No empirical evidence on Benin thus 
far has demonstrated that outages of electricity have caused reductions in GDP. This study will fill 
that gap by verifying if negative shocks to electricity supply cause negative shocks to GDP in 
Benin. As mentioned previously this study will contribute to the policy dialogue on electricity 
security in Benin, and will also add to the existing literature on energy security.  
Therefore the problem investigated is: the effect of disruption risk to electricity supply on economic 
growth in Benin. 
1.3  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In alignment with the previously stated focus of this study, the general research question is the 
following: What is the effect of disruption in electricity supply on economic growth in Benin? The 
specific research questions are as follows: 
Q1. How does Benin perform in terms of offsetting the risk of disruption to electricity supply? 
Q2. What is the effect of electricity losses on GDP in Benin? In order to calculate the effect of 
electricity losses on GDP, it is necessary to know the effect of both electricity supply net of losses 
and electricity supply under the hypothesis of absence of losses, on GDP. The effect of electricity 
supply under the hypothesis of absence of losses minus the effect of electricity supply net of losses 
is the net effect of electricity losses on GDP. Therefore, this question is divided into three sub-
questions: 
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Q2.1. What is the effect of electricity supply net of losses on real GDP in Benin? In the context of 
Benin, electricity supply net of losses should be understood as the total electricity generated minus 
electricity losses. It can also be defined as electricity consumption, in other words the amount of 
electricity that is distributed to consumers after exclusion of electricity losses. It is measured in 
kilowatt hours (kWh). 
Q2.2. What is the effect of the electricity supply under the hypothesis of absence of electricity 
losses, on real GDP in Benin? In the context of Benin, electricity supply is defined as the sum of 
electricity consumption (electricity supply net of losses) and electricity losses. In other words, it is 
the electricity supply under the hypothesis of the absence of losses, or in a situation where it is 
assumed that transmission and distribution losses are equal to zero. It can also be called total 
electricity generated, which is composed of electricity generated domestically and imported 
electricity. It is measured in kilowatt hours (kWh). 
Q2.3. What is the net effect of losses of electricity on real GDP in Benin? 
Q.3. Do negative shocks to electricity supply (electricity supply net of losses) cause negative 
shocks to GDP?  
1.4  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In alignment with the focus of the research questions, the general objective of the study is to 
investigate the effect of disruption to electricity supply on economic growth in Benin. 
Specifically, the aims are: 
O1. To measure Benin’s performance in terms of electricity supply disruption risks. This will be 
done by constructing an electricity supply disruption index: this composite index will assess the 
country’s overall performance in terms of disruption to electricity supply.  
O2. To evaluate the loss of real GDP resulting from electricity losses. This requires first an 
investigation of the relationship between electricity supply net of losses (electricity consumption) 
and real GDP. Second, the relationship between electricity supply (under the hypothesis of 
absence of electricity losses) and economic growth must also be investigated. As electricity supply 
(under the hypothesis of absence of electricity losses) is the sum of electricity supply net of losses 
(electricity consumption) and electricity losses, the net effect of electricity losses on real GDP will 
be equal to the effect of electricity supply (under the hypothesis of absence of electricity losses) on 
real GDP, minus the effect of electricity supply net of losses (electricity consumption) on real GDP. 
Therefore, this objective is composed of three sub-objectives: 
O2.1. To investigate the effect of electricity supply net of losses (electricity consumption) on real 
GDP. 
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O2.2. To investigate the effect of electricity supply under the hypothesis of absence of electricity 
losses, on real GDP. 
O2.3. To assess the net effect of electricity losses on real GDP. 
O3. To verify if negative shocks to electricity supply (electricity supply net of losses) cause 
negative shocks to real GDP.  
1.5  JUSTIFICATION, SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study aligns with the formulation and implementation of electricity policy in Benin in three 
different ways. First, as mentioned previously, it will contribute to defining and measuring 
performance indicators within the Beninese electricity sector by constructing an electricity supply 
disruption index, which will assess Benin’s overall performance related to managing risk to 
disruption in electricity supply. In doing so, the study will align itself with one of the sub-objectives 
set out by the national policy framework for electricity: this sub-objective is necessary for the 
implementation of the policy’s fourth strategic goal. This sub-objective seeks to define and improve 
performance indicators for the Beninese electricity sector and the national distribution company. 
Constructing an electricity supply disruption index will advance the monitoring and evaluation of the 
electricity security policy in Benin. Such an index will also be a contribution to the body of 
knowledge, as there is currently no composite index in the world to measure overall performance 
as it relates to managing risks to disruption in electricity supply, while accounting for dimensions of 
energy supply security such as the availability, acceptability, accessibility, and affordability of 
energy. 
Second, as said before, the current study will advance electricity efficiency policy in Benin by 
assessing the effect of electricity losses on GDP. In doing so, it aligns with one of the pillars of the 
second objective set out in the national strategy for access to electricity, which is the promotion of 
electricity efficiency on both demand and supply sides in Benin. As stipulated by the Republic of 
Benin (République du Bénin, 2008), the target of the Beninese Ministry of Energy is to lower 
electricity losses by 14% from 2020 to 2025. As explained previously, the national policy 
framework for electricity suggested an indirect financing mechanism aiming to fund the costs 
associated with the reduction of electricity losses. It has been suggested that such a mechanism 
first use funds from donors or national budget to finance the costs and then, use the gain in GDP 
resulting from reductions in electricity losses to reimburse these funds. Assessing the effect of 
electricity losses on GDP will therefore contribute to assessing the feasibility of this indirect 
financing mechanism as set out in the national policy framework for electricity. Apart from its 
contribution to policy, this study will also add to the existing literature on electricity efficiency in 
Benin. 
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Third, as explained previously, this study will contribute to advancing electricity security policy in 
Benin by verifying if negative shocks to electricity supply caused negative shocks to GDP. As 
explained previously, the second principle of the national strategy of the development of the 
electricity sector aims to ensure the affordability and availability of production factors, including 
electricity, in order for the Beninese economy to become more competitive. However, over the 
years, there have been many shortages of electricity in Benin, and according to the national policy 
framework for electricity, these electricity shortages have had a negative effect on the economy. 
The current study aims to verify such conclusions by investigating if negative shocks to electricity 
supply caused negative shocks to GDP. Such verification is important as there currently exists no 
empirical evidence demonstrating that negative shocks to electricity supply have caused negative 
shocks to GDP in Benin. Apart from its contribution to policy, this study will also add to the existing 
literature on electricity security. 
1.6  ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The rest of the study is organised as follows: Chapter 2 measures Benin’s overall performance 
related to managing risk to disruption in electricity supply with the creation of an electricity supply 
disruption index (electricity supply security index). Chapter 3 evaluates the effect of electricity 
losses on real GDP. Chapter 4 verifies if negative shocks to electricity supply (electricity supply net 
of losses) cause negative shocks to real GDP. Chapter 5 concludes the study and summarizes the 
policy recommendations. As it is expected in a dissertation based on articles, each of the chapters 
of this study (except the chapters 1 and 5) is a paper that has its own introduction, literature 
review, methodology, empirical results, and conclusion. Because of this requirement, it is possible 
that some aspects of the study are repeated from one chapter to another, as each chapter 
constitutes a publishable paper.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MEASURING ELECTRICITY SECURITY RISK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several decades, the concept of energy security has become the focus in different 
fields, government, industries, and has also been considered in many countries as a national 
security issue (Vivoda, 2010; Ang, Choong and Ng, 2015). Many factors have justified such 
attention: volatility in oil prices, political instability in energy exporting countries, increasing 
dependency of industrialized countries on energy, military conflicts in energy exporting areas, 
limited oil reserves, climate change issues, competition in access and supply of energy, important 
disruptions in the supply of energy within importing countries, etc. (Vivoda, 2010; Bielecki, 2002; 
Jonsson, Johansson, Månsson, Nilsson, Nilsson and Sonnsjö, 2015; Kaare Koppel and Leppiman, 
2013; Kunz, 2012; Asif and Muneer, 2007; Haghighi, 2007; Aparicio, Pinilla and Serrano, 2006; 
Kim, 2014; Bang, 2010; Constantini and Gracceva, 2004). Both developed and developing 
countries have been working to identify ways of minimizing the vulnerability of their energy sector 
to internal and external risks. For many countries energy security has become an important pillar 
among their national policy targets because a continuous supply of energy is necessary for the 
functioning of the economy. Hence, there have been many attempts to conceptualize, define and 
quantify energy security. However, it is impossible to provide a universal definition of energy 
security, as each definition depends on the people and countries, the types of threats to energy 
security, the social and economic response of countries, the time period (Alhajji, 2007), and the 
type of energy. Hence there is no consensus on the definition of energy security (Ang et al., 2015).  
The focus of the current study is on electricity security. However, because there is a lack of 
literature which provides a clear definition of electricity security, this study will provide different 
definitions of energy security as an attempt to understand electricity security, and will finally 
provide a general definition of electricity security, and a definition of electricity security that is 
specific to the Beninese context. Although the definitions of energy security provided concerns total 
energy, they also apply to specific types of energy such as electricity.  
Some studies focused exclusively of the security of energy supply in importing countries (Andrews-
Speed, 2004; Bahgat, 2007, amongst others), highlighting the importance of availability and prices 
of energy (Spanjer, 2008; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008), while other studies included aspects such as 
the effects on social and economic welfare of energy security risks (Vivoda, 2010). Very few 
studies, such as Platts (2012) and Marcel (2006), focused on the security of energy demand from 
the perspective of the exporting countries. Security of demand is a concern for exporting countries, 
as a reduction in energy demand significantly affects revenues from energy exports, as is the case 
with oil exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia and Russia. Security of domestic energy supply 
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has also become a concern in several energy exporting countries. As they are facing a growing 
domestic energy demand, one of their focuses is to ensure the availability of domestic supply in 
order to meet the domestic growing demand, before any energy exportation. This has been the 
case in the African electricity market with exporting countries such as Ghana. Again, few studies, 
such as Yafimava (2011), focused on the security of the transportation and transit of energy to 
some countries. Transit countries are used by several exporting and importing countries when 
transporting energy. The absence of violence and terrorism in these countries as well as their 
political stability matter for the safe transportation and transit of energy supply.  
Energy security in this study will be mostly analysed from the supply side perspective because of 
lack of data on energy/electricity demand in Benin and many developing countries. There have 
been some surveys on energy/electricity demand at different time periods, but in Benin and many 
developing countries, these surveys have been conducted randomly over time; hence, they are not 
useful for studies that requires times series data. In addition, because these surveys are not 
conducted at the same period of time for all countries, it is impossible to make use of them when 
comparing annually the state of energy/electricity security in Benin to that of other countries. 
Throughout the literature, most studies which attempt to define the security of energy supply can 
generally be classified in three main groups. The first group comprises studies which consider 
security as an uninterrupted supply of energy commodities. One of the advocates of such a 
definition is the United Kingdom (UK)’s Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). 
According to the DECC (2009, p. 19): “Secure energy means that the risks of interruption to energy 
supply, are low”. Other advocates of such definition of energy security include studies such as Ölz, 
Sims and Kirchner (2007), Scheepers, Seebregts, de Jong and Maters (2007), Wright (2005), 
Hoogeveen and Perlot (2007), and Lieb-Dóczy, Börner and MacKerron (2003).  
A few studies (Billinton and Allan, 1996); Makarov and Moharari, 1999) among the first group 
introduced the notion of “reliability” to explain the concept of “low interruption risks” stated in the 
DECC’s (2009) definition of energy security. According to these studies, the “reliability” of an 
energy system implies two sub-concepts: “security” and “adequacy”. An energy system is 
considered to be secured if it is able to remain unaffected by risks, and it is considered to be 
adequate if it is able to ensure consumers’ energy needs at any time. Unlike DECC (2009), 
Billinton and Allan (1996) and Makarov and Moharari (1999), in their framework on “reliability” do 
not define energy security as a state of “low interruption risks”, rather, they define energy security 
as the ability of an energy system to resist risks or adapt to change. While there are slight 
differences in the definition of energy security among studies of the first group, their common view 
is that a rise in the shortage of energy can be interpreted as energy insecurity. 
The second group of studies differentiates between secure and insecure levels of uninterrupted 
energy supply when defining energy security. Small outages or discontinuities in the supply of 
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energy are not necessarily a risk for energy security. The most known definitions of energy security 
among this group of studies are those of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP). According to the IEA (2001, p. 76), “Energy security is 
defined in terms of the physical availability of supplies to satisfy demand at a given price”. The IEA 
(2007, p. 160) defines energy security as: “adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy”, 
and for the IEA (2014, p.13) energy security is the “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at 
an affordable price”. The UNDP (2000, p. 112) argued that energy security is “the continuous 
availability of energy in varied forms, in sufficient quantities and at affordable prices”. According to 
the World Energy Council (2008, p. 1), energy security is “an uninterruptible supply of energy, in 
terms of quantities required to meet demand at affordable prices”. Such definitions imply that in 
addition to interruptions of the energy supply, increases in energy prices above a certain threshold 
are also considered as energy security risks. However, increases in energy prices below such 
thresholds are not considered as energy security risks. A significant number of studies align with 
the IEA’s definitions, such as Andrews (2005), Vicini, Gracceva, Markandya and Costantini (2005), 
Yergin (1988), Luciani (2004), Jun, Kim and Chang (2009), Le Coq and Paltseva (2009), 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (2008).  
Another definition of energy security among this group is that of Mabro (2008, p. 3) who stated the 
following: “Security is impaired when supplies are reduced or interrupted in some places to an 
extent that causes a sudden, significant and sustained increase in prevailing prices”. His definition 
implies that interruptions of energy supply can be considered as an energy security risk only if 
increases in energy prices are beyond a certain threshold. Other studies in the second group 
included in their definition the occurrence of a predictable or unexpected event which can 
determine energy security. Significant among these are McCarthy, Ogden and Sperling (2007), 
Rutherford Scharpf and Carrington (2007) and Spanjer (2007). While most studies of the second 
group agree on the differentiation between secure and insecure levels of energy supply, they 
diverge in their identification of a common secured quantity energy supply because secure and 
insecure levels of energy supply vary from one country to another. A secure level of energy supply 
in one country can be considered insecure in another country. 
Within the third group of studies, first, some studies extended the definition of energy security to 
the impact on the ability to provide energy services. Their definition of energy security is focused 
on the potential impact of energy disruption on the availability of energy services. Significant 
among them are Patterson (2008), Findlater and Noel (2010), and Li (2005). Findlater and Noel 
(2010, p. 2) on gas supply security stated the following: “security of gas supply (or gas supply 
security) refers to the ability of a country’s energy supply system to meet final contracted energy 
demand in the event of a gas supply disruption”. Their statement implies that disruption of gas 
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supply may or may not necessarily affect the continuity of gas services such as heating, cooking, 
and so forth.  
Other studies within the third group extended the definition of energy security to the impact on the 
economy of a country. Significant among these are Bohi, Toman and Walls (1996), Joode, Kingma, 
Lijesen and Shestalova (2004), Grubb, Butler and Twomey (2006) and Lefèvre (2010). The most 
comprehensive is Bohi et al. (1996) who defined energy insecurity as reductions in welfare that 
may arise because of variation in the availability or the price of energy. This definition implies that 
changes in the price or availability of energy may or may not necessarily affect the economy; in 
addition, the economic impact of energy disruptions varies from one type of energy to another.  
Finally, a number of studies within the third group extended the definition of energy security to the 
impact on the environment. Significant among these are Verrastro and Ladislaw (2007), the study 
of the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) (2007), the European Commission (2000), 
and Kruyt, van Vuuren, de Vries and Groenenberg (2009). APERC (2007, p. 6) define energy 
security as: “the ability of an economy to guarantee the availability of energy resource supply in a 
sustainable and timely manner with the energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect 
the economic performance of the economy”. 
The differentiation between secure and insecure levels of energy supply and the inclusion of 
impacts on energy services, the economy and the environment, make the definition of energy 
security very inclusive. However, such inclusiveness is also a disadvantage as it makes the 
concept of energy security difficult to measure. Although there is no consensus on a unique 
definition of energy security, all definitions reflect the idea that energy security implies avoiding 
risks which can lead to an interruption of the supply of energy services, and leave the demand 
unmet. Such interruption of energy supply varies according to the country, the risk context and the 
energy type. Hence, it is worth indicating that each country has its own energy security risks and 
energy security risks vary according to the type of energy (electricity, oil, coal, etc). This study will 
specifically focus on the sustainable security of electricity supply in the Beninese context. 
Based on the idea that energy security implies avoiding risks which can lead to an interruption of 
the supply of energy services, and leave the demand unmet, it is worth defining electricity security 
as an uninterrupted supply of electricity services which satisfies the demand. In Benin, electricity 
supply security risk is mainly related to the inability to cope with sudden disruptions of electricity 
supply. First, the country has a high dependency on the importation of electricity: according to the 
USEIA (2017), in 2015 around 77.575% of its electricity was imported from neighbouring countries. 
Hence, the Beninese electricity sector is affected by any outages of electricity supply which occur 
in its neighbouring countries (exporting countries).  
Second, the country relies heavily on oil for its domestic electricity generation: according to the 
World Development Indicators (2017), in 2014 Benin relied on oil to generate 99.45% of its 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
domestic electricity, while the country is not an oil exporter. This high dependency on oil exposes 
the electricity sector to fluctuations in oil prices. High oil prices constitute a limitation to the 
country’s capacity to generate electricity domestically because they increase electricity production 
costs. In addition, oil, as any other fossil fuel energy, is a limited and non-renewable resource. In 
the perspective of long-run and sustainable energy security, countries should include in their 
energy mix an important share of sustainable energy resources such as renewable energy. 
Increases of the share of renewable electricity in the total domestic generation of electricity will 
therefore contribute to sustainable electricity supply security. In the case of Benin, however, only 
5.55% of the electricity generated domestically came from renewable sources in 2015, and the 
generation of electricity based on renewable sources has never exceeded such amount over the 
period 1996-2015. This indicates that in 2015, 94.45% of the electricity generated domestically in 
Benin came from non-renewable sources. Therefore the sustainability of Benin’s domestic 
electricity production becomes a concern. 
Third, the Beninese electricity sector encounters a high quantity of technical and non-technical 
electricity losses: according to the USEIA (2017), 19.358% of the electricity supply was lost during 
transmission and distribution in 2015. These losses constitute a reduction in the quantity of 
electricity supply available for consumers.  
In the context of the Beninese electricity sector, electricity security risks can therefore be defined 
as exposure of electricity supply to electricity losses, foreign outages of electricity due to high 
dependency on electricity importation, and fluctuations in the price of oil which is a limited and non-
renewable energy resource. Losses of electricity, heavy dependency on importation of electricity, 
heavy dependency on oil/fossil fuel (a non-renewable energy resource for domestic electricity 
generation) therefore constitute three major indicators of the vulnerability of the Beninese electricity 
sector. For this study, five additional indicators will be added.  
The first is a governance index. The “control of corruption” in a country, the “rule of law”, the 
“quality of the regulatory system”, the “political stability and absence of violence”, and “government 
effectiveness”, represent governance indicators (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2017) which 
influence the effectiveness of the delivery of electricity to consumers. An insufficient rule of law and 
an ineffective law enforcement system can cause thefts of electricity. A poor quality of the 
regulatory system and corruption can lead to mismanagement in the distribution of electricity and 
delays in the access to electricity for households and firms. Violence and terrorism can damage 
electricity infrastructure and this can lead to significant disruptions to electricity supply. The 
governance index comprises the governance indicators previously mentioned, and each indicator 
has been converted to positive values by adding 100 for ease of calculation of the index; further 
explanation is provided in the methodology, section 2.4.1.  
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The second is the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to the growth of the 
urbanization rate. The urbanization rate is defined as the share of the population that lives in urban 
areas, and is expressed as a percentage of total population. For ease of comparison between the 
growth of the urbanization rate and the growth of urban access to electricity, this ratio has been 
transformed into a ratio with solely positive values by adding 100% to both numerator and 
denominator (further explanation is provided in the methodology, section 2.4.1). The transformed 
ratio is multiplied by 100 in order to have all its values as percentages. As reported by the IEA 
(2016), rapid urbanization increases energy consumption and in 2013, cities accounted for 64% of 
the world’s use of primary energy. Other studies, such as Sheng, He and Guo (2017) on 78 
countries and Jones (1991) on 59 developing countries, also established that urbanization 
increases energy consumption. Urbanization increases the demand for energy and if the supply of 
energy is unable to meet the demand, then energy shortages occur. In other words, urbanization 
must go along with urban access to electricity/energy in order to avoid disruption to the supply of 
energy, including electricity. The ratio of the rate of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to 
the rate of growth of urbanization compares the urbanization speed to the speed of urban access 
to electricity. It measures the ability of countries to meet the increases in electricity demand caused 
by urbanization, by increasing urban access to electricity. On one hand, if this ratio is less than 
100, it indicates that urbanization is growing faster than urban access to electricity. This situation 
can result in electricity supply disruption in urban areas, as the urban supply of electricity may not 
be able to meet the urban demand for electricity. On the other hand, if this ratio is greater than 100, 
it indicates that urban access to electricity is growing faster than urbanization. Therefore, 
promoting urban access to electricity can help cities to meet their growing electricity demand.  
The third is the rate of access to electricity, which is defined as the ratio of the population that has 
access to electricity to the total population. For the purpose of simplicity it will be expressed as a 
percentage. A rate below 100 indicates that the country has a supply gap as there is a proportion 
of its population that does not have access to electricity. In other words, a proportion of the 
population is left without electricity and therefore is facing a total disruption of electricity. A value 
equal to 100 indicates that the entire population of the country has access to electricity and there is 
no supply gap. Promoting access to electricity can enable a country to minimize the electricity 
supply gap or total disruption of electricity supply. 
The fourth is real GDP per capita (expressed as a percentage of the world annual average real 
GDP per capita; further explanation is provided in the conceptual framework on electricity supply 
security and the methodology, sections 2.2.2 and 2.4.1 respectively). It highlights how wealthy the 
country is, and indicates the country’s ability to avoid or prevent disruptions of electricity supply by 
investing in electricity infrastructure and utilities. A country with a high GDP per capita is financially 
more able to invest in electricity utilities in order to reduce or avoid supply disruptions than a 
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country with a low GDP per capita. As argued by Ferguson et al. (2000), a positive correlation 
exists between countries’ wealth and their electricity consumption.  
The fifth is the share of real GDP that is not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
(expressed as percentage of real GDP; further explanation is provided in the conceptual framework 
on electricity supply security and the methodology, sections 2.2.2 and 2.4.1 respectively). It 
highlights the cost of electricity supply compared to the national income (SeeKendell and James 
(1998)). If the share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply is high, it 
indicates that the country can easily afford to cover the cost of its electricity supply. When the 
share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply is low, it indicates that 
supplying electricity is very costly for the country; in other words, it it difficult for the country to 
cover the cost of its electricity supply. 
The aim of this study is to build a composite index of electricity supply security risks, which account 
for the three major indicators of the vulnerability of the Beninese electricity sector as described 
above (losses of electricity, heavy dependency on importation of electricity, and heavy dependency 
on oil/fossil fuel), plus the governance index, the transformed ratio of growth of access to electricity 
in urban areas to growth of the urbanization rate, the rate of access to electricity, real GDP per 
capita (expressed as a percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita), and the 
share of real GDP that is not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply. Such an index will 
measure the disruption risk to electricity supply on an annual basis. The index does not measure 
the daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly disruption risk to electricity supply, because of lack of data 
(For example, there is no data for the governance index, on a daily, or weekly, or monthly, or 
quarterly basis). However, first a framework will be provided to explain the dimensions of energy 
and electricity supply security. 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENERGY AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SECURITY 
2.2.1  Conceptual framework for energy supply security 
The definitions of energy security have evolved over time according to the context and the types of 
exposure to energy risks. According to Chevalier (2006), the IEA (2007), APERC (2007), and the 
Clingendael Institute/Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) (2004), four main pillars 
(“the four As”) characterize energy security: The first is the “availability” of energy. This implies the 
physical existence of energy resources in an economy or a country. Losses of energy/electricity 
supply reduce the quantity of energy available for consumers. Rapid urbanization without a sound 
plan to promote urban access to energy will cause a supply gap of energy in urban areas. Lack of 
access to energy/electricity by a proportion of the population in a country is due to a supply gap.  
The second pillar is “accessibility”. In many countries, production and consumption of energy occur 
in separate places. Many countries have to import energy from places where there is political 
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instability, or other geopolitical issues. Although energy might be available to be imported, it may 
not be easily accessible. On the other hand, energy may be available in a country, but access to 
such energy by domestic consumers can be a challenge within that country if there are governance 
issues (corruption, lack of rule of law, poor quality of the regulatory system, political instability and 
violence) which affect the delivery of energy to consumers.  
The third pillar is the “affordability” of energy. Although energy might be available and accessible, it 
may not be easy to purchase it at an affordable price. In the oil industry, affordability of energy is a 
concern for importing countries, as oil prices are often volatile. Affordability can also be interpreted 
as a country’s financial ability to invest in energy infrastructure and provide energy utilities services 
in order to prevent or avoid supply disruption of energy among its population. Countries that have a 
high GDP per capita are considered wealthy and able to achieve such a goal, while countries that 
have a low GDP per capita lack the necessary financial resources to enable them to achieve such 
a goal. “Affordability” is therefore an important aspect of energy security.  
The fourth pillar is “acceptability”, which indicates the acceptability of the energy types by society 
(the production or consumption of such energies should not cause heavy environmental damage to 
society), and the sustainability of the energies produced or consumed. The production and 
consumption of many energy types affects the environment. For instance, production and 
consumption of oil/fossil fuel energy pollute the environment by generating CO2 emissions in the 
atmosphere. The generation of electricity using oil also pollutes the atmosphere with CO2 
emissions, and CO2 emissions in the atmosphere are one of the climate change issues. Hence, 
many countries are concerned about producing and consuming energy without damaging the 
environment significantly.  
As explained previously, oil and other types of fossil fuel are limited and non-renewable energy 
resources. Long-term and sustainable production of electricity/energy implies the use of 
sustainable energy resources, such as renewable energy. Ellabban, Abu-Rub, and Blaabjerg 
(2014, p. 749) defined renewable energy as: “energy sources that are continually replenished by 
nature and derived directly from the sun (such as thermal, photo-chemical, and photo-electric), 
indirectly from the sun (such as wind, hydropower, and photosynthetic energy stored in biomass), 
or from other natural movements and mechanisms of the environment (such as geothermal and 
tidal energy)”. The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) defined 
sustainable development as a development which satisfies the needs of the current generation 
without jeopardizing future generation’s capability to satisfy their own needs. Renewable energies 
are unlimited and their stock will still be available for future generations as they can be renewed. 
Therefore, increases in the share of renewable energy in the total domestic production of energy 
matters for a sustainable energy supply security.  
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While previously-mentioned studies have characterized energy security according to concepts of 
“availability”, “accessibility”, “affordability” and “acceptability”, the IEA (2007) distinguishes between 
long- and short-run security of energy supply. Short-run energy security refers to the ability to avoid 
interruptions of energy supply, while long-run energy security refers to structural patterns of the 
energy sector, and the causes of energy supply interruptions. The lack of long-term investments to 
increase energy supply will lead to short-term interruptions of energy supply in the future. 
Although the concepts of “availability”, “accessibility”, “affordability” and “acceptability” have been 
identified as the four pillars of energy security, their importance will evolve over time and according 
to the context. On the one hand, in a world where globalization, multilateralism and market 
cooperation are the pattern, the issue of energy dependence of one region on another will not 
matter, as geopolitical issues will be easily solved. The focus will rather be on the existence of a 
sufficient quantity of energy resources and their production costs. In other words, the focus will be 
on the concepts of “availability” and “affordability”. Conversely, in a world where regionalization and 
political barriers are the pattern, geopolitical issues will matter. The focus will be on energy 
independence, as access to energy in politically unstable zones will be an issue. The attention will 
therefore be on the concept of “accessibility”. 
On the other hand, in a world where sustainable development and climate change issues matter 
and where the production and consumption of energy that has low environmental damage is 
encouraged, the cost of energy may rise, as there is a tradeoff between targeting environmental 
goals and low energy cost. Solving such a tradeoff will require more innovation in science and 
technology to reduce the production costs of environmentally safe energy. This will take time. 
Hence, in such a world the focus will be on the concepts of “acceptability” and “affordability”.  
2.2.2  Conceptual framework for electricity supply security (electricity supply disruption 
risks) 
As discussed in previous sections, the focus in this study is on sustainable electricity supply 
security, precisely on electricity supply disruption risks. The attention is on both short- and long-run 
security. Long-term and sustainable electricity security take into account the ability of countries to 
rely more on renewable energy resources when producing electricity and to be less dependent on 
importation of electricity. Renewable energy resources are unlimited, while fossil fuel energy 
resources used in many countries for the production of electricity are limited. In addition, there are 
always uncertainties related to dependency on importation of electricity. For instance, Ghana is a 
politically stable country and has been exporting electricity to Benin and Togo for decades. 
However, because of natural disasters such as droughts which have reduced the level of water in 
the Akossombo dam and limited its capacity to produce electricity, Ghana was constrained in 1983, 
1994 and 2004 to reduce its export of electricity to Benin and Togo. Therefore, even in the 
absence of geopolitical issues there are still uncertainties which can affect countries’ importation of 
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electricity. Because of this, this study considers dependency on importation of electricity as one of 
the sources of risks for electricity security in both the short and the long run. Countries that are 
self-sufficient in terms of their domestic electricity supply are not exposed to uncertainties related 
to importation of electricity. They may be exposed to uncertainties related to fluctuation of the 
international demand for electricity if they are exporters. As mentioned previously, security of 
electricity demand is not the focus of this study; rather the focus is on the supply side of electricity 
security.  
The analysis of electricity supply security will be based on the four pillars of energy security 
mentioned previously (“the four As”). The security risks related to these traditional four pillars have 
been proxied by a variety of indicators. First, on the one hand, the electricity security risk related to 
the concept of “accessibility” can be proxied by either the share of net imports of electricity in the 
total domestic supply of electricity, or the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency. Such rate is 
defined as the ratio of electricity not imported to total domestic supply of electricity, while the share 
of net imports of electricity is defined as the ratio of net imports of electricity to total domestic 
supply of electricity. The rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency is positively correlated to 
countries’ efforts to avoid disruption to electricity supply. In other words, it is positively correlated to 
the composite index of electricity supply disruption risk (“positive polarity”, further explanation is 
provided in the methodology, section 2.4.1.), whereas the share of net imports of electricity in the 
total domestic supply of electricity is negatively correlated with the composite index (“negative 
polarity”, further explanation is provided in the methodology, section 2.4.1).  
Because of the negative values of net imports of electricity for exporting countries, a geometric 
mean will be used to calculate the electricity supply disruption risk index (all numbers must have 
the same sign, when taking their geometric mean, further explanation is provided in the 
methodology, section 2.4.1), and because of the necessity of a “positive polarity” (see Mazziotta 
and Pareto (2013)), the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency has been chosen as a proxy for 
security risk related to the concept of “accessibility”. Such a rate reflects a country’s ability to be 
self-sufficient in terms of its domestic electricity supply. It also points out the self-sufficiency gap, in 
other words the dependency on importation of electricity (in countries that import electricity). A 
value of such a rate below 100 indicates that the country has a deficit of electricity supply and is 
dependent on the importation of electricity. A value equal to 100 indicates that the country has no 
electricity supply deficit or is self-sufficient in terms of its domestic electricity supply, and a value 
above 100 indicates that the country has a surplus of electricity supply, in other words, the country 
is self-sufficient in terms of its domestic electricity supply, and exports its surplus of electricity. 
Such a rate highlights the exposure of importing countries to outages and shortages of electricity 
occurring in exporting countries.  
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The political stability of exporting countries also matters for easy importation of electricity. It is one 
of the causes of sudden reductions in exports of electricity within exporting countries, and can be 
considered as one of the indicators related to the concept of accessibility. However, because of 
lack of data on exporting countries and the countries to which they supply electricity, the political 
stability of exporting countries has not been included as a proxy for electricity security risks related 
to the concept of “accessibility”. In addition, the political stability of exporting countries highlights 
exclusively the risks related to access to electricity by importing countries: it does not provide any 
information on the degree of a country’s dependency on the importation of electricity. A country 
can rely heavily on the importation of electricity while its supplier countries are politically stable. In 
this case, there is no risk related to political stability, but there is a risk related to high import 
dependency, because exporting countries also face a growing domestic demand for electricity, and 
they can suddenly reduce their exports of electricity in order to meet their growing domestic 
demand for electricity. This has been the case with Ghana, a politically stable country which has 
suddenly reduced its exportation of electricity to Benin and Togo. This situation has been the 
cause of electricity shortages in Benin and Togo. The self-sufficiency rate in terms of domestic 
electricity supply or the proportion of imported electricity highlights – in the case of Benin – the 
exposure of the country to sudden reductions, outages and shortages of electricity occurring in its 
supplier countries such as Ghana. 
On the other hand, the electricity security risk related to the concept of “accessibility” can also be 
proxied by the quality of governance within a country. As explained previously, the effectiveness of 
the delivery of electricity to consumers within a country can be influenced by the quality of 
governance prevailing in such a country. The effectiveness of the delivery of electricity to 
consumers influences consumers’ accessibility to electricity. Consequently, the quality of the 
governance within a country influences consumers’ accessibility to electricity. Five governance 
indicators (“control of corruption”, “rule of law”, “quality of the regulatory system”, “political stability 
and absence of violence”, and “government effectiveness”) (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
2017) have been identified to construct a composite governance index which will be used as a 
proxy for the concept of “accessibility”. 
Second, on the one hand, the electricity security risks related to the concept of “availability” can be 
proxied either by the share of electricity losses in the total supply, or by the rate of electricity 
efficiency. The rate of electricity efficiency is the ratio of the quantity of electricity that is not lost to 
the total supply of electricity, while the share of losses of electricity in the total supply of electricity 
is the ratio of the electricity lost to the total supply of electricity. Losses of electricity reduce the 
available quantity of electricity generated, and they can be technical or non-technical. Non-
technical losses are mostly due to human behaviours such as thefts of electricity. Technical losses 
are related to the technology used for the transmission and distribution of electricity. Countries 
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should try to invest in electricity-efficient technology for transmission and distribution. The rate of 
electricity efficiency is positively correlated with a country’s effort to avoid disruption to electricity 
supply. In other words, it is positively correlated with the composite index of electricity supply 
disruption risk (“positive polarity”; further explanation is provided in the methodology section 2.4.1). 
The share of electricity losses in total supply is negatively correlated with countries’ effort to avoid 
disruption to electricity supply. Therefore, it has not been chosen. Rather, the rate of electricity 
efficiency has been chosen as a proxy for the concept of “availability”: it highlights a country’s 
ability to reduce the losses of electricity, and it also points out the electricity efficiency gap, in other 
words the proportion of losses of electricity in the total supply.  
On the other hand, the electricity security risks related to the concept of “availability” can also be 
proxied by the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to the growth of the 
urbanization rate, or the rate of access to electricity. As mentioned previously, for ease of 
comparison between the growth of the urbanization rate and the growth of urban access to 
electricity, the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to growth of the urbanization 
rate has been transformed (further explanation is provided in the methodology, section 2.4.1). As 
reported by the IEA (2016), Sheng et al. (2017) on 78 countries, and Jones (1991) on 59 
developing countries, urbanization increases energy consumption. As explained previously, if 
countries fail to promote urban access to electricity, the available supply of electricity in urban 
areas may not be able to meet the urban demand. Consequently, a supply disruption of electricity 
may occur in urban areas. As said before, the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas 
to growth of the urbanization rate compares the speed of urban access to electricity to the speed of 
urbanization expressed as a percentage. If the value is less than 100, it indicates that the available 
urban supply of electricity may not be able to meet the demand. Conversely, if its value is greater 
than or equal to 100, it indicates that promoting urban access to electricity can help to satisfy the 
increased demand for electricity caused by urbanization.  
The rate of access to electricity indicates the existence or not of a supply gap in the country. As 
said previously, it is defined as the proportion of the total population that has access to electricity. 
In other words, it is the ratio of the population that has access to electricity to the total population. If 
the rate of access to electricity is less than 100%, this indicates that a proportion of the population 
does not have access to electricity. This situation is due to a supply gap, and indicates that the 
available electricity in the country is not enough to satisfy the electricity needs of the entire 
population and the country does not have enough financial resources to provide full access to 
electricity to its entire population. For the proportion of the population that does not have access to 
electricity, this situation is comparable to a total and continual disruption of electricity supply. 
Conversely, if the rate of access to electricity is equal to 100%, this indicates that the entire 
population of the country has access to electricity. In other words, there is no electricity supply gap 
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or none of the population is facing a total and continual disruption of electricity supply. A country 
with a high rate of access to electricity has a smaller supply gap of electricity to fill while a country 
with a low rate has a high supply gap to fill. The rate of access to electricity is therefore a 
decreasing function of electricity supply gap. In other words, it is a decreasing function of a total 
and continual disruption of electricity. Increasing access to electricity will contribute to reduce the 
supply gap of electricity or total disruption of electricity supply. 
Third, following APERC (2007), the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of 
electricity will be used as a proxy of the electricity security risks related to the concept of 
“acceptability”. APERC (2007) argued that the share of renewable and nuclear energy in the total 
supply of energy can be used as an indicator for the concept of acceptability. It represents the 
“share of zero carbon fuel” in the total fuel supply and is considered as a country’s efforts to 
increase its use of low carbon intensive energy and decrease its use of high carbon intensive 
energy. It also represents countries’ efforts to have sustainable sources of electricity production. As 
said previously, renewable energies are unlimited energy resources, while fossil fuels are limited 
energy resources. For the sustainability of their energy supply security, countries should increase 
the share of sustainable energy resources such as renewable energy in their total energy supply. 
Gnansounou (2008) argued that increasing the share of renewable electricity in the total supply is 
one of the ways of diversifying the sources of electricity generation. Hence, the share of renewable 
electricity in the total domestic production of electricity can also be considered as an indicator of 
diversification of sources of electricity generation. In alignment with Gnansounou (2008), Kruyt et 
al. (2009) stipulated that a diversity of sources of energy supply enables countries to mitigate risks 
related to physical disruption of supply. 
Fourth, the electricity security risks related to the concept of “affordability” can be proxied by the 
price of electricity or the share of electricity expenditures in real GDP, or real GDP per capita. Real 
GDP per capita indicates countries’ ability to improve the standard of living of their population by 
investing in electricity infrastructure and providing utility services such as electricity to their 
populations with the purpose of preventing or avoiding supply disruption of electricity among these 
populations. As mentioned before, Ferguson et al. (2000) argued that there is a positive correlation 
between a country’s wealth and its energy consumption. Countries that have high real GDP per 
capita are more financially capable of investing in electricity infrastructure and utilities in order to 
avoid disruption of electricity supply among their populations, while countries that have a low real 
GDP per capita are less financially capable of achieving such goals. Real GDP per capita is 
therefore an increasing function of countries’ financial ability to finance electricity infrastructure or 
utilities services in order to prevent or avoid disruption of electricity supply. For the purpose of 
simplicity and in order to avoid having an indicator with a very high numerical range, a relative 
measure of real GDP per capita is used in this study. Real GDP per capita is expressed here as a 
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percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita (further explanation is provided in the 
methodology section 2.4.1).  
Kendell (1998) argued that energy expenditures are an indicator of energy affordability. Their 
rationale is that high energy expenditures indicate that a country has some difficulties in supplying 
energy. They recommend using the share of energy expenditures in income. The USEIA (2018) 
has also used the share of energy expenditures in GDP to highlight the importance of energy in the 
economies of the United States and other countries. Economies for which the share of energy 
expenditures in GDP is high are more vulnerable to increases in energy prices, because the 
increase in energy costs resulting from increases in energy prices is significant. Because of a lack 
of data on electricity prices in Benin and many other African countries, the concept of affordability 
with electricity prices cannot be proxied in this study. Rather, in alignment with Kendell (1998), 
either the ratio of the total cost of electricity supply to real GDP or the share of real GDP which is 
not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply (which is equal to total real GDP minus the 
share of real GDP dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply) will be used. The ratio of the 
total cost of electricity supply to real GDP highlights the proportion of real GDP dedicated to cover 
the cost related to electricity supply.  
On the one hand, a high proportion of real GDP dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
indicates that supplying electricity is very costly for the country, and affordability of electricity by the 
country may become an issue if there are some unpredicted negative shocks to real GDP. This 
situation can result in a limited capacity for the country to purchase electricity: consequently supply 
disruption can occur. On the other hand, a low proportion of real GDP dedicated to cover the cost 
of electricity supply indicates that supplying electricity is not very costly. In other words, electricity 
is affordable by the country. In the same way, if the share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the 
cost of electricity supply is high, this indicates that supplying electricity is not very costly, and is 
affordable by the country. However, if the share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of 
electricity supply is low, this indicates that supplying electricity is very costly for the country, and 
affordability of electricity by the country may become an issue if unpredicted negative shocks affect 
real GDP. Such a situation can result in disruption of electricity supply in the country.  
Between these two indicators (ratio of the total cost of electricity supply to real GDP and the share 
of real GDP which is not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply), this study uses the share 
of real GDP which is not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply as a proxy for the concept 
of “affordability” because its numerical range is very similar to that of the other indicators used in 
the calculation of the composite index of electricity supply disruption risk. The ratio of the total cost 
of electricity supply to real GDP has a very small numerical range when compared to the numerical 
ranges of the other indicators used in the calculation of the composite index of electricity supply 
disruption risk. In addition, for an easy interpretation of the composite index, it is important that all 
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the indicators included in its calculation have similar numerical interpretation; in other words it is 
important that all these indicators are positively correlated with the composite index (“positive 
polarity”; see Mazziotta and Pareto (2013). Further explanation is provided in the methodology 
section 2.4.1.  
Small values of all the previous indicators highlight a low performance in terms of effort to avoid a 
disruption to electricity supply, while high values of these indicators point out a high performance in 
terms of effort to avoid disruption to electricity supply. Only the numerical interpretation of the 
share of real GDP which is not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply aligns with the 
numerical interpretation of the previous indicators. As mentioned previously, high values of the 
share of real GDP which is not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply, indicate that 
supplying electricity is not costly for the country. In other words, the country is financially capable to 
invest in electricity infrastructure that will prevent disruption to electricity supply. Conversely, low 
values of the share of real GDP which is not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
indicate that supplying electricity is costly for the country. In other words, the country financially 
struggles to invest in electricity infrastructure that will prevent disruption to electricity supply. 
Based on these four pillars of energy security and the proxies used as indicators of electricity 
security risks, the following framework of electricity security (Figure 2.1) has been designed to 
depict a composite index of electricity supply disruption risks. Before describing the procedure 
used for the construction of such composite index, it is important to review past studies on energy 
security indicators and indexes. 
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Figure 2.1: Summary of conceptual framework for electricity supply security 
Source: Author’s own conceptualization based on Chevalier (2005), IEA (2007), APERC (2007), 
and CIEP (2004) 
2.3  Review of past studies on energy security indicators and indexes 
Throughout the literature, there have been several studies which have attempted to measure 
energy security. Some have analysed only one aspect of energy security, while others have 
attempted to measure several aspects using either an aggregated or a disaggregated indicator. 
Although many of these indicators have attempted to quantify one or several aspects of energy 
security, most of them have been designed based on a certain context, and they are subject to 
improvement or change as contexts evolve.  
2.3.1  Studies on disaggregated indicators of energy security 
First, the availability or physical existence of energy is important for the security of the energy 
supply. As a result, the “resources estimates” have been used as an indicator of the availability of 
energy. However, there are issues related to the available quantity of hydrocarbon resources and 
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their possible extraction. Among the few studies which attempted to estimate fossil fuel resources, 
the United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2000) is the most comprehensive. While some 
studies, such as Mulders, Hettelaar and van Bergen (2006), argued that USGS (2000) is the most 
reliable source for energy resource estimates, other studies, such as Greene, Hopson and Li 
(2005), highlighted the limitations of the USGS (2000) in measuring energy estimates. Hence there 
is a lack of consensus among studies with regard to the measurement of available resources. 
Second, as stipulated by Feygin and Satkin (2004), the reserves to production ratios (R/P ratios or 
RPRs) had been used as an indicator of security of energy supply in several studies. It can also be 
defined as the remaining years of production considering the current speed, quantity or level of 
production. This indicator is highly dependent on time, as both existing reserves and production of 
energy resources are not static but evolve over time.  
Third, another indicator of energy security that has been used is the “diversity index”. The most 
comprehensive studies which explained the concept of diversity in the context of energy security, 
are the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) (2007), Jansen, van Arkel and Boots (2004) 
and the IEA (2004, 2007). Jansen et al. (2004) and APERC (2007) argued that a diversity of 
energy types and geographical location of production and importation of energy will contribute to 
reduce energy security risks related to supply. According to the IEA (2004, 2007), a diversity of 
energy suppliers is a way of reducing energy security risks related to market power. A diversity 
index is therefore a quantitative measurement of either the diversity of energy types and sources of 
production or the diversity of energy suppliers.  
Stirling (1999) stipulated that a diversity index comprises three aspects. One aspect, called the 
“variety”, is defined as the “number of categories”. Another aspect, called the “balance”, is defined 
as “the spread across categories”. A third aspect, called the “disparity”, is defined as “the degree to 
which categories are different from each other”. In practice, measuring aspects related to disparity 
are very challenging, hence most diversity indexes focus on aspects of “variety” and “balance”. 
One of the limitations of diversity indexes as indicators of energy security is that they do not 
capture risks related to each energy type. Each type of energy carries different types of risks. Risks 
related to electricity supply are not exactly the same as risks related to gas or oil supply. In 
addition, diversification of energy types, sources and suppliers will not necessarily prevent physical 
disruption of energy supply. Price shocks can occur as a result of unexpected geopolitical issues or 
natural disasters, and can be transmitted from one energy market to another and this can lead to 
physical disruption of an energy supply. 
Fourth, another indicator of energy security that has often been used is “import dependency”, 
which can be measured for total energy as well as disaggregate energy, and is expressed in 
monetary form or as a percentage of total or disaggregate energy consumption. In the oil sector, 
for instance, the total oil imported relative to total oil consumption can be used to indicate “import 
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dependency” (Alhajji and Williams, 2003). Because some countries import and export oil, gas 
and/or electricity, it is important to use net imports in the calculation of the “import dependency” 
indicator. Net imports are obtained after subtracting exports from imports. Net imports reflect 
accurately the “import dependency” of the economy in terms of energy.  
APERC (2007) improved the “import dependency” indicator by including some diversity aspects: it 
used an adapted version of the Shanon index to measure both the import dependency and the 
energy diversity of an economy. In a context of mutual dependency in terms of energy, the 
international trade of energy, or the energy traded globally, can be used as indicators of mutual 
dependency. As said in the previous section, in the context of globalization and cooperation, an 
“import dependency” indicator will not matter, as there will be fewer barriers to importation of 
energy. Conversely, in the context of regionalization, an “import dependency” indicator will matter, 
as there will be political and economic barriers to importation of energy. 
Fifth, another indicator of energy security widely used is the “political stability” of supplier countries. 
In many countries, the government directly oversees the supply of energy or regulates the energy 
market. A stable government and fair regulations matter for both importing and exporting countries. 
Political instability, such as military coups, can affect the energy trade between countries. Some 
studies such as IEA (2007) used an average of two of the World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (2018) – “regulatory quality” and “political stability and absence of violence and 
terrorism” – to calculate the “political stability” score of each country. Other studies such as Jansen 
et al. (2004) calculated the long-term social and political risk of each country using UNDP 
indicators such as the Human Development Index.  
Sixth, another indicator of energy security that has been used is energy price. This is an 
expression of energy supply as related to energy demand or vice versa. Energy prices balance 
supply and demand, and they are also an indication of economic impact. A reduction in oil prices 
affects the economy of countries whose production systems are not diversified and whose main 
export is oil. Energy prices can also indicate the scarcity of energy resources. However, Kruyt et al. 
(2009) argued that there are some limitations when using energy prices as an indicator of energy 
security: in the oil sector, for instance, oil prices can be influenced by speculation. 
Seventh, another indicator of energy security is the “Mean Variance Portfolio” (MVP) which is often 
used in contexts of diversification of energy generation sources. The MVP is used for optimization 
of different investment options according to their costs and risks. It is often used to assess the 
financial viability of electricity generating projects (Awerbuch and Berger, 2003; Awerbuch, 2006) 
and other energy projects (Lesbirel, 2004) and to predict future energy costs and risks such as 
price volatility. It accounts for the energy generating unit costs and the variance, as well as the 
correlation between energy costs.  
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One of the advantages of using the MVP to assess the financial viability of energy projects is that 
rather than offering only one investment option for energy projects, it provides a cost-risk frontier 
(also called the “efficient frontier”) beyond which the cost of investing in energy projects cannot be 
reduced without increasing the uncertainties and risks, and the uncertainties and risks related to 
energy projects cannot be reduced without increasing the investment costs. In a context of energy 
insecurity and necessity to diversify the sources of energy generation, the use of the MPV helps to 
analyse different energy diversification options according to their financial costs, and to predict 
future energy security risks and their associated costs. One of the limitations of the MVP is that it 
uses past data on energy costs to predict future energy prices and risks. As argued by Stirling 
(1999), in a context where there is no information on the future, there is no evidence that future 
patterns will be similar to past patterns. 
Eighth, another indicator of energy security is the “share of zero-carbon fuels”, which has been 
used by APERC as an indicator of “acceptability”. The aim was to measure countries’ efforts to 
transition their energy mix portofolio from carbon intensive to non-carbon intensive. APERC (2007) 
uses the share of nuclear and renewable energy in the total supply of primary energy as a proxy 
for such indicator. However, concerns about the acceptability of nuclear energy have been raised 
and therefore APERC’s (2007) approach to proxy the “share of zero-carbon fuels” is still 
questionable.  
Ninth, another indicator of energy security is “market liquidity”, which is related to price elasticity. It 
is the ability of markets to adapt to fluctuations in demand and supply of energy. The IEA (2004) 
defines “market liquidity” as a function of the ratio of total energy consumption to total available 
energy on the market. In stock markets, Datar (2000) suggested proxying “market liquidity” by a 
“coefficient of elasticity of trading (CET)”, which is defined as the ratio of the relative variations in 
volume of trade to the relative variations in price. A value of CET that is greater than one indicates 
that the stock market is elastic, and a value of CET that is less than one indicates that the stock 
market is inelastic. 
Tenth, there are some energy demand side indicators which are relevant to the security of energy 
supply as they help to measure the magnitude and impacts of disruption in energy supply. Among 
them are “energy intensity”, “energy consumption per capita”, and the “share of energy used”. 
“Energy intensity” is defined as the ratio of total energy consumption to GDP, while “energy 
consumption per capita” is defined as the ratio of total energy consumption to total population. The 
“share of energy used” indicates the proportion of energy used in a sector. If a sector uses high 
proportions of a particular energy type, this indicates that that sector is highly dependent on that 
energy type to function. For instance the share of oil used in the transportation sector is important 
and indicates the dependency of the sector on oil. In addition to these three indicators, Kendell 
(1998) included “energy expenditures”, another demand side indicator, among energy security 
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indicators. Although it is a demand side indicator, it can be used to highlight risks related to 
disruption of the energy supply. The rationale is that high energy expenditures in a country imply 
that it faces great difficulties in supplying energy, and disruption of energy supply can occur. 
Eleventh, another indicator of energy security is the electricity index developed by the African 
Development Bank (2013). Although it is called electricity composite index, it only focuses on the 
generation of electricity. It is defined as the net generation of electricity and is measured in KWh 
per hour and per inhabitant. The limitation of such an indicator is that it only focuses on one pillar 
of energy/electricity security: the availability of energy/electricity. In addition it is only calculated for 
African countries. 
2.3.2  Studies on aggregated indicators (indexes) of energy security 
There have been several composite indexes of energy security (energy affinity index, geoeconomic 
vulnerability index, security of supply index, geopolitical energy security measure, risky external 
energy supply index, etc.), among which six are the most comprehensive. The first is Jansen et 
al.’s (2004) aggregated indicator which uses the “Shanon index” to account for diversity of energy 
types supplied and diversity among suppliers of each type of imported energy. Each supplier of an 
imported energy type is allocated a political stability weight based on a modified version of the 
UNDP Human Development Index. The rationale is that politically stable suppliers have more 
weight than those that are politically unstable. In addition to considerations of political stability, 
other aspects such as resource depletion are added to the aggregate indicator. Resource depletion 
is measured by a depletion index which is allocated to the energy-exporting countries. The 
rationale for this index is that markets will respond to a low value of a ratio of reserve to production. 
Low values of such a ratio indicate that the energy reserves are decreasing, and this can lead to a 
situation of energy scarcity.  
While Jansen et al.’s (2004) aggregated indicator is related to several dimensions of energy 
security, it has some limitations. The IEA (2007) argued that there is no objective basis to balance 
between resource depletion, political stability, diversity of energy types, and diversity of suppliers of 
imported energy types, and there is no objective threshold as a basis to analyse the reserve-to-
production ratio. Moreover, the diversity of suppliers of imported energy types can become 
irrelevant in a context of globalization, as there will be fewer political barriers to imports of energy. 
The second is the “IEA’s energy security index” which is composed of different indicators. The first 
targets the physical availability of energy and is relevant for markets where energy prices are 
regulated. The second indicator uses a Herfindhal–Hirschman Index to evaluate market 
concentration among energy suppliers. It specifically targets risks related to energy prices. Aspects 
related to political stability have been included in the IEA’s index using two of the World Bank’s 
“worldwide governance indicators”. The limitation of the IEA’s energy security index is that there is 
no objective basis to balance between political stability and concentration of energy suppliers. In 
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addition, some important aspects of energy security such as depletion of energy resources are not 
included in the construction of the IEA’s energy security index.  
The third is the “supply demand index (S/D index)” developed by Scheepers et al. (2007). It is very 
comprehensive as it covers many aspects of energy security such as energy supply and demand, 
energy conversion and transportation in both long and medium run. Each aspect of energy security 
is allocated a score based on criteria such as energy efficiency, energy refinery, energy reserve, 
energy storage, sources of energy supply, etc. One of the advantages of the S/D index is that it 
accounts for the demand aspect of energy security while many of the previous indexes and 
indicators do not. However, because it covers many aspects of energy security, it has become 
complex and lacks transparency.  
The fourth is the “willingness to pay” developed by Bollen (2008). It is defined as the share of GDP 
a country is willing to pay in order to reduce energy security risks. It is expressed in monetary 
terms and represents the costs to pay in order to reduce energy security risks. The rationale is that 
the higher the risks, the higher the costs to pay. The energy security risks included in Bollen’s 
(2008) “willingness to pay” are energy intensity, import dependency, and share of oil and gas in the 
total primary energy supply. One of its limitations is that some of the indicators may not be relevant 
depending on the worldview. Issues of import dependency may not be relevant in a context of 
globalization where there are fewer political barriers to importation of electricity. 
The fifth is the “oil vulnerability index” of Gupta (2008). This index has seven components: “ i) the 
ratio of net value of imported oil to GDP; ii) the ratio of oil consumption to GDP; iii) GDP per capita; 
iv) the proportion of oil supply in the total energy supply; v) the ratio of internal energy reserves to 
oil consumption; iv) exposure to geopolitical risks related to oil supply concentration, and vii) 
“market liquidity” (see Gupta, 2008, p.1196). Weights were assigned to each of these indicators 
using a statistical tool named principal component analysis (PCA), based on the covariance 
between indicators. The allocation of weights based on the PCA methodology has increased the 
robustness of the “oil vulnerability index” compared to other energy security indexes where weights 
are allocated without any objective basis. However, as with the MVP theory, the “oil vulnerability 
index” is criticized for using past values of covariance to predict future information related to the set 
of indicators which compose the oil vulnerability index.  
The sixth is the World Bank (2018a) index that measures the quality of electricity supply. Such an 
index is based on a participatory approach, which consists of a survey where respondents are 
asked to rank the reliability of electricity supply (absence of voltage fluctuations or lack of 
disruption) in their countries, using scores ranging from 1 to 7. The limitation of such an index is 
that respondents’ allocation of scores to rate the reliability of electricity supply can be subjective 
and biased. In addition, such an index does not take into account important pillars of 
energy/electricity security such as acceptability. 
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2.3.3  Contribution of this study 
A research paper of this nature can contribute to the advancement of knowledge in three areas: 
theory and concept, application (policy), and methodology.  
First, this study’s contribution is in terms of application or policy. Studies on disaggregate indicators 
of energy security have focused mostly on one or two particular pillars of energy security; hence 
they are very limited in terms of measuring the whole spectrum of energy security. Studies on 
aggregate indicators of energy security have accounted for several pillars of energy security. 
However, most of them have focused on either total energy or a particular type of energy such as 
oil. To the best of the writer’s knowledge, there is no study which has constructed an aggregate 
indicator (index) of electricity security risk which takes into account the whole spectrum of energy 
security (availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability). The index developed by the 
World Bank (2018a) to measure the quality of electricity supply does not take into account the 
whole spectrum of energy/electricity security. Important aspects such as the use of electricity 
produced based on renewable sources in order to ensure the sustainability of electricity supply 
security (part of the energy security pillar called acceptability) are not included in its construction. 
Therefore, the use of such index is very limited when it comes to the implementation of policies 
that will ensure the sustainability ofelectricity supply security. As mentioned previously, the 
electricity index developed by the African Development Bank (2013) focused mostly on the 
availability of electricity (net generation). Other pillars of energy/electricity security (accessibility, 
affordability, and acceptability) are not included in its construction, and it is only calculated for 
African countries. Therefore, its use is also very limited when it comes to the implementation of 
policies that can ensure the sustainability of electricity supply security. This study has filled that 
gap by constructing a composite index of electricity security which takes into account the whole 
spectrum of energy security. Such an index is relevant for policy in the field of electricity security. It 
focuses essentially on security risks related to supply disruption of electricity in both the short and 
the long run.  
Long-run and sustainable electricity security is essential for countries relying heavily on non-
renewable energy resources to produce electricity. In addition, in the long run, countries aim to be 
self-sufficient in terms of electricity supply, because there are always uncertainties and risks 
related to dependency and importation of electricity. The study has not modelled the security risk 
index related to fluctuations in electricity demand: the electricity security risk index has been 
constructed only from the supply side perspective. A composite index of electricity supply security 
risk (electricity supply disruption risk) will be a great tool for policy makers in the assessment of the 
vulnerability of countries’ electricity supply. It will also be an important tool in the assessment of the 
ease of doing business in various countries, as easy access to electricity and affordable electricity 
are important indicators of the ease of doing business in a geographic area.  
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The study has generated a data set that measures annual disruption risk to electricity supply over 
17 years (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2015) for more than 172 countries (see the data set for the 
measurement of electricity security risk in Dakpogan (2018)). Such a data set will be useful for 
simulations and policy decision in the field of electricity security. Such a data set is the first 
extensive database that measures disruption risk to electricity supply for all countries of the world 
(countries for which data is available for each sub-component of the composite index of disruption 
risk to electricity supply). Therefore, this study adds value to the body of knowledge in the field of 
energy security in general and in the field of electricity security in particular. 
Second, the study brings a methodological contribution by providing a model to measure disruption 
risk to electricity supply in urban area. Such a model is the ratio of change in the growth rate of 
access to electricity in urban area to change in the growth rate of urbanisation (RUB), and was 
previously non-existent (further explanation is provided in the methodology section 2.4.1). In 
addition, for the construction of the composite index of disruption risk to electricity supply this study 
has developed a new variable which was previously non-existent: the governance index (GI) 
(further explanation is provided in the methodology section 2.4.1). Moreover, the study developed 
a formula to measure the disruption risk to electricity supply for each country of the world. Such a 
formula is the inverse of the geometric mean of a set of selected sub-indicators, and did not exist 
previously. (Although electricity security is an important concern, none of the previous studies has 
developed a formula that can be used worldwide to measure electricity security, while taking into 
account the whole spectrum of energy/electricity security: accessibility, availability, affordability, 
and acceptability of electricity). As mentioned previously, the methodology used by the World Bank 
(2018a) to develop an index that measures the reliability of electricity supply is a participatory 
approach based on survey. Such a participatory approach can result in an inaccurate assessment 
of the reliability of electricity supply, because the surveyees’ answers can be subjective. 
Third, the study delivers a conceptual contribution. It extends the understanding of the concept of 
accessibility of electricity to issues related to governance, corruption which can affect the delivery 
of electricity (see the conceptual framework for energy and electricity supply security, sections 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Previous studies did not include aspects related to governance in the 
understanding of the concept of accessibility. The study has also extended the understanding of 
the concept of availability to issues related to electricity losses, rapid urbanisation and disruption 
risk to electricity supply in urban area (see the conceptual framework for energy and electricity 
supply security, sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). These aspects were not included in the understanding of 
the concept of availability in previous studies.  
2.4 METHODOLOGY 
According to OECD (2008) and Mazziotta and Pareto (2012) several steps are required for the 
design of a composite index: the first is to develop a theoretical or a conceptual framework for the 
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composite index and the second is the selection of variables. These steps have been completed in 
section 2.2 (conceptual framework for energy and electricity security). The following steps are: the 
choice of techniques for the imputation of missing values, the normalization of the indicators 
selected for the construction of the composite index, the choice of the weighing and aggregation 
techniques, and the sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. The composite index is calculated for 
Benin, and in order to compare the performance of Benin to that of the rest of the world in terms of 
disruption to electricity supply, it was also calculated for all countries for which data is available. In 
other words, when data was not available for a country or for a given year, the composite index 
was not calculated. In addition, this chapter does not aim to use values of the composite index in 
regression analyses where it is sometimes important to increase the size of samples by imputing 
missing values. Hence, at this stage the step related to the choice of techniques for the imputation 
of missing values was not required. 
2.4.1  Definition and normalisation of variables  
Normalization is important because each indicator included in the calculation of the composite 
index has a different measurement unit. Hence, prior to any aggregation of these indicators, it is 
necessary to transform these indicators into dimensionless values or quantities. Another reason for 
normalizing the indicators is that some of them can be negatively correlated with the problem or 
phenomenon to be assessed (“negative polarity”), while other can be positively correlated with it 
(“positive polarity”). For an easy interpretation of the composite index, it is better that it moves in 
the same direction with the normalized indicators included in its calculation. In other words, it is 
better that normalized indicators and the composite index are positively correlated. Several 
techniques can be used for the normalization of the indicators: the “standardization” also called “z-
scores”, the “distance to a reference country”, the “balance of opinion”, the “ranking”, the “min-max” 
method, the “indicators below or above the mean”, the “percentage of annual difference over 
consecutive years”, the “categorical scales”, the “cyclical indicators” (Mazziotta and Pareto, 2012, 
OECD, 2008, pp. 27-30). 
The “ranking” method is often used in cross-country analyses. For a given indicator, it allocates a 
rank to each country. Such rank is then considered as the score or performance of that country, for 
this indicator (see Fagerberg (2003)). One of the limitations of the “ranking” method is that it does 
not take into account the absolute performance of countries for a given indicator (the value 
obtained by countries for a given indicator). For example, if the absolute performance of country A, 
B, C, D is 50, 60, 75, 100 respectively, then, their scores based on the “ranking” method will be 
respectively 1, 2, 3, and 4. With the scores obtained based on the “ranking” method, the difference 
in terms of performance between two consecutive countries does not vary: it remains always 1. 
Conversely, the difference between two consecutive countries in terms of absolute performance 
varies: it can be either 10, or 14, or 25. Hence, the “ranking” method does not allow measuring 
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properly the dispersion of countries’ absolute performance. Another limitation of the “ranking” 
method is that it is sensitive to the sample size. The scores can change depending on the addition 
of new countries or the removal of any country. Because of these limitations, this study did not use 
the “ranking” method.  
The method called “categorical scale” allocates scores to each indicator. Such a score can be 
quantitative or qualitative (very excellent, excellent, very good, good, fairly good, etc). The 
allocation of scores is usually done according to the percentiles of distribution of the indicators (see 
OECD (2008)). For example, the values which represent the top 10% (values that are between the 
90th and the 100th percentile) can receive the score 90. Following them, the values that are 
between the 80th and the 90th percentile can receive the score 80; then, the values that are 
between the 70th and the 80th percentile can receive the score 70; and so forth. As in the case of 
the “ranking” method, one of the limitations of the “categorical scale” is that it does not allow 
measuring properly the dispersion of countries’ absolute performance. It reduces information about 
the variance of the transformed indicators. For example, countries A, B, C, D can respectively have 
71, 74, 77, and 79 as absolute performance for a given indicator. If they are normalized using the 
“categorical scale” method, they can all have 70 as a score (if we refer to the example of allocation 
of score using the “categorical scale”, described previously). The “categorical scale” method 
therefore reduces information about the variance of the indicators, while such information can be 
very useful. Because of these limitations, this study did not use the “categorical scale” method to 
normalize the indicators included in the calculation of the composite index of electricity supply 
disruption risk. 
The “z-scores” method converts all the indicators to a common scale with one as standard 
deviation and zero as mean (see OECD (2008)). The method called “indicators below or above the 
mean” allocates the score 0 to indicators’ values that are around the mean, and gives to the 
indicators’ values that are below and above the mean the score -1 and 1 respectively (see 
European Commission (2001a)). The method called “percentage of annual difference over 
consecutive years” normalises the indicators by transforming them into the growth of their values 
with respect to the previous year. Such growth values are in percentage and represent the new 
values of the normalised indicators (see European Commission (2001b); Tarantola, Saisana, 
Saltelli, Schmiedel and Leapman (2002); Tarantola, Liska, Saltelli, Leapman and Grant (2004)). 
Such a method is very useful in times series analysis. The method called “cyclical indicators” 
normalises the indicators by first substracting the mean (μ), and then by dividing the result of the 
substraction by the mean of the distances to the mean (μ) (see European Commission (2004)). 
 The use of these methods of normalisation (the “z-scores”, the “indicators below or above the 
mean”, the “percentage of annual difference over consecutive years”, the “cyclical indicators”) has 
generated both positive and negative values of the indicators included in the calculation of the 
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composite index of electricity supply security risk. Because we will be using the geometric mean as 
a method of aggregation, all the values of the normalised indicators to be included in the 
calculation of the composite index, have to be of same sign. In order to avoid having both positive 
and negative values of the normalised indicators, this study did not use these normalisation 
methods (“z-scores”, “indicators below or above the mean”, “percentage of annual difference over 
consecutive years”, the “cyclical indicators”). 
The method called “balance of opinion” asks different respondents to express their opinions about 
the performance of firms, or institutions, for a given indicator (see OECD (2008)). The limitiation of 
this method is that it is very subjective as it depends solely on respondents’ perspectives. 
Respondents’ opinions can be biased as they are not always based on quantitative evidence. 
Because of the possible existence of such bias in the respondents’ opinion, this study did not use 
the “balance of opinion” method for the normalisation of the indicators. 
The “min-max” method converts the indicators to a scale of 0 to 1 by substraction of the smallest 
value (the minimum value) and then by dividing the result of the substraction by the difference 
between the maximum and the minimum values (see Jacobs, Smith and Goddard (2004); 
Freudenberger (2003)). The “distance to a reference” method normalises the indicators by 
calculating the distance between their position and a given point of reference (see OECD (2008)). 
Such a point of reference can be an external target in term of good practices. For example, the 
ECA (2008) suggested that the international target for losses of electricity should not exceed 12%. 
In other words, countries in which electricity losses are below 12% have a good performance. The 
point of reference can also be an external country which is an example in terms of best practices. It 
can also be the average country of the sample of countries, or the country that is leading the group 
of countries in term of best practices.  
Six out of the eight indicators selected (the self-sufficiency rate in terms of electricity supply, the 
governance index, the rate of electricity supply efficiency, the ratio of growth of access to electricity 
in urban areas to growth of the urbanization rate, the rate of access to electricity, the share of 
renewable electricity in the total domestic production of electricity, the share of GDP not dedicated 
to cover the cost of electricity supply, and real GDP per capita) for the calculation of the composite 
index of electricity supply disruption risk have their absolute values expressed as a ratio and are in 
percentage. Hence, their values are dimensionless. The absolute values of the seventh indicator 
(the governance indicators/index) are also dimensionless quantities (see Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (2018)). Therefore, it is not necessary to normalize these seven indicators (the self-
sufficiency rate in terms of electricity supply, the governance index, the rate of electricity supply 
efficiency, the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to growth of the urbanization 
rate, the rate of access to electricity, the share of renewable electricity in the total domestic 
production of electricity, the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply) in 
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order for their values to become dimensionless. Only the values of the eighth indicator (real GDP 
per capita (RGDPc)) are not dimensionless. They are expressed in $US constant 2010. Hence, it is 
important to normalize RGDPc.  
The “distance to a reference” method was used to normalize RGDPc, rather than the “min-max” 
method, in order to avoid having 0 among the values of the normalised RGDPc. If the study had 
used the “min-max” method, the normalisation of the minimum value of RGDPc (min RGDPc) 
would have generated a score equal to zero (normalised minimum value of RGDPc = ((min 
RGDPc - min RGDPc)/(the difference between the maximum and the minimum values of RGDPc)). 
As the study is using the geometric mean, all indicators included in the calculation of the composite 
index have to be of the same sign. If the normalized RGDPc is equal to 0, while the values of the 
other indicators included in the calculation of the composite index are not equal to 0, the value of 
the composite index will be equal to 0. This may not reflect the true performance of the country that 
has the minimum (smallest) RGDPc. Because of all this, the “distance to a reference” method was 
used to normalize RGDPc. The real GDP per capita of the average country was first calculated by 
summing the real GDP per capita of all countries (for which data was available) and by dividing the 
sum by the total number of countries. Then, the real GDP per capita of every country was divided 
by the real GDP per capita of the average country to obtain the normalised values of RGDPc 
(RGDPcW).  
Real GDP per capita (RGDPc) is one of the indicators of a country’s wealth and standard of living. 
Countries that have a high real GDP per capita (RGDPc) are wealthier and can offer a high 
standard of living to their population: this includes access to electricity, internet, decent housing 
and health care, public transport, and so forth. These countries are financially able to invest in 
electricity infrastructure and utilities in order to prevent or avoid future disruptions of the electricity 
supply. Conversely, countries that have a low real GDP per capita (RGDPc) are less wealthy and 
unable to offer a high standard of living, which will include access to electricity, internet, decent 
housing and health care, public transport, and so forth. In addition, these countries are financially 
limited in terms of investing in electricity infrastructure and utilities in order to prevent or avoid 
future disruptions of electricity supply. This is the case with a country such as Benin. As reported 
by the National policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008), one of the major 
causes of the supply gap in Benin is that the country is financially limited in terms of investing in 
electricity infrastructure which would increase the available supply. As a result of that, the rate of 
access to electricity in the country was only 41.40% in 2016, below the sub-Saharan Africa and 
world average rate of access to electricity, which were 42.81% and 87.35% respectively. The 
normalised real GDP per capita (RGDPc) of countries has been expressed as a percentage of the 
world average real GDP per capita (WRGDPc). This normalised real GDP per capita is denoted by 
RGDPcW and is expressed as follows: 
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100                                                                                                             2.1
RGDPc
RGDPcW
WRGDPc
    
 
The focus of the study is to construct a composite index of security of electricity supply, more 
precisely, a composite index of electricity supply disruption risk. As mentioned previously in the 
framework for electricity supply security, the composite index for electricity supply disruption risks 
will be constructed based on the four pillars of energy security: “accessibility”, “availability”, 
“affordability” and “acceptability”. To construct this index, the set of indicators of electricity supply 
disruption risks previously identified have been defined as a proxy for each of the four pillars. The 
self-sufficiency rate in terms of electricity supply and a governance index have been identified as 
proxies for the concept of “accessibility”; the rate of electricity supply efficiency, the ratio of growth 
of access to electricity in urban areas to growth of the urbanization rate, and the rate of access to 
electricity have been identified as proxies for the concept of “availability”; the share of renewable 
electricity in the total domestic production of electricity has been identified as a proxy for the 
concept of “acceptability” (which also implies “sustainability”); and the share of GDP not dedicated 
to cover the cost of electricity supply, and real GDP per capita (as a percentage of the world 
annual average GDP per capita) have been identified as proxies for the concept of “affordability”. 
Although initially, they are all dimensionless (except RGDPc which has been normalized to 
become RGDPcW), some of the indicators included in the calculation of the composite index  have 
been transformed because of the presence of negative or zero values in their series. First, the 
governance index (GI) has been transformed because the governance indicators used to construct 
it have both positive and negative values, depending on the years. As the study uses a geometric 
mean for the calculation of the composite index of electricity supply security risk, all values to be 
used have to be of the same sign. Hence, all these governance indicators were transformed by 
adding 100 to their annual value in order for them to be essentially positive. In this way, there are 
only positive values for the governance index which itself is the geometric mean of the governance 
indicators (see equation 2.1, further explanation of the choice of geometric mean is provided in the 
method section below).  
The governance indicators are provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018) and are 
the following: “rule of law” (RLA), “control of corruption” (COC), “quality of the regulatory system” 
(QAR), “government effectiveness” (GEF), “political stability and absence of violence” (POS). Each 
of these indicators is respectively an increasing function of a country’s efforts in terms of rule of 
law, efforts to control corruption, efforts to improve the quality of their regulatory system, efforts to 
improve the effectiveness of their government system, a country’s level of political stability and 
attempts to reduce violence. High values of the governance index (GI) indicate a high quality of 
governance in the country, while low values of the governance index indicate a low quality of the 
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country’s governance. This indicates that the governance index (GI) is an increasing function of a 
country’s governance.  
As said previously, the quality of governance within a country influences the effectiveness of the 
delivery of electricity to consumers. Ineffective planning and mismanagement in the distribution of 
electricity can occur because of corruption, poor quality of the regulatory system, and political 
instability. This situation can result in a lack of foresight of increases in electricity demand and 
unpredicted disruptions of electricity supply. In addition, corruption and a lack of rule of law can 
lead to mismanagement in the electricity billing system and thefts of electricity. This situation can 
cause non-technical losses of electricity, and can reduce the available quantity of electricity 
supplied to legal consumers, and therefore can be considered as one of the risks of electricity 
supply disruption. The governance indicator (GI) is one of the proxies for the concept of 
“accessibility” and is expressed as follows: 
 5 ( 100) ( 100) ( 100) ( 100) ( 100)                              2.2GI RLA COC QAR GEF POS            
Second, the ratio (RUB) of growth of access to electricity in urban areas (∆UAE) to growth of the 
urbanization rate (∆UR) measures a country’s ability to avoid an electricity supply gap caused by 
rapid urbanization. Such a supply gap is considered as a total and continuous disruption to 
electricity supply in urban area. If the urbanization rate (UR) evolves more rapidly than urban 
access to electricity (UAE), then there will be a rapid increase in the urban demand for electricity 
which will not be met by the urban supply of electricity. A supply gap will occur and there will be a 
disruption of electricity supply in urban areas. If urban access to electricity (UAE) evolves more 
rapidly than the urbanization rate (UR), then promoting access to electricity in urban areas can 
contribute to reducing the urban supply gap and preventing the urban disruption of the electricity 
supply.  
The series of the ratio (RUB) of growth of access to electricity in urban areas (∆UAE) to growth of 
the urbanization rate (∆UR) also possesses both positive and negative values, and values that are 
equal to zero. As said before, the study uses a geometric mean for the calculation of the electricity 
supply disruption risks index, and this requires all values to be of same sign. Hence, the number 
100 has been added to both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio (RUB) of growth of 
access to electricity in urban areas (∆UAE) to growth of the urbanization rate (∆UR), in order for 
that ratio to have essentially positive values. High values of that ratio (RUB) indicate that a 
country’s effectiveness in filling the urban supply gap of electricity (caused by rapid urbanization) is 
increasing in order to contribute to satisfying the urban demand for electricity (also caused by 
urbanization). Therefore, that ratio is an increasing function of a country’s effectiveness in filling the 
urban supply gap of electricity caused by rapid urbanization. It is one of the proxies for the concept 
of “availability”, and is expressed as a percentage as follows: 
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100
UAE
RUB
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 
 
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Third, as said previously, the self-sufficiency rate in terms of domestic electricity supply (ESS), 
which is defined as one minus the ratio of net imports of electricity (NIE) to total domestic supply of 
electricity (TDES), has been used as one of the proxies for the concept of “accessibility”, instead of 
the share of net imports of electricity in the total domestic supply. The share of net imports of 
electricity in the total domestic supply possesses both positive and negative values in its series. As 
noted previously, it is defined as the ratio of net imports of electricity to the total domestic supply of 
electricity. Net imports of electricity are defined as imports of electricity minus exports of electricity. 
Negative values of the share of net imports of electricity in the total domestic supply indicate that 
the country is self-sufficient in terms of domestic electricity supply, and exports its surplus of 
electricity. Positive values of the share of net imports of electricity in total domestic supply indicate 
that the country is not self-sufficient in terms of domestic electricity supply and imports electricity. A 
share of net imports of electricity in the total domestic supply that is equal to zero, simply indicates 
that the country is self-sufficient in terms of domestic electricity supply.  
As explained previously, because the study uses a geometric mean for the calculation of the 
electricity supply disruption risk index, all values of indicators have to be of same sign. The share 
of net imports of electricity in the total domestic supply does not fulfill this requirement, and this is 
why the self-sufficiency rate in terms of domestic electricity supply (ESS) has been chosen as one 
of the proxies for the concept of “accessibility”. It highlights both a country’s dependency on 
importation of electricity and its ability to produce its electricity supply domestically. It is an 
increasing function of a country’s ability to produce its electricity supply domestically and a 
decreasing function of a country’s dependency on importation of electricity. It is expressed as a 
percentage as follows: 
General expression 
1 100                                                                                                                    2.4
NIE
ESS
TDES
 
   
 
  
Case of importing countries 
1 100                                                                                                                2.5
NIE
ESS
ED IE
 
   
 
 
Case of exporting countries 
1 100                                                                                                             2.6
NIE
ESS
ED EXE
 
   
 
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Case of countries which neither import nor export electricity 
1 100                                                                                                                       2.7
NIE
ESS
ED
 
   
 
 
where IE represents imports of electricity and IE is equal to zero for countries that are self-
sufficient in terms of domestic electricity supply. On the one hand, if a country has a surplus of 
electricity and exports it, then the total domestic supply of electricity (TDES) is equal to the 
domestic production of electricity (ED) minus the export of electricity (EXE). On the other hand, if a 
country has a deficit of electricity and relies on importation to fill the supply gap, then the total 
domestic supply of electricity (TDES) is equal to the sum of the domestic production of electricity 
(ED) and the importation of electricity (IE). If a country neither imports nor exports electricity, then 
its total domestic supply of electricity (TDES) is equal to its domestic production of electricity (ED). 
If the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency (ESS) is less than 100, this indicates that the country 
has an electricity supply gap and relies on importation of electricity to fill this gap: net imports of 
electricity are positive in this case. If the electricity supply self-sufficiency rate (ESS) is equal to 
100, this indicates that the country is self-sufficient in terms of its domestic electricity supply: net 
imports of electricity are equal to zero in this case. Finally, if the rate of electricity supply self-
sufficiency (ESS) is greater than 100, this indicates that the country is self-sufficient in terms of its 
domestic electricity supply, and has a surplus of electricity which is exported: net imports of 
electricity are negative in this case. 
Fourth, the share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total domestic production of electricity 
(ED) has been used as a proxy for the concept of “acceptability”. As pointed out previously, the 
concept of “acceptability” also implies “sustainability”. Acceptability means that the type of energy 
used does not cause significant damage to the environment or to society. Such type of energy is a 
sustainable energy resource. For long-term and sustainable electricity supply security it is 
important to account for the concept of “acceptability”. As noted earlier, renewable electricity (RE) 
is a sustainable energy resource. The share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total 
domestic production of electricity (ED) is defined as the ratio (RRE) of electricity produced 
domestically based on renewable sources (RE) to the total domestic production of electricity (ED). 
The denominator of the ratio is not the total domestic electricity supply (TDES) (for importing 
countries, TDES is equal to the sum of total domestic production of electricity (ED) and imports of 
electricity (IE)), because countries do not always have control over the sources of electricity 
imported. Electricity imported can be renewable or non-renewable, and importing countries do not 
necessarily have control over the production of such electricity. One of the ways for importing 
countries to increase the share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total domestic supply of 
electricity (TDES) is to increase both their electricity supply self-sufficiency rate (ESS), and their 
share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total domestic production of electricity (ED).  
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Annual series on the share of renewable electricity in the total domestic production of electricity 
comprise the value zero for some of the years. As this study uses a geometric mean to calculate 
the electricity supply disruption risks index, all indicators identified for the calculation of such index 
have to be of same sign. All indicators (RUB, ESS, GI) identified previously are of positive sign, 
and 100 has been added to each value of the series on the share (RRE) of renewable electricity 
(RE) in the total domestic production of electricity (ED), in order for all values of that series to be 
essentially positive. The share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total domestic production 
of electricity (ED) highlights both countries’ ability to improve the sustainability of their electricity 
supply, and countries’ dependency on non-renewable electricity (NRE) in their domestic production 
of electricity. It is an increasing function of a country’s ability to improve the sustainability of its 
electricity supply by using more renewable electricity, and a decreasing function of a country’s 
dependency on non-renewable electricity (NRE) in its domestic production of electricity (ED). It is 
expressed as a percentage as follows: 
100 100                                                                                                                      2.8
RE
RRE
ED
     
or 
1 100 100                                                                                                           2.9
NRE
RRE
ED
 
    
 
 
Other indicators, however, did not need any transformation. First, as noted previously, the rate of 
electricity supply efficiency (ESE) which is defined as the ratio of electricity not lost (ENL) to the 
total electricity supply (TES) has been used as one of the proxies for the concept of “availability” (in 
addition to the ratio of growth of urban access to electricity to growth of the urbanization rate), 
rather than the share of electricity losses (EL) in the total supply (TES). Total supply of electricity 
(TES) is equal to the sum of domestic production of electricity (ED) and imports of electricity (IE) in 
the case of an importing country. In other words, in that case TES is equal to TDES (total domestic 
supply of electricity). In the case of an exporting country, TES is equal to the domestic production 
of electricity (ED). In other words, TES is equal to the sum of TDES (in that case TDES is equal to 
the domestic production of electricity (ED) minus exports of electricity (EXE) and exports of 
electricity (EXE). In the case of countries which neither import nor export electricity, TES is equal to 
the total domestic production of electricity (ED). In other words, TES is equal to TDES (TDES in 
that case is equal to the domestic production of electricity). Electricity that is not lost (ENL), is the 
electricity distributed which reaches legal consumers. Electricity that reaches illegal consumers is 
considered stolen electricity and therefore is a loss of electricity. Electricity not lost (ENL) 
comprises only the domestic legal consumption of electricity (EC) if the country is not exporting 
electricity. In the case of countries that export electricity, it comprises both the domestic legal 
consumption of electricity (EC) and exports of electricity (EXE). It highlights both the ability of 
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countries’ electricity sector to be efficient by minimizing electricity losses, and the exposure of 
countries to electricity losses. It is an increasing function of a country’s ability to minimize electricity 
losses, and a decreasing function of a country’s exposure to electricity losses. It is expressed as a 
percentage as follows: 
General expression 
100                                                                                                                             2.10
ENL
ESE
TES
 
  
In other words,  
1 100                                                                                                                    2.11
EL
ESE
TES
 
   
 
In the case of exporting countries 
100                                                                                                                    2.12
EC EXE
ESE
ED

   
In the case of importing countries  
100                                                                                                                        2.13
EC
ESE
ED IE
 

 
In the case of countries that neither import nor export electricity 
100                                                                                                                               2.14
EC
ESE
ED
   
Second, another proxy for the concept of “availability” is the rate of access to electricity (RACE). It 
is defined as the ratio of the population that has access to electricity (PACE) to the total population 
(TPO), and is expressed as a percentage. A value of such a ratio less than 100 indicates that there 
is a supply gap in the country because a proportion of the population does not have access to 
electricity. In other words, electricity is not available for a proportion of the population. As in the 
case of the urban supply gap of electricity, this supply gap is considered as a total and continuous 
disruption of electricity supply encountered by the population that does not have access to 
electricity. Increasing access to electricity will contribute to reduce the supply gap of electricity. 
Conversely, a value of such ratio that is equal to 100 indicates that the entire population of the 
country has access to electricity, and there is no supply gap. In other words, electricity is available 
for the entire population. The rate of access to electricity (RACE) is a decreasing function of the 
electricity supply gap of total and continuous disruption of electricity supply. High values of such a 
rate indicate that the country is making efforts to reduce its electricity supply gap, while low values 
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of such rate indicate the presence of an important electricity supply gap in the country. The rate of 
access to electricity is expressed as follows: 
100                                                                                                                      2.15
PACE
RACE
TPO
    
Third, the share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) has 
been used as a proxy for the concept of “affordability”. It is defined as the ratio (RNEEX) of the 
proportion of real GDP not dedicated to cover the electricity supply expenditures (NEEX) to real 
GDP (RGDP). It can also be defined as one minus the share of GDP dedicated to cover the cost of 
the electricity supply (EEX). The cost of electricity supply is calculated by multiplying the total 
quantity of electricity supply converted in barrel of oil equivalent (bbl) by the annual real average 
crude oil price (COP) (US$/bbl; constant 2010 US$). The share of real GDP not dedicated to cover 
the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) highlights both a country’s ability to minimize the cost of 
electricity supply, and a country’s vulnerability to the high cost of electricity supply. High values of 
this ratio indicate that countries are able to minimize the cost of their electricity supply, while low 
values of this ratio indicate that countries are exposed to high costs of electricity supply. A high 
cost of electricity supply limits a country’s capacity to afford electricity, which can lead to a supply 
disruption of electricity. The share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
(RNEEX) is therefore an increasing function of a country’s ability to minimize the cost of electricity 
supply, and a decreasing function of a country’s exposure to high costs of electricity supply. It is 
expressed as a percentage as follows: 
100                                                                                                                   2.16
NEEX
RNEEX
RGDP
    
or 
1 100                                                                                                           2.17
EEX
RNEEX
RGDP
 
   
 
  
2.4.2  Data 
All data collected are secondary and have been collected for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000, and 
over the period 2002-2015 (years and period for which data is available for all indicators at the 
same time, and years and period for which data are available for governance indicators) for the 
calculation of the composite index of electricity supply disruption risk. In order to observe 
separately the performance of Benin for each of the indicators/index included in the composite 
electricity supply disruption risk index, data on growth of urban access to electricity (∆UAE) and 
growth of the urbanization rate (∆UR) have been collected over the period 1996-2016; data on the 
rate of access to electricity (RACE) have been collected over the period 1990-2016; data on the 
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share of renewable electricity in total domestic electricity supply (RRE) have been collected over 
the period 1996-2015; data on real GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$; as a percentage of the 
world average GDP per capita; (RGDPcW)) have been collected over the period 1960-2017; data 
on real GDP (RGDP), average crude oil prices (COP), domestic supply of electricity (ED), 
electricity consumption (EC), imports of electricity (IE), net imports of electricity (NIE), exports of 
electricity (EXE), total supply of electricity (TES) (sum of domestic production of electricity and 
imports of electricity), and electricity not lost (ENL) (the electricity not lost is the sum of electricity 
consumption and exports of electricity), and losses of electricity (EL), have been gathered over the 
period 1980-2015.  
Sources of data are diverse. With regard to governance indicators, data on “control of corruption” 
(COC), “rule of law” (RLA), “quality of the regulatory system” (QAR), “government effectiveness” 
(GEF), and “political stability and absence of violence” (POS) have been collected from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018) website. Data on growth of urban access to electricity 
(∆UAE), growth of the urbanization rate (∆UR), the share of renewable electricity in the total 
domestic supply of electricity (RRE), real GDP (RGDP), real GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
(RGDPcW), and the rate of access to electricity (RACE) have been collected from the World 
Development Indicators (2018) website. The series on annual real average prices of crude oil 
(COP) (US$/bbl; constant 2010 US$) has been collected from the World Bank’s Commodity 
Markets (2018) website (see World Bank (2018b) for reference). Data on domestic electricity 
production (ED), imports of electricity (IE), net imports of electricity (NIE), exports of electricity 
(EXE), electricity consumption (EC), total supply of electricity (TES), electricity not lost (ENL) and 
losses of electricity (EL) have been gathered from the US Energy Information Administration’s 
(2018) website. 
2.4.3  Weighting and aggregation method 
Depending on the aspect of the phenomenon they measured, each indicator can have a specific 
importance in the calculation of the composite indicator. Such a specific importance also called 
weight can be estimated using different assumptions and techniques. First, some techniques are 
based on participatory approaches. Significant among them are the Budget Allocation, the Conjoint 
Analysis, the Public Opinion, and the Analytic Hierarchy Process. The allocation of weights using 
these participatory approaches is based on expert opinion, which can be very subjective. Different 
experts can allocate different weights to the same indicator, depending on their preferences, 
knowledge, and perceptions. Because of such subjectivity, it is impossible to come to a consensus 
on the true weight of indicators. This constitutes one of the reasons why this study did not use the 
participatory approaches for the calculation of weights. 
Second, other techniques are based on statistical and mathematical modelling. Significant among 
them are the Benefit of the Doubt Approach (BOD), the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), 
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Factor Analysis (FA), the Unobserved Component Models (UCM), and the regression approach. 
The FA and the PCA use linear transformation methods to decrease the data’s dimensionlity, while 
avoiding at the same time information loss (DeCoster and Hall, 1998; Dunteman, 1989). Because 
of their capacity to reduce the dimensionality of the data, FA and PCA are very useful when 
working on a large number of indicators (Yeheyis, Hewage, Alam, Eskicioglu, and Sadiq, 2013).  
Originally, FA and PCA were designed in order to analyse the relationship between different 
variables; they were not designed for the calculation of weights (Hermans, Van den Bossche, and 
Wets, 2008); hence these two techniques have some limitations in terms of weights’ calculation. 
Some of these limitations are that they can gather in the same dimension correlated indicators for 
which the interrelationship or correlation is meaningless (the correlation cannot be supported by 
theories or the real-world facts (historical, social or economic facts, etc.) (OECD, 2008). In addition, 
weighing of dimensions is based on correlation rather than real-world facts. An important 
dimension (in term of real-world facts) can be allocated a low weight, because its correlation with 
other dimensions is weak (Hermans et al., 2008). According to Mikulić, Kožić, and Krešić (2015), 
the allocation of weights using PCA and FA can be inconsistent, because the relative importance 
of these weights does not always correspond to the real-world facts.  
Other types of limitations are that the use of FA and PCA requires an adequate number of 
indicators and these indicators need to show a certain level of correlation with each other (OECD, 
2008). All these constitute some of the reasons why this study did not use FA or PCA for the 
allocation of weights. For instance, among the indicators used in this study for the construction of a 
composite index, the share of renewable electricity (RRE) in total supply of electricity is important 
as its highlights countries’ effort to have a sustainable source of electricity supply, and thus, 
countries’ effort to ensure a sustainable security of electricity supply. However, it is weakly 
correlated with all the other indicators included in the calculation of the composite index (the 
governance index (GI), the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency (ESS), the rate of electricity 
supply efficiency (ESE), the normalized real GDP per capita (RGDPcW), the share of real GDP not 
dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX), the rate of access to electricity (RACE), 
the ratio of the growth of urban access to electricity to the growth of the urbanization rate (RUB)) 
because high share of renewable electricity in the total supply of electricity in a country does not 
necessarily imply good governance, high rates of electricity supply self-sufficiency, or electricity 
supply efficiency, or access to electricity, high GDP per capita, and low cost of electricity supply. 
PCA or FA methods can assign a low weight to RRE because of its weak correlation to other 
indicators, while RRE is an important indicator when it comes to the assessment of the 
sustainability of electricity supply security.   
Kleinbaum, Kupper, Nizam, and Rosenberg (2013), define the regression approach as a 
multivariate technique that uses statistical methods to model relationships between different 
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variables. Nardo, Saisana, Saltelli, and Tarantola (2005) argued that a regression approach 
assigns weights to indicators by identifying the relationship between each of these indicators and a 
common output called the dependent variable. However, some assumptions required for the 
regression approach constitute a limitation in its ability to assign weights for the construction of a 
composite index. For instance, in a regression analysis, multicolinearity between variables must be 
avoided. When the set of indicators selected for the construction of the composite index are 
correlated, it becomes difficult to use a regression approach for the weights allocation, because of 
the issue of multicolinearity (Muldur, 2001). In addition, if the number of indicators selected as 
independent variables is not sufficient enough, omitted variables bias can occur in a regression 
analysis, and this can hinder the consistency of weights allocated. For instance, health, income 
and education are the dimensions and indicators used for the construction of the Human 
Development Index. These three indicators are positively correlated, and if a regression approach 
were used for the construction of the Human Dvelopment Index, multicolinearity issues will occur. 
In the case of this study, for instance, the normalized governance index (GI), the normalized real 
GDP per capita (RGDPcW), the rate of access to electricity (RACE), the share of real GDP not 
dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) are positively correlelated. If a regression 
approach were used for the allocation of weights, the issue of multicolinearity would have occurred. 
As mentioned by Nardo et al. (2005), the Benefit of a Doubt Approach (BOD) uses the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques. The BOD expressed indicators’ weights as a ratio, based 
on the relative performance of these indicators, and using optimisation techniques (Shwartz, 
Burgess, and Berlowitz, 2009; Cherchye, Moesen, Rogge, and Van Puyenbroeck, 2007). One of 
the avantages of BOD is its ability to combine aggregation, weighing, and index calculation 
methods. Another advantage is that some of the limitations of the linear aggregation are overcome 
when using the weighing method of BOD (Nardo et al., 2005). Some of the limitations of the BOD 
mentioned by Nardo et al. (2005) and Shwartz et al. (2009) are that it can provide multiple results 
in term of weighing of indicators and these results can be incompatible. For example, it can assign 
the score 1 to many units or countries, while such value is the maximum score of the composite 
index (when using the BOD approach). At the same time, it can also assign the weight 0 to some 
selected indicators included in the calculation of the composite index. In the case of this study, and 
according to the data obtained from different sources to quantify all selected indicators, it is 
impossible for any of them to have the value 0 as weight. A modified BOD subject to some 
restrictions on the selected indicators included in the calculation of the composite index was 
proposed. However, the identification of such restrictions sometimes requires an expert opinion 
(policy makers, government, international organization, simple citizens, etc) (Cherchye et al., 
2007), which can be subjective. Because of these limitations, this study did not use the BOD 
approach for the calculation of the composite index of disruption risk to electricity supply. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
86 
 
The Unobserved Component Models (UCM) have been primarily used in economics for the design 
of governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999). Like the Benefit of a Doubt 
Approach (BOD) they combine aggregation, weighing and index calculation methods. One of their 
advantages is that they are able to provide interval estimates of a composite index, rather than just 
specific values of such index (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011). A limitation of the UCM is 
that the calculation of weighing may not be reliable and accurate if the data set used is small. 
Another limitation is that when using UCM, the correlation between the indicators selected for the 
construction of the composite index should not be strong (Nardo et al., 2005). In the case of this 
study, indicators such as RENEEX and RGDPcW and RACE are strongly correlated (countries that 
have high GDP per capia also have high rates of access to electricity; they can easily afford their 
electricity supply; consequently, their shares of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of 
electricity supply are high; see Ferguson et al. (2000), IEA (2002), and ECA (2004)). Hence, this 
study did not use the UCM approach for the calculation of weights. 
Finally, some studies have used none of these techniques, but are based on equal weighing, which 
means that all indicators have the same importance. As mentioned by Land (2006), one of the 
advantages of the equal weighing is its simplicity; another advantage is that equal weighing is an 
approach that can be easily replicated by other researchers. The construction of several composite 
indexes that have been used worldwide, such as the Genuine Saving Index (see Hamilton, 2000), 
the Living Planet Index (see Loh, Green, Ricketts, Lamoreux, Jenkins, Kapos, Randers, 2005; Loh, 
Randers, MacGillivray, Kapos, Jenkins, Groombridge, 1998), the Human Development Index (see 
UNDP, 1990), is based on equal weighing. In a survey of 96 studies related to the construction of 
composite indexes, Gan, Fernandez, Guo, Wilson, Zhao, Zhou, and Wu (2017) established that 
21.88% of these studies have used the weighing techniques based on statistical modeling, while 
23.95% of them used the weighing techniques based on participatory approaches, and 46.88% of 
them are based on equal weighing. Because of its simplicity and its easy replicability, the equal 
weighing approach has been used in this study.  
Although the equal weighing approach is simple and easy to replicate, its validity has been 
criticized by different studies such as Mikulić et al. (2015), Finnveden (1999), McClelland (1978), 
Geniaux, Bellon, Deverre, and Powell (2009), Gordon (1995), and Rowley, Peters, Lundie, and 
Moore (2012). Further researches on the construction of a composite index of disruption to 
electricity supply will explore other innovative weighing approaches that are simple, easy to 
replicate, and have fewer concerns in term of validity. While the weight allocation is an essential 
step in the construction of a composite index, the choice of the aggregation approach also matters 
as it influences the values of the composite. The most common approaches of aggregation are the 
non-compensatory aggregation, the additive aggregation, and the geometric aggregation.  
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The non-compensatory aggregation is very useful when a substitution between the components of 
an index is inappropriate. It does not allow that the low performance of some indicators be 
compensated by the high performance of other indicators, and uses a multicriteria decision making 
approach (Munda, 2005; Guitouni and Martel, 1998). With the non-compensatory aggregation 
approach, quantitative and qualitative inforamtion can be used jointly. In addition, it does not 
require a nornalisation of indicators. One of its main disadvantages is the incompatible results 
obtained when ranking different countries or units. Such incompatibility in the ranking, also called 
rank reversal or cycle can occur and affect the comparison of countries or units’ performance 
(Munda and Nardo, 2005). For instance, when using the non-compensatory aggregation, it is 
possible to establish that country G is prefered to country H, country H is prefered to country I, and 
country I is prefered to country G. In such a situation, it is impossible to rank a country’s 
performance with accuracy. Because of the possibility of rank reversal issue, this study did not 
explore the possibility of using a non-compensatory aggregation approach. 
The additive aggregation approach consists of using a function that sums up the values of the 
normalised indicators that have been selected. The value of such a sum is the value of the 
composite index. The most used additive aggregation approach is the weighted arithmetic mean 
(Pollesch and Dale, 2015), which sums up the value of the selected indicators and divides such 
sum by the total number of selected indicators. One of the disadvantages of the arithmetic mean is 
that it gives more weight to indicators that have a high numerical range. One indicator A may not 
be as important as other indicators B and C. If A has a higher numerical range than B and C, the 
arithmetic mean of A, B, and C will allocate more weight to A. For example, let us assume that A 
ranges from 1 to 100, and B and C range from 2 to 6. If the value of A is 30, and B or C is equal to 
3, the arithmetic mean of A, B and C will be 12, If the value of A increases by 50%, in other words, 
if the value of A becomes 45, while the values of B and C remain 3, then the arithmetic mean of A, 
B and C will be equal to 17. If the value of B increases by 100%, in other words if the value of B 
becomes 6, while the values of A and C remain 30 and 3 respectively, then the arithmetic mean of 
A, B and C will be 13. This example shows that although the percentage change in B (100% 
increase in B) is far greater than the percentage change in A (50% increase in A), the arithmetic 
mean in the case of a change in B is only 13, while the arithmetic mean in the case of a change in 
A is 17. This situation is caused by the difference in numerical range between A and B. A has a 
higher numerical range, and thus change in A has a greater impact on the arithmetic mean, 
compared to change in B. Therefore, it is worth concluding that the arithmetic mean allocates more 
weight to A because of its higher numerical range. In the case of this study, the selected indicators 
for the calculation of the composite index of disruption risk to electricity supply do not have exactly 
the same numerical range. Using the arithmetic mean will allocate more weight to indicators that 
have higher numerical ranges.  
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As mentioned by Gan et al. (2017), another disadvantage of the arithmetic mean is the 
compensability between indicators. In other words, low socres or values of some indicators are 
compensated by high scores or values of other indicators. For example, countries D and E may 
respectively have the values (10, 2, 3, 1) and (4, 4, 4, 4) for the following indicators: I1, I2, I3, I4. If 
the arithmetic mean were used as the aggregation approach, the value of the composite index will 
be equal to 4 for both countries, while the country D has a lower performance for three indicators 
when compared to the country E. For the country D, the low performance of these three indicators 
has been compensated by the high performance of the fourth indicator. Therefore, using the 
arithmetic mean as an aggregation approach, does not allow the composite index to reflect the 
difference between countries D and E in regard to these three indicators. Because of these two 
disadvantages, the current study did not use the arithmetic mean as an aggregation approach.  
The current study has rather used the geometric mean which is an aggregation approach that is 
less compensatory (see Bullen, 2013; OECD, 2008; Beliakov, Pradera, Calvo, 2007). For example, 
if the geometric mean were used as an aggregation approach, country D would have a much lower 
value for the composite index when compared to country E. The value of the composite index 
would be 2.78 for country D, while it would be 4 for country E. Unlike the arithmetic mean which 
uses an additive function, the geometric mean uses a multiplicative function (Pollesch and Dale, 
2015; Beliakov et al., 2007; Munda and Nardo, 2005; OECD, 2008) and is defined as the pth root of 
the product of a set of scalars or numbers y1, y2,…yp. Its general expression is as follows: 
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The geometric mean is often used to calculate the average of a set of variables which have 
different properties and different numerical ranges. The geometric mean levels the variables’ 
numerical ranges when averaging them, so that no numerical range has more weight than the 
others. In that way, a percentage change d in any variable yi has the same impact on the 
geometric mean. There have been previous uses of the geometric mean in the calculation of 
indexes such as the United Nation Development Program (UNDP)’s 2010 Human Development 
Index (HDI). The 2010 HDI is the geometric mean of Life Expectancy Index (LEI), Education Index 
(EI), and Income Index (II). Although the geometric mean has different advantages compared to 
the arithmetic mean, it also has some limitations. First, as mentioned by OECD (2008) and Keeney 
(2006 & 2008), it is not a fully non-compensatory approach. However, as mentioned before, it is an 
aggregation approach that is less compensatory when compared to the arithmetic mean. Second, 
as explained by Beliakov et al (2007) and Calvo, Kolesárová, Komorníková, Mesiar (2002), with 
the geometric mean approach it is impossible to undertake sensitivity analysis for the composite 
index using its components (sub-indicators)’ measurement errors. Further researches on the 
composite index of disruption risk to electricity supply will investigate the existence of innovative 
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aggregation approaches that are less compensatory, and with which it is possible to use 
measurement errors of sub-indicators to undertake sensitivity analysis. 
In this study, the geometric mean has been used to calculate a composite index of electricity 
supply disruption risk (ESRI) based on the following indicators/index: GI (country’s governance 
index), RUB (the ratio of the growth of access to electricity in urban areas to the growth of the 
urbanization rate), RACE (rate of access to electricity), ESS (electricity supply self-sufficiency), 
ESE (the rate of electricity supply efficiency), RNEEX (the share of real GDP not dedicated to 
cover the cost of electricity supply), RGDPcW (real GDP per capita expressed as a percentage of 
the world average real GDP per capita), and RRE (the share of renewable electricity in total 
domestic supply of electricity). As stated previously, the geometric mean has also been used to 
calculate the governance index (GI). The composite index of electricity supply disruption risk is 
expressed as follows: 
8                                          2.19ESRI GI RUB ESS ESE RNEEX RRE RACE RGDPcW       
  
High values of ESRI indicate that the country has a low risk of electricity supply disruption, while 
low values of ESRI indicate the country has a high risk of electricity supply disruption. In other 
words, ESRI is a decreasing function of disruption risks in electricity supply. For the purposes of 
simplicity, this study uses a composite index of electricity supply disruption risk (ESRI) which 
values are small numbers. Hence, the inverse values of the initial electricity supply disruption risk 
index (ESRI) have been calculated and each has been multiplied by 100. These transformed 
values of the initial electricity supply disruption risk index (ESRI) constitute the values of a new 
index called the modified electricity supply disruption risk index (MESRI). High values of MESRI 
indicate that the country has a high risk of electricity supply disruption, while low values of MESRI 
indicate that the country has a low risk of electricity supply disruption. In other words, MESRI is an 
increasing function of disruption risk to electricity supply. It is expressed as follows: 
8
1
100                            2.20   MESRI
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      
  
2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Empirical results on the performance of Benin with regard to each of the indicators included in the 
calculation of the composite index of electricity supply disruption risks have been analysed in order 
to understand better why Benin is a country that has a disruption risk to electricity supply. First, the 
performance of Benin with regard to the governance index (GI) is shown in Figure 2.2, which 
represents the history of Benin’s performance in terms of governance for the year 1996, 1998, 
2000, and over the period 2002-2015. On the vertical axis are the governance index (GI) values, 
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while on the abscissa line, we have the corresponding years. We notice that the performance of 
Benin in regard to the governance index (GI) has been decreasing as shown by the overall 
downward trend on Figure 2.2. In other words, Benin’s combined performance in terms of “control 
of corruption”, “rule of law”, “quality of the regulatory system”, “government effectiveness”, “political 
stability and absence of violence” has a downward trend. In the electricity sector, this overall 
reduction of governance performance can be illustrated by the mismanagement of the delivery of 
electricity to consumers in the country. As mentioned in the national policy framework for electricity 
(“document de politique et de strategie de development du secteur de l’energie electrique”, see 
Republique du Bénin (2008, pp. 30-31)) there have been mismanagements in the Beninese 
electricity sector, low quality of the delivery of service to consumers, low technical and financial 
performance of transmission and distribution’s companies (SBEE and CEB). The low performance 
of these two public companies is mainly due to unprofitable investments made because of political 
considerations. In addition, because of the government’s social and political agenda, the national 
pricing policy imposes on these companies a price of electricity that is below the production cost of 
electricity.  
When compared to other countries, Benin is ranked 70th out of 183 countries in the world and 37th 
out of 50 countries in Africa in terms of risks associated with governance, with a five years average 
governance index value of 99.592 (Table A.1 in Appendix A). The governance index (GI) as 
presented in Table A.1 is a decreasing function of countries’ risks associated with governance 
(Countries with low values of governance index (GI) have high risks related to governance, while 
countries with high values of governance index (GI) have low risks related to governance). 
 
Figure 2.2: Evolution of Benin’s performance in term of governance (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-
2016)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018) 
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Second, the performance of Benin in terms of effort to avoid a supply gap of electricity in urban 
areas is shown in Figure 2.3, which represents the history of the ratio of growth of access to 
electricity in urbans area to growth of urbanization (RUB), in Benin over the period 1996-2016. On 
the abscissa line are the years, and on the vertical axis are the values of the ratio (RUB) expressed 
as percentages. Noticeably the values of the ratio (RUB) have remained below 100% over the 
entire period, fluctuating between 96.06% and 96.39%. The periods of a significant reduction in 
RUB (1996, 2000, 2002, 2007, 2013, and 2014, 2016) correspond to some of the years that Benin 
has faced severe electricity crises. During these periods, there have been severe shortages of 
electricity in the country (including the urban areas), and the growth rate of access to electricity in 
urban areas has been far smaller than the growth rate of urbanization. The periods of significant 
increase in RUB (1997, 2010, and 2015) correspond to the years that access to electricity in urban 
areas has been significantly improved, although its growth rate has remained smaller than the 
growth rate of urbanization. All this indicates that in Benin, urbanization has been growing more 
rapidly than access to electricity in urban areas. This situation is one of the causes of the electricity 
supply gap in urban areas. However, the ratio (RUB) has an upward overall trend over the entire 
period (1996-2016). This indicates that though growth of urbanization is higher than urban access 
to electricity, the overall trend of access to electricity in urban areas is upward.  
When compared to other countries in terms of performance related to the ratio of growth of access 
to electricity in urban areas to growth of urbanization (RUB), Benin is ranked 36th out of 183 
countries in the world and 24th out of 50 countries in Africa, with a five years (2011-2015) average 
ratio (RUB)’s value of 96.388% (Table A.2 in Appendix A). The ratio of growth of access to 
electricity in urban areas to growth of urbanization (RUB) is a decreasing function of risks 
associated with the electricity supply gap in urban areas (low values of the ratio indicates high risks 
of electricity supply gap in urban areas, while high values of the ratio indicates low risks of the 
electricity supply gap in urban areas).  
 
Figure 2.3: History of the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to growth of 
urbanization in Benin (1996-2016) 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018) 
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Third, Benin’s performance in terms of affordability of electricity supply is shown in Figure 2.4, 
which represents the history of the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity 
supply (RNEEX). The horizontal axis shows the years, and the vertical axis shows the share of 
GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) expressed as a percentage of 
real GDP (constant 2010 US$). It can be seen that the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the 
cost of electricity supply has remained above 99% for the entire period (1980-2015). In other 
words, the cost of electricity in Benin has never exceeded 1% of GDP over the period 1980-2015. 
However, the overall trend of the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
(RNEEX) is downward. This indicates that although the share of the cost of electricity supply in 
GDP has remained small (less than 1%), it has an overall upward trend. In other words, the 
general observation over the period 1980-2015 is that electricity supply has become more costly, 
although its overall cost has remained less than 1% of GDP.  
When compared to other countries in terms of affordability risk (proxied by the share of GDP not 
dedicated to cover the cost of electricity), Benin is ranked 156th out of 183 countries in the world 
and 33rd out of 50 countries in Africa (Table A.3 in Appendix A). Table A.3 shows that the lower the 
share of GDP not used to cover the cost of electricity supply, the higher the risk associated with 
affordability of electricity supply. In other words the share of GDP not used to cover the cost of 
electricity supply (RNEEX) is a decreasing function of electricity supply disruption risks associated 
with affordability of electricity supply.  
It is recommended that Benin attempts to minimize the cost of electricity supply by for instance 
relying less on oil for its domestic electricity production. According to the World Development 
Indicators (2018), 99.457% of the domestic production of electricity in Benin was based on oil in 
2014. As stated previously, increases in oil prices augment the production costs of electricity and 
therefore limit the capacity of the country to supply electricity. As mentioned in the national policy 
framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 31), one of the reasons for the poor 
financial performance of the national distribution company (SBEE) is the use of fossil fuels such as 
gasoil and jet A-1 (a type of aviation fuel) for the domestic production of electricity. Jet A-1 is 
expensive and the price of both fossil fuels can fluctuate. This situation has significantly increased 
the financial cost borne by the company while the company’s financial revenue is under pressure 
because electricity is sold to consumers at a price below its production cost.  
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Figure 2.4: History of the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
in Benin (1980-2015)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from USEIA (2018), World Bank (2018b), and 
World Development Indicators (2018) 
Fourth, Benin’s performance in terms of “acceptability” of the type of electricity produced, in other 
words in terms of the sustainability of the production of electricity (production of electricity using 
unlimited energy resources, and with little damage to the environment) is shown in Figure 2.5. The 
figure represents the history of the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of 
electricity (RRE) over the period 1996-2016. The horizontal axis shows the years, and the vertical 
axis shows the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity (RRE). In 
Figure 2.5, the origin of the reference frame X (horizontal axis) and Y (vertical axis) is not 0, but 
100, the indicator RRE has been transformed (the number 100 has been added to each values of 
the series on RRE, a detailed explanation has been provided in the methodological section). It can 
be seen that the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity has 
remained less than 6% over the entire period, which indicates that the electricity produced 
domestically in Benin is mainly non-renewable. This constitutes a major risk for the country in 
terms of sustainability of domestic electricity production. As noted before, fossil fuel energy 
constitutes limited energy resources.  
When compared to other countries in terms of long-term disruption risk of electricity supply related 
to the use of unsustainable energy resources, Benin is ranked 34th out of 183 countries in the world 
and 10th out of 50 countries in Africa (Table A.4 in Appendix A). This makes Benin one of the 
countries in Africa and in the world with high risks associated with sustainability of electricity supply 
security. Table A.4 shows that the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of 
electricity (RRE) is a decreasing function of long-term disruption risks of electricity supply related to 
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the use of unsustainable energy resources (countries with a low RRE have high long-term 
disruption risks of electricity supply related to the use of unsustainable energy resources, while 
countries with a high RRE have low long-term disruption risks of electricity supply related to the 
use of unsustainable energy resources).  
For a long-term and sustainable security of electricity supply, Benin should try to increase its 
production of renewable electricity, which is an unlimited energy resource, rather than electricity 
produced using fossil fuels. In other words, increasing the share of renewable electricity in total 
domestic production of electricity will contribute to minimizing long-term electricity supply disruption 
risks related to the use of unsustainable energy resources as inputs for electricity production. As 
mentioned in the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, pp. 30–31), 
because of a lack of financial investment, there is very low usage of Benin’s potential in terms of 
renewable electricity, as the country has significant hydro, solar and wind potential: 85 zones were 
identified for the construction of hydroelectric dams, the solar potential varies between 3.9 and 6.2 
kWh per square metre per day (kWh/m2/day), and the wind speed measured at an altitude of 10 
metre (m) above sea level varies between 3 and 6 metres per second (m/s). How to attract private 
investment in the renewable electricity sector should be one of the priorities of the country if it aims 
to ensure a long-term and sustainable security of electricity supply. 
 
Figure 2.5: History of the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of 
electricity (RRE) in Benin (1996-2015)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Fifth, Benin’s performance in terms of electricity supply self-sufficiency (ESS) (supply disruption 
risks related to the concept of “accessibility”) is shown in Figure 2.6 which represents the history of 
electricity supply self-sufficiency rate (ESS) over the period 1980-2015. The horizontal axis shows 
the years, and the vertical axis shows the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply expressed as a 
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percentage of total domestic supply of electricity (TDES). It can be seen that over the entire period, 
Benin’s self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply has not exceeded 27%. In 2015 the self-sufficiency 
rate of electricity supply was 22.424%. All this indicates that Benin is heavily dependent on the 
importation of electricity in order to reduce its electricity supply gap. As mentioned previously, this 
situation exposes the countries to electricity crises which occur in its supplier countries such as 
Ghana and Nigeria. Whenever these countries reduce their exports of electricity to Benin because 
of the necessity to satisfy their domestic growing demand for electricity, electricity supply disruption 
occurs in Benin. The self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply (ESS) is a decreasing function of 
electricity supply disruption risks related to the importation of electricity: in other words, a high ESS 
is associated with low supply disruption risks related to importation of electricity, while a low ESS is 
associated with high supply disruption risks related to importation of electricity.  
Figure 2.6 shows a significant reduction of the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency (ESS) in 
1989, 1992, 2002 and 2012. For instance, ESS falls to 4.11% in 2012 because of the severe 
electricity crisis due to both a reduction of electricity importation and the weakened capacity of the 
national distribution company (SBEE) to fill the gap caused by the import deficit. Other electricity 
crises also occurred in 1983, 1995 and 2004, and these can be seen in Figure 2.6 by a sudden 
reduction of the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency in these years. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, droughts in Ghana in 1983, 1994 and 2004 limited the capacity of the 
Akossombo dam to generate electricity, which caused Ghana to reduce its exportation of electricity 
to Benin during these years. The consequence was the sudden reduction of Benin’s electricity 
supply self-sufficiency rate observed in Figure 2.6 in 1983, 1995 and 2004. Although the self-
sufficiency rate of electricity supply in Benin has remained less than 27% over the entire period of 
1980 to 2015, it can be seen in Figure 2.6 that there is an upward trend of ESS.  
When compared to other countries in terms of supply disruption risk of electricity related to 
importation of electricity, Benin is ranked 2nd out of 194 countries in the world, and 2nd out of 53 
countries in Africa (Table A.5 in Appendix A). As proposed in the national policy framework for 
electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 30), Benin should try to increase its self-sufficiency rate 
of electricity supply in order to minimize its dependency vis-à-vis its supplier countries. One of the 
targets of the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 56) is to 
increase the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply to 70% by 2025.  
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Figure 2.6: History of electricity supply self-sufficiency rate (ESS) in Benin (1980-2015) 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on USEIA (2018) data 
Sixth, the performance of Benin with regard to the electricity supply efficiency rate (ESE) (a proxy 
for supply risk related to the concept of availability of electricity) is shown in Figure 2.7 which 
represents the history of Benin’s rate of electricity efficiency over the period 1980-2015. In this 
figure, the horizontal axis represents the years and the vertical axis represents the efficiency rate 
of electricity supply (ESE) expressed as a percentage of total supply of electricity (TES). As said 
previously, this rate is defined as the ratio of electricity not lost to total supply of electricity. It can 
be seen that over the entire period, the rate of electricity supply efficiency has fluctuated between 
74.86% and 90.65%. In other words, losses of electricity have fluctuated between 9.35% and 
25.14% over the period 1980-2015. The ECA (2008) reported that the international standard for 
maximum electricity losses is 12%. Apart from the electricity losses for 1982, which were 9.35%, 
losses of electricity in Benin have always exceeded this international standard.  
Compared to other countries in terms of rate of electricity supply efficiency, Benin is ranked 24th 
out of 194 countries in the world and 11th out of 53 countries in Africa (Table A.6 in Appendix A). 
This indicates that the Beninese electricity sector is not efficient. As mentioned before, losses of 
electricity can be technical or non-technical. Technical losses are related to the technology used 
for the distribution of electricity, while non-technical losses are caused by human behaviour such 
as electricity thefts, errors in the electricity billing system, corruption and poor governance of the 
electricity distribution system etc. As reported by the République du Bénin (2008), rapid 
urbanization and the insufficiency of urban distribution lines have caused the development of illegal 
distribution networks by a proportion of the urban population that does not have access to 
electricity. This situation has increased the non-technical losses of electricity. As mentioned by the 
République du Bénin (2008), among its goals for energy efficiency, the Beninese Ministry of 
Energy has targeted to reduce electricity losses by 14% from 2020 to 2025, from its level of 
15.93% in 2008. 
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Figure 2.7: History of the rate of electricity supply efficiency in Benin (1980-2015)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on USEIA (2018) 
Seventh, the performance of Benin with regard to access to electricity (RACE) (a proxy for 
electricity supply disruption risks related to the concept of “availability”) is shown in Figure 2.8, 
which represents the history of access to electricity (RACE) in Benin over the period 1990-2016. 
The horizontal axis shows the years, and the vertical axis shows the rate of access to electricity as 
a percentage of total population. It can be seen that apart from the years 2013 and 2014, access to 
electricity has been growing in Benin. Despite this continuous growth, it has remained below 41.5% 
over the entire period. The reduction in access to electricity observed in 2013 and 2014 are the 
consequences of the severe electricity crisis faced by the country during these years (a detailed 
explanation has been provided in the chapter 1, section 1.1.4). As said previously, access to 
electricity in Benin in 2016 was 41.40%, which is lower than both the sub-Saharan Africa and the 
world average access to electricity for this year, which are 42.81% and 87.35% respectively. This 
indicates that there is a huge supply gap of electricity in Benin, as a large proportion of the 
population is still without access to electricity. In other words, there is a total and continuous supply 
disruption of electricity encountered daily by the proportion of the population that does not have 
access to electricity. In addition, when compared to other countries, Benin is ranked 29th in the 
world out of 195 countries and 27th in Africa out of 54 countries in terms of rate of access to 
electricity (Table A.7 in Appendix A). In order to reduce this supply gap of electricity, the national 
framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 40) aimed to increase access to electricity 
to 95% in urban areas and 65% in rural areas by 2025. 
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Figure 2.8: History of access to electricity (RACE) in Benin (1990-2016)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Eighth, the performance of Benin with regard to real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) (expressed as a 
percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita) is shown in Figure 2.9, which 
represents the history of Benin’s real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) (expressed as a percentage of 
the world annual average real GDP per capita) over the period 1960-2017. The vertical axis shows 
Benin’s real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) expressed as a percentage of the world annual average 
real GDP per capita, and the horizontal axis shows the corresponding years. It can be seen that on 
average, the RGDPcW has been decreasing over the period 1960-2017 (as shown by the overall 
downward trend line in Figure 2.9). This indicates that over the period 1960-2017, the average 
person living in Benin has become poorer compared to the average person living in the world. This 
also indicates that over the period 1960-2017, Benin as a country has become more financially 
unable to offer to its population a standard of living similar to the average standard of living of the 
population of the rest of the world.  
However, the absolute value of real GDP per capita (RGDPc) has been increasing over the period 
1960-2017 (Figure 2.10). This indicates that although Benin as a country has become more 
financially unable to offer its population a standard of living similar to the average standard of living 
of the population of the rest of the world, the country’s wealth has increased over the period 1960-
2017. In other words, Benin has become more financially capable of investing in electricity 
infrastructure and utilities, even if such financial capability is very low compared to the financial 
capability of the average country of the world. Such an increase in real GDP per capita (RGDPc) 
did not prevent the country from needing some financial investment in the electricity sector. As 
reported by the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008 pp. 30–31), 
one of the major causes of the supply gap of electricity is the lack of financial investment in 
electricity infrastructure and utilities. Compared to other countries of the world in terms of real GDP 
per capita (RGDPcW) (expressed as a percentage of the world annual average real GDP per 
capita), Benin is ranked 25th in the world out of 189 countries and 22nd in Africa out of 51 countries 
(Table A.8 in Appendix A). 
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Figure 2.9: History of Benin’s real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) (as a percentage of the world 
annual average real GDP per capita) (1960-2017)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the World Development Indicators (2018) data 
 
Figure 2.10: History of Benin’s real GDP per capita (RGDPc) (1960-2017) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
The performance of Benin as related to the disruption risk to electricity supply has been measured 
by the modified index of electricity supply disruption risk (MESRI). It can be seen in Tables B.1, B.2 
in Appendix B that Benin has remained among countries that have a very high level of disruption to 
electricity supply and was ranked the fourth country in the world in terms of disruption to electricity 
supply over the periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2010, and with an index (MESRI) score of 2.157 and 
2.036 for both periods respectively. In the period 2011-2015, Benin was ranked third country in the 
world in terms of disruption to electricity supply with a score of 2.132 for the index (MESRI) (Table 
B.3 in Appendix B). These results emphasize the fact that Benin is among the most vulnerable 
countries in the world in terms of disruption of electricity supply. It can be seen in Tables B.1, B.2, 
B.3 that sub-Saharan African countries tend to constitute the group of countries that have an 
extreme, a very high or high disruption to electricity supply, while most of the wealthiest countries 
in the world constitute the group of countries that have a low disruption to electricity supply. This 
aligns with the IEA (2018), statistics from the World Development Indicators (2018) and the USEIA 
(2018) which emphasize that sub-Saharan African countries have the lowest access to electricity 
and the lowest consumption of electricity. This also aligns with Ferguson et al. (2000) who argued 
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that a positive correlation exists between a country’s wealth and its energy consumption. Wealthy 
countries have high access to energy/electricity and a high consumption of energy/electricity. In 
other words, they have less supply gap of energy/electricity or less disruption to energy/electricity. 
Conversely, poor countries have low access to energy/electricity and a low consumption of 
energy/electricity. In other words, they have more supply gaps in energy/electricity or more 
disruption to energy/electricity supply.  
Figure 2.11 represents the history of the annual performance of Benin as related to disruption of 
electricity supply in 1996, 1998, 2000, and over the period 2002-2015. On the vertical axis are the 
values of the modified index of electricity supply disruption risk (MESRI), while on the abscissa line 
are the corresponding years. MESRI is an increasing function of the level of disruption to electricity 
supply. It is clear that the level of disruption of electricity in the country has remained very high or 
high over the entire period of time. The years 1996, 1998, 2000, the periods 2002-2006 and 2009-
2013, correspond to times of very high levels of disruption to electricity supply, while the periods 
2007-2008 and 2014-2015 correspond to times of high levels of disruption to electricity supply. 
These observed patterns of the modified index of electricity supply disruption risk (MESRI) in 
Figure 2.11 align with the historical facts observed in the Beninese electricity sector. The years or 
periods of very high level of disruption to electricity supply correspond to years of severe electricity 
crises such as 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013. These electricity crises have 
affected the country over consecutive years, which is the reason why, for instance in 1996, the 
country was still facing a very high level of disruption to electricity supply which started in 1994. 
 
Figure 2.11: History of the Modified Electricity Supply Disruption Risk Index of Benin 
(MESRI) (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2015)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from USEIA (2018), World Development Indicators 
(2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank (2018b) 
2.6  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
In this chapter an index of electricity supply security that focuses on the disruption risk to electricity 
has been constructed. Such an index is called the Modified Index of Electricity Supply Disruption 
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Risks (MESRI), and can provide several benefits. First, it will be a very useful tool in the hands of 
policy makers for the monitoring and evaluation of a country’s performance related to electricity 
security. In Benin, it will contribute to the achievement of one of the sub-objectives of the national 
policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008): to define and improve performance 
indicators for the electricity sectors and the national electricity distribution company. In Benin, no 
performance indicator exists to measure the security of electricity supply. The current Modified 
Index of Disruption Risks to Electricity Supply will contribute to fill this gap by being a tool for the 
measurement of the performance of the country in terms of electricity supply security. 
Second, MESRI will be a useful tool for domestic and foreign private investors when assessing the 
ease of doing business in Benin and other countries of the world. As noted previously, some of the 
criteria when assessing the ease of doing business in a country are easy access to electricity and 
the absence or low frequency of disruption risks to electricity supply. MESRI measures the overall 
performance of a country in terms of disruption risks to electricity supply. It also facilitates the 
understanding of how a country performs according to access to electricity, electricity supply 
efficiency, electricity supply self-sufficiency, sustainability of electricity supply (in other words the 
share of renewable electricity used), influence of urbanization on electricity supply, governance, 
capacity to cover the cost of electricity supply and electricity infrastructure. Therefore, it provides 
for domestic and foreign private investors, a whole spectrum of indicators by which countries can 
be assessed in terms of ease of doing business. 
Third, MESRI will be a useful tool for development finance institutions such as the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) when assessing a country’s need for investments in 
infrastructure (physical infrastructure such as power plant, or institutional infrastructure such as 
governance systems or regulatory systems in the electricity sector, etc.) as related to a disruption 
to the electricity supply. A high or very high level of disruption risk to electricity supply in a country 
indicates the need for investment in electricity infrastructure (either physical infrastructure, or 
institutional infrastructure, or both).  
Fourth, MESRI is the first composite index of electricity supply security. It will be a useful tool for 
research institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), the United States Energy 
Information Administration (USEIA), and research departments of development finance institutions 
such as AfDB, ADB, IADB and the World Bank in assessing a country’s performance in terms of 
electricity security, and in forecasting electricity supply security for countries. 
With this index (MESRI), an assessment of the overall performance of Benin in terms of disruption 
risks to electricity supply has been done, which revealed that Benin has a very high level of 
electricity supply disruption risk. An assessment of the performance of Benin according to each 
component of the index has been carried out which revealed that the performance of Benin in 
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terms of the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply, rate of access to electricity, rate of electricity 
supply efficiency, share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity, 
governance, and ratio of growth of urban access to electricity to growth of the urbanization rate, 
are all low. Especially in the case of electricity supply self-sufficiency, Benin is the second worst in 
the world after Togo over the period 2011-2015 (see Table A.5). This suggests that in order to 
improve its overall performance in terms of disruption risk to electricity supply, Benin must first 
improve its governance system as it affects the delivery of electricity to consumers.  
Second, the country must improve its level of domestic production of electricity. The aim of the 
national policy framework is to increase the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply to 70% by 
2025. A reduction of its dependency on importation, will significantly improve Benin’s overall 
performance in terms of disruption risk to electricity supply. Third, the country must improve its 
electricity supply efficiency rate by reducing electricity losses. Finally, in order to align the speed of 
urbanization with the speed of urban access to electricity, Benin must create incentives for the rural 
population to stay in rural areas by building more social and economic infrastructure in those 
areas. Failing this, the high rate of migration from urban to rural area will continue, and will 
increase the rate of urbanization which can become higher than the rate of urban access to 
electricity. The consequence will be an increasing urban supply gap of electricity.  
Both the improvement of the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply and of the electricity supply 
efficiency rate require important investments in electricity infrastructure, while Benin’s wealth as 
measured by its GDP per capita is very low. This requires the country to create incentives for 
foreign and domestic private investors and development finance institutions to invest in the 
Beninese electricity sector. Other ways of financing electricity infrastructure have also been 
identified in the national policy framework for electricity. One of these is an indirect financing 
mechanism, which suggests using donor or national budget funds to finance electricity 
infrastructure in order to contribute to minimizing electricity losses. The financing mechanism then 
recommends using the gain in GDP caused by reductions in electricity loss to reimburse the 
donors or national budget funds. These recommendations of the national policy framework require 
an assessment of the gain in GDP resulting from reductions in electricity losses. In other words, 
they require an assessment of the effects of electricity losses on GDP. This assessment is the 
focus of the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 32 
THE EFFECTS OF ELECTRICITY LOSSES ON GDP 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Payne (2010) and Alam (2006), the availability and low costs of electricity will attract 
investments. Firms will not have to increase their fixed costs by purchasing generators, as 
electricity is available and at low prices. Conversely, the lack of access, high cost and shortages of 
electricity will negatively affect investments and the competitiveness of an economy. Firms will 
prefer to avoid investing in countries where access to electricity is very costly, as the purchase of a 
generator of electricity will be an additional fixed cost. The performance of the electricity sector has 
become one of the indicators of the ease of doing business in a country. Without electricity, several 
sectors of an economy such as transport, industry, services and agribusiness will find it difficult to 
exist. Outages of electricity generate inefficiencies in the economy as they increase costs for firms, 
delay production of goods and services and even affect labour force productivity. Without 
electricity, the health and education system cannot function effectively, and these two sectors are 
essential in building human capital. As mentioned by the IMF (2015), electricity is an important 
driver of total factor productivity in an economy. High investments in electrical infrastructure, 
adequate regulation and good governance in the electricity sector will increase total factor 
productivity. Conversely, outages and low access to electricity will impede total factor productivity, 
economic growth and poverty alleviation. This indicates that investments in the electricity sectors 
should be a priority in all developing countries facing electricity shortages, especially in a country 
such as Benin where there were several electricity shortages in 1984, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2012 and 2013.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Benin also faces huge amounts of electricity losses during distribution 
and transmissions and is ranked 20th in the world and 9th in Africa in terms of electricity losses in 
2015 according to the USEIA (2018). According to the World Development Indicators (2017), 
electricity losses include transmission losses which occur between the sources of production and 
the sources of distribution, and distribution losses which occur between the sources of distribution 
and the consumption’s sites. Antmann (2009, p. 5) in a cross-country study defined losses of 
electricity as follows: “losses refer to the amounts of electricity injected into the transmission and 
distribution grids that are not paid for by users”. In other words, losses of electricity are parts of 
electricity supply that do not reach legal consumers. As explained in the Introduction, illegal 
consumers steal electricity from the national distribution lines. As reported by the République du 
                                               
2
 This chapter has been accepted for publication in the International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 
(IJEEP). The chapter has also been presented as a paper titled “The effects of electricity losses on GDP in 
Benin”, at the 2018 British Institute of Energy Economics (BIEE) conference, held at Oxford University, in the 
UK, in September 2018. 
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Bénin (2008), stolen electricity from the national distribution lines forms part of the non-technical 
electricity losses in Benin. As mentioned previously, technical losses of electricity are related to the 
types of technology used for the transmission and distribution of electricity. Figure 3.1 represents 
the history of electricity supply and electricity consumption. The vertical axis shows electricity 
supply and electricity consumption expressed in billions of kilowatt hour (kWh), and the horizontal 
axis shows time measured in years. There is a gap between electricity supply and electricity 
consumption, and this gap represents electricity losses.  
 
Figure 3.1: History of electricity supply and consumption (in billions kWh) in Benin (1980-
2014)  
Source: USEIA (2017) 
In Benin, losses of electricity ranged between 9.35% and 25.14% of the total electricity supply for 
the period 1980-2014; in 2014, the proportion was 19.403% of the total electricity supply (USEIA, 
2017), while the ECA (2008) suggested that the international maximum target for electricity losses 
should not exceed 12% of the total electricity supply. The total electricity supply in Benin is 
composed of total electricity generated domestically and imports of electricity. According to the 
World Development Indicators (2017), losses of electricity in Benin during the periods 1996-2000, 
2006-2008 and the year 1994 (periods and year for which data are available on the World 
Development Indicators website at the time of analysis) have exceeded 50% of total electricity 
generated domestically. The proportions in 2006, 2007 and 2008 were respectively 81.81%, 
56.81% and 61.13% of total electricity generated domestically (World Development Indicators, 
2017). In order to improve electricity supply efficiency, the Beninese Ministry of Energy planned to 
reduce electricity losses by 18% each year from 2005 to 2010, and by 15% in 2015. However, the 
actual losses of electricity were above the targets set by the Ministry for 2010 and 2015, 
respectively 18.56% and 19.35% (République du Bénin, 2008; USEIA, 2018). The cost of these 
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losses of electricity can range between 0.5 and 1.2% of GDP in many countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa (Antmann, 2009). They constitute a burden on the Beninese economy. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, the promotion of electricity efficiency on both the supply and demand sides is one of 
the pillars of the second objective of the national strategy for access to electricity. In alignment with 
such a pillar, the Ministry of Energy has targeted a reduction of electricity losses by 14% in the 
period 2020-2025 in Benin (République du Bénin, 2008). As explained in the Introduction, in order 
to reduce technical losses of electricity, one of the goals of Benin’s electricity efficiency policy is the 
modernization of the distribution lines using electricity efficient technology. In order to reduce non-
technical losses of electricity, Benin targets to implement an emergency plan aiming at fighting 
corruption and the theft of electricity, and at improving the billing system for electricity supply and 
consumption in the country (see République du Bénin, 2008, pp. 54–55). 
In alignment with Antmann (2009), the national policy framework for electricity acknowledged that 
electricity losses lead to losses of GDP. It then proposed a financing mechanism to be used to fund 
the cost of activities which will help to reduce electricity losses (see République du Bénin, 2008, p. 
65). As reported by the Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (2018), Benin does not have 
a direct financing mechanism for the costs of activities which will help to reduce electricity losses. 
The mechanism proposed by the national policy framework for electricity is an indirect financing 
mechanism. As reported by the Republic of Benin (République du Bénin, 2008), the 
recommendation of such mechanism is twofold: first, it is to use donor or national budget funds to 
finance the cost of projects which will contribute to reduce electricity losses. Reduction of electricity 
losses will result in gains in GDP. For instance, an improvement of the billing system of electricity 
supply and consumption will lower commercial losses of electricity and government revenue 
generated through the sales of electricity by the SBEE and the CEB will increase. Reducing 
electricity losses will increase the quantity of electricity that reaches legal consumers, and such 
increase will lead to an equivalent decrease in the importation of electricity. Hence, the cost of 
importation of electricity will be reduced by an amount equal to the monetary value of gain in 
electricity resulting from the reduction in electricity losses. Consequently, the government will save 
some of its revenues that were allocated to cover the costs of the importation of electricity. These 
increases in government revenues constitute gains in terms of GDP as government revenues are 
included in the calculation of GDP.  
Second, the indirect financing mechanism described in the national policy framework for electricity 
proposed to use the gain in GDP resulting from a reduction in electricity losses to reimburse the 
costs of projects aimed at reducing electricity losses. It therefore becomes important to evaluate 
the effect of electricity losses on GDP. There is no empirical study on Benin which has investigated 
the effect of electricity losses on GDP. Hence, the current study conducts such investigation. It will 
evaluate the effect of electricity losses on GDP; in other words, it will evaluate the gain in GDP 
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resulting from reductions in electricity losses in the Beninese context. By doing so, the study will 
contribute to assess the feasibility of the indirect financing mechanism proposed by the national 
policy framework for electricity to fund the costs of reductions of electricity losses. The study will 
contribute to advance electricity supply efficiency in Benin and will also add value to the existing 
literature on energy efficiency in general and electricity supply efficiency in particular. The 
approach adopted by the study to assess the effect of electricity losses on GDP is, first, to evaluate 
the effect of both electricity consumption (electricity supply under the hypothesis of existence of 
electricity losses or electricity supply net of losses) and electricity supply (electricity supply under 
the hypothesis of non-existence of electricity losses) on GDP. As said before, electricity 
consumption in the Beninese context is equal to electricity supply minus electricity losses. Then, 
following on from this first evaluation, the study will derive the effect of electricity losses on GDP. 
Prior to all these assessments it is important to understand both theoretically and empirically the 
relationship between energy/electricity consumption and economic growth. 
3.2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the effect of electricity losses on economic growth (proxied 
by real GDP). This will be done in a multivariate framework. As argued by Zachariadis (2007) 
multivariate analyses minimize bias of omitted variables encountered in bivariate analyses. 
Although control variables will be inserted in the model, the variables of interest remain electricity 
consumption/supply and real GDP. As mentioned in previous chapters, electricity consumption can 
also be defined as electricity supply net of losses (electricity supply minus electricity losses). The 
theoretical foundation of the relationship between economic growth (real GDP) and energy 
consumption/supply will be examined first, as well as the theoretical foundation of the relationship 
between economic growth and its other determinants such as technological advancement, human 
and physical capital, which in this study represent control variables. Secondly, the empirical 
literature on the relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption/supply will be 
examined. 
3.2.1  Theoretical foundation 
3.2.1.1  Relationship between economic growth and energy consumption/supply 
Early growth models such as Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) (also called Solow-Swan (1956)) in 
which technological advancement is exogenous, the endogenous growth model (for instance the 
Schumpeterian model), Arrow’s (1962) model denoted “learning by doing”, Hicks’s (1932) model 
denoted “induced innovation” did not consider energy as a factor of production. However, 
ecological economists such as Georgescu-Roegen (1971), Cleveland, Costanza, Hall and 
Kaufmann (1984), Ayres and Warr (2005, 2009), Costanza (1980), Hall, Cleveland and Kaufmann 
(1986), Hall, Lindenberger, Kümmel, Kroeger and Eichhorn (2001), Hall, Tharakan, Hallock, 
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Cleveland and Jefferson (2003), and Murphy and Hall (2010) argued that energy plays a crucial 
role in the process of economic development. Following them, scholars in economic geography 
such as Smil (1994), and authors in economic history such as Allen (2009) and Wrigley (1988) 
argued that energy was one of the main determinants of the industrial revolution, and it was 
important to consider it as a factor of production, like capital and labour. According to Wrigley 
(1998), existing constraints on economic growth, energy supply and the production process were 
leveraged since new types of energy such as fossil fuels started to be used. He illustrated his 
statement by comparing the British economy to the Dutch economy. In the Dutch economy, the 
lack of an ongoing availability of energy was a constraint for capital, while in the British economy 
such constraint was lifted as the country had coal mines. Consequently, only the British economy 
experienced the industrial revolution. Following Wrigley (1998), Stern (2010) and Allen (2009) 
highlighted the crucial role of energy in the industrial revolution in the British economy. Theorists in 
ecological economics such as Hall et al. (2003, 1986) and Cleveland et al. (1984) considered that 
the use of energy has led to an increase in productivity. 
While Solow (1956) and endogenous growth theorists do not consider energy as one of the 
important determinants of economic growth, Stern (2010) stipulated that like capital and labour, 
energy is an important production factor for economic growth. However, Stern (2010) did not agree 
with the view of ecological economists who stated that energy was the main cause of economic 
growth. Stern (2010) held that energy is not the main cause of economic growth, but highlighted 
the crucial role played by energy in economic growth and explained that capital and labour, as well 
as energy are necessary production factors of an economy. Based on Stern (1997, 2010) and 
ecological economists’ views, economic growth and energy/electricity consumption/supply are 
expected to have a positive relationship. 
3.2.1.2  The relationship between economic growth, technology, human and physical 
capital 
The focus here is to explain the theoretical foundation of the relationship between economic growth 
and some of its main determinants such as technological advancement, physical capital and 
human capital. These determinants are considered in this study as control variables, as the main 
variables of interest are electricity consumption/supply and economic growth. According to Solow 
(1956) and Swan’s (1956) neoclassical growth theory, also called the “exogenous growth model”, 
advancement in technology drives economic growth in the long run, while physical capital 
accumulation drives growth in the short run. Endogenous growth theorists extended the 
“exogenous growth model” by including human capital stock (Islam, 1995; Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil, 1992), and productivity factors such as “technological knowledge” and “learning-by-doing” as 
variables which drive economic growth in addition to physical capital accumulation (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986, 1990). Throughout the theoretical literature, there is 
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consensus that the stock of human capital, physical capital accumulation and productivity factors 
such as technological advancement constitute important macroeconomic variables which 
determine economic growth in most countries (Romer, 1986, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; Solow, 
1956; Aghion and Howitt, 1991; Lucas, 1988; Frankel, 1962).  
However, throughout the empirical literature, there is no consensus on the sign of the correlation 
between economic growth and the stock of capital, either physical or human. The sign is not 
always positive as it depends on the country’s specific context. Some studies (Knight, Loayza, and 
Villanueva, 1993; Dollar, 1992; Barro, 1999, 2003; Hamilton and Monteagudo, 1998; Anaman, 
2004; Fischer, 1992; Acikgoz and Mert, 2014; Anyanwu, 2014; Bayraktar, 2006; Checherita-
Westphal and Rother, 2012; Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller, 2001) established a significant and 
positive relationship between economic growth and physical capital, while other studies on 
developing countries (Chang and Mendy, 2012; Most and Vann de Berg, 1996) established that 
physical capital proxied by investment can have a significant and negative relationship with 
economic growth, depending on the economic and social context of the countries of analysis. 
Some studies (Knight et al., 1993; Anyanwu, 2014; Fischer, 1992; Freire-Seren, 2002; Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Chen and Feng, 2000; Bayraktar, 2006;) established a significant and positive 
relationship between human capital and economic growth, while other studies such as Hamilton 
and Monteagudo (1998) established a significant and negative relationship between economic 
growth and human capital. In a meta-analysis of the relationship between economic growth and 
human capital Benos and Zotou (2014) established that this relationship is not homogenous, 
rather, it varies according to the economic, social, and political context of the countries of analysis.   
Based on the literature, a positive relationship between technological advancement and economic 
growth can be expected, while the relationship between economic growth and the stock of capital, 
either physical or human, can be either positive or negative: it will depend on the specific context of 
Benin, the country of analysis. 
3.2.2  Empirical literature on the relationship between economic growth and electricity 
consumption/supply 
As stated previously, the goal of this chapter is to investigate the effect of electricity losses on 
economic growth. In order to achieve this goal the relationship between economic growth and 
electricity consumption/supply is investigated. Hence, the focus here will be to review previous 
studies on the effect of electricity consumption/supply on economic growth. Again, as explained 
previously, electricity consumption can also be defined as electricity supply net of losses (electricity 
supply minus electricity losses).  
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3.2.2.1  Studies on the relationship between economic growth and electricity 
consumption/supply 
There is extensive literature on the relationship between electricity consumption and economic 
growth (Acaravci and Ozturk, 2010; Niu, Ding, Niu, Li and Luo, 2011; Ozturk and Acaravci, 2011; 
Solarin, 2011; Shahbaz, Tang and Shahbaz Shabbir, 2011; Georgantopoulos, 2012; Akpan and 
Akpan, 2012; Bouoiyour and Selmi, 2013; Shahbaz and Feridun, 2012; Acaravci and Ozturk, 
2012). This extensive literature can be divided into two groups: the first group comprises country-
specific studies and the second group comprises multiple country studies.  
Country-specific studies have established mixed results on the causal relationship between 
electricity consumption and economic growth. Some studies (Yang, 2000; Jumbe, 2004; Tang, 
2008, 2009; Odhiambo, 2009a; Lean and Smyth, 2010; Ouédraogo, 2010) established a 
bidirectional causal relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption. According 
to these studies, economic growth and electricity consumption/supply are interdependent. Any 
energy efficiency policy aiming to reduce electricity consumption will negatively affect economic 
growth, and any negative shock to economic growth will reduce electricity consumption. Other 
studies (Aqeel and Butt, 2001; Altinay and Karagol, 2005; Lee and Chang, 2005; Shiu and Lam, 
2004; Yoo, 2005; Narayan and Singh, 2007; Yuan et al., 2007; Chandran, Sharma and Madhavan, 
2010; Odhiambo, 2009b) established a unidirectional causal relationship running from electricity 
consumption to economic growth. These studies consider that electricity consumption/supply 
drives economic growth, but not the reverse. Therefore an energy efficiency policy aiming to lower 
electricity consumption will have a negative effect on economic growth. However, negative shocks 
to economic growth will not reduce electricity consumption.  
Yet other studies (Ghosh, 2002; Narayan and Smyth, 2005; Yoo and Kim, 2006; Ho and Sui, 2007; 
Mozumder and Marathe, 2007; Jamil and Ahmad, 2010) established a unidirectional causal 
relationship running from economic growth to electricity consumption. According to these studies, 
economic growth drives electricity consumption, but not the reverse. Hence, any energy efficiency 
policy aiming to reduce electricity consumption will not have a negative effect on economic growth. 
Chandran et al. (2010) established a cointegration relationship between economic growth and 
electricity consumption for Malaysia. Shiu and Lam (2004) established a cointegration relationship 
between electricity consumption and economic growth for China. The mixed results observed 
among country-specific studies are due to the differences in the social, economic, and political 
context of each country, with differences in: the methodology used, the sample size, the proxies 
used for the variables, the omitted variables, the data, and the energy policy of each country 
(Chen, Kuo and Chen, 2007). Results established in country-specific studies are limited to a 
specific context and cannot be generalized. They are very relevant for country-specific policy 
decision, but cannot serve as a reference for regional or international policy decision. 
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Multiple country studies have also established mixed results. In some countries they established 
that electricity consumption drives economic growth or economic growth and electricity 
consumption are interdependent. In such countries, any energy efficiency policy aiming to reduce 
electricity consumption will negatively affect economic growth. In other countries, they established 
that economic growth drives electricity consumption or there is no causal relationship between the 
two variables. In these countries, any energy efficiency policy aiming to reduce electricity 
consumption will have no negative effect on economic growth. For example, Yoo (2006) 
investigated the causal relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption for 
Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. He established a bidirectional causal relationship 
between economic growth and electricity consumption for Singapore and Malaysia. For Thailand 
and Indonesia, he established a unidirectional causal relationship running from economic growth to 
electricity consumption.  
Chen et al. (2007) investigated the causal relationship between economic growth and electricity 
consumption for 10 Asian economies (China, Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, India, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Hong Kong). They established a causal relationship between 
electricity consumption and economic growth for five of the countries studied, while there was no 
causal relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption for Thailand, Indonesia, 
China, Taiwan and Korea. In the case of Malaysia, India, Singapore and the Philippines, they 
established a unidirectional causal relationship running from economic growth to electricity 
consumption; while for Hong Kong, they established a unidirectional causal relationship running 
from electricity consumption to economic growth.  
Squalli (2007) investigated the cointegration and causal relationship between economic growth and 
electricity consumption for OPEC countries such as Iran, Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. He established the 
existence of a long-run relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth for all 
these countries. He also established a unidirectional causal relationship for six of these countries 
(Libya, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Indonesia and Venezuela), while in the case of Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, UAE, and Qatar, there was a bidirectional causal relationship between electricity consumption 
and economic growth.  
Narayan and Prasad (2008) investigated the causal relationship between economic growth and 
electricity consumption in 30 OECD economies. They established the absence of a causal 
relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption in 19 of these, and the 
existence of a causal relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption in the 
remaining 11 economies. Specifically, they established a unidirectional causal relationship running 
from economic growth to electricity consumption for Hungary, the Netherlands, and Finland. In the 
case of Italy, Portugal, Australia, the Slovak People Republic and the Czech People Republic, they 
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established a unidirectional causal relationship running from electricity consumption to economic 
growth. For countries such as Korea, the United Kingdom and Iceland, they established a 
bidirectional causal relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption.  
Narayan and Smyth (2009) established that electricity consumption and exports had a positive 
effect on economic growth in six economies, within the Middle East. Narayan and Smyth (2005) 
established a cointegration relationship between electricity consumption, real income and 
employment in Australia. Yoo and Kwak (2010) analysed the relationship between economic 
growth and electricity consumption for a group of seven South American economies, using Hsiao’s 
(1981) approach to the Granger causality test. They established a unidirectional causal relationship 
running from electricity consumption to economic growth in Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina 
and Chile. For Peru and Venezuela, they established respectively the absence of a causal 
relationship and the evidence of a bidirectional causal relationship between economic growth and 
electricity consumption. They also established a cointegration relationship between economic 
growth and electricity consumption for Venezuela and Columbia.  
Ozturk and Acaravci (2010) investigated the causal relationship between economic growth and 
electricity consumption for some European countries, and established the absence of a causal 
relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption for Bulgaria, Albania and 
Romania, and a bidirectional causal relationship between economic growth and electricity 
consumption for Hungary. Acaravci and Ozturk (2010) investigated the long- and short-run 
relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth for 11 Middle East and North 
African economies. They established a cointegration relationship for four of these economies: 
Oman, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. However, for Syria, Iran, and Morocco, there was no 
cointegration relationship. Using the Johansen and Fisher cointegration technique, Lean and 
Smyth (2010) established a cointegration relationship between output, carbon dioxide emissions 
and electricity consumption for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.  
Wolde-Rufael (2006) on Tunisia, and Ciarreta and Zarraga (2010) on panel data of 12 European 
countries established a negative unidirectional causal relationship running from electricity 
consumption to economic growth. While no explanation was provided for the negative causality 
result of Wolde-Rufael (2006), Ciarreta and Zarraga (2010) interpreted the negative causality as 
the result of the presence of several unproductive industries in this set of European countries. 
Acaravci, Erdogan and Akalin (2015) established both long- and short-run unidirectional causal 
relationships running from electricity consumption to economic growth in Turkey over the period 
1974-2013. Wolde-Rufael (2006) in Egypt, Gabon and Morocco, and Yoo (2005) in Korea, 
established a bidirectional causal relationship between GDP and electricity consumption. When 
compared to country-specific studies, multiple country studies cover many different contexts. 
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Therefore their results and conclusions can often be generalized to a certain extent. They are most 
relevant for regional and international policy decisions. 
To sum up, there is no consensus on the direction of causality between electricity consumption and 
economic growth. Ozturk (2010), Chen et al. (2007) and Payne (2010) argue that the different 
results found in the empirical literature in regard to the direction of causality can be due to 
econometric techniques used, the country’s specific context, the database used, and the omitted 
variables bias. The different results found also highlight the complexity of channels though which 
economic growth and electricity consumption influence each other. 
Four main hypotheses can be found in the empirical literature on the causal relationship between 
economic growth and energy consumption. The first is the “conservation” hypothesis, which 
stipulates that economic growth causes energy consumption. Hence, an energy conservation 
policy will not affect economic growth. The second is the “growth” hypothesis, which stipulates that 
energy consumption causes economic growth. The third is the “feedback” hypothesis which 
stipulates that energy consumption and economic growth cause each other and are interrelated. 
Any energy conservation policy in a context of the “growth” or “feedback” hypotheses will affect 
economic growth. The fourth is the “neutrality” hypothesis, which stipulates that no causal 
relationship exists between economic growth and energy consumption, hence any energy 
conservation policy will not affect economic growth (Apergis and Payne, 2009a, 2009b; Ozturk, 
2010).  
Throughout the empirical literature of the causal relationship between economic growth and 
electricity consumption, these four hypotheses (“conservation”, “growth”, “feedback”, “neutrality”) 
have also been noticed. Payne (2010) in a survey of the literature on the relationship between 
electricity consumption and economic growth, established that the neutrality hypothesis, the 
conservation hypothesis, the growth hypothesis and the feedback hypothesis are supported 
respectively by 31%, 28%, 23%, and 18% of the studies. Payne (2010, pp. 729) also established 
that 34.92% of studies surveyed used multivariate analyses, while 65.08% of them used bivariate 
analyses. One of the limitations of bivariate analyses is the omitted variable bias. Multivariate 
analyses allow the inclusion of different control variables in the model and therefore minimize the 
omitted variable bias. Zachariadis (2007) argued that multivariate analyses allow multiple causality 
frameworks.  
While these studies have attempted to analyse the causal and cointegration relationship between 
electricity and economic growth, it is important to acknowledge their limitations. First, with the 
differing results provided by these studies, it becomes impossible to conclude the true direction of 
the causal relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth. Second, many of 
these studies are cross-country analyses, so they are very limited in terms of country-specific 
policy recommendations. As argued by Lindmark (2002), Stern, Common and Barbier (1996) and 
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Ang (2008), cross-country analyses are too general and very limited for specific policy 
recommendations within countries.  
In the literature on economic growth and energy, very few studies have focused on Benin. Because 
of that, the next section will present both studies on energy consumption and economic growth, 
and studies on electricity consumption and economic growth. 
3.2.2.2  Specific studies on Benin and some African countries on the relationship between 
economic growth and energy/electricity consumption  
There have been very few studies on Benin (Wolde-Rufael, 2009; Wolde-Rufael, 2005; Al-mulali 
and Binti Che Sab, 2012; Rault, Arouri, Youssef and M’Henni, 2014; Dogan, 2014; Menegaki and 
Tugcu, 2016; Fatai, 2014; Zerbo, 2017; Wolde-Rufael, 2006; Ouédraogo, 2013) that have analysed 
the relationship between electricity/energy consumption and economic growth.  There is no 
consensus on the true direction of causality among these studies. Most of them have focused on 
Benin and other countries. Depending on the type of analysis (bivariate or multivariate), and the 
methodology used, these studies have established for Benin either a causal relationship running 
from energy consumption to economic growth (growth hypothesis), or a causal relationship running 
from economic growth to energy consumption (conservation hypothesis), or the absence of a 
causal relationship between economic growth and energy consumption (neutrality hypothesis). In 
the case of other countries, not only have these studies established the previous hypotheses found 
in the case of Benin (either the growth hypothesis, or the conservation hypothesis, or the neutrality 
hypothesis) but they have also found a bidirectional causality between energy consumption and 
economic growth (feedback hypothesis). For example, using a VAR model for a sample of 17 
African countries, Wolde-Rufael (2009) established a causal relationship running from economic 
growth to energy consumption for three of these countries, including Benin. According to his study, 
the implementation of any energy conservation policy in these three countries will negatively affect 
economic growth. He argued that a country like Benin has one of the lowest energy efficiency 
ratios and rates of access to electricity in the world: US$2.5 GDP per unit of energy use as the 
energy efficiency ratio and 22% as the rate of access to electricity in 2009. He explained that the 
Beninese average for these two indicators was even below the sub-Saharan African averages, 
which in 2009 were respectively US$2.9 GDP per unit of energy use (energy efficiency ratio) and 
25.9% (rate of access to electricity). He recommended that a country such as Benin should 
increase its supply of energy in order to achieve sustainable economic growth. 
While Wolde-Rufael (2009) established a causal relationship between economic growth and 
energy consumption, Wolde-Rufael (2005), using the bound testing approach and Toda Yamamoto 
approach to Granger causality in a bivariate analysis for 19 African countries, established for nine 
of these African countries, including Benin, that there is no causal relationship between economic 
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growth and energy consumption. Lütkepohl (1982) and Wolde-Rufael (2009) relate such absence 
of causality to the omitted variables bias, which characterizes bivariate models. 
A cross-country analysis of 30 African countries by Al-mulali and Binti Che Sab (2012), including 
Benin, established that energy consumption causes both economic growth and financial 
development, but with some environmental damage in these countries such as CO2 emissions. 
Rault et al. (2014) studied 16 African countries, including Benin using a VAR model, and 
established for Algeria a causal relationship running from economic growth to energy consumption. 
In the case of Ethiopia, they established a bidirectional causality between energy consumption and 
economic growth, and for seven of the countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, the 
DRC, and Morocco) they established a positive causal relationship running from energy 
consumption to economic growth. For Cameroun, Zambia and South Africa they established a 
negative causality running from energy consumption to economic growth. Rault et al. (2014) 
explained that the negative causality observed in these countries is the result of their energy 
deficit. According to them, these three countries are net importers of total energy. In South Africa 
for example, the electricity shortages have affected the manufacturing industry and the mining 
sector. Workers in the mining industry (underground mining) have to cease working sometimes for 
up to a week, because the mining company cannot garantee an alternative supply of electricity 
whenever there is a disruption to electricity supply. Zambia and Cameroun have also been facing 
disruptions to electricity shortages which have affected several industries. In the case of Benin, no 
causality was found between economic growth and energy consumption.  
Dogan (2014) established for Congo, Benin, and Zimbabwe that there is no causal relationship 
between economic growth and energy consumption. However, in the case of Kenya, he 
established a causal relationship, running from energy consumption to economic growth. Menegaki 
and Tugcu (2016) established that there is no causal relationship between energy consumption 
and national income (proxied by GDP) for 42 African countries, including Benin. Ouedraogo (2013) 
found opposite results for countries of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), including Benin: she established a causal relationship running from energy 
consumption to economic growth (proxied by GDP) in the long run, and a causal relationship 
running from economic growth (proxied by GDP) to energy consumption in the short run. In a study 
of 18 sub-Sahara African countries Fatai (2014) established that there is no causal relationship 
between energy consumption and economic growth for countries of Western and Central Africa, 
including Benin. In the case of countries of Southern and Eastern Africa, he established the 
existence of a causal relationship running from energy consumption to economic growth.  
Zerbo (2017) studied 13 sub-Saharan African countries, including Benin, and established a long-
run relationship between energy consumption and economic growth for all these countries. In the 
case of Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Senegal, South Africa, Ghana and Congo, he established that 
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there is no causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth, but he 
established a causal relationship running from energy consumption to economic growth in the case 
of Nigeria, Kenya and Gabon. In the case of Cameroon, he established a bidirectional causality 
between energy consumption and economic growth, while in the case of Sudan and Zambia, he 
established that causality runs from economic growth to energy consumption.  
Among the few studies which have investigated the relationship between economic growth and 
energy consumption in Benin, very few have targeted electricity consumption (Ouedraogo, 2013; 
Wolde-Rufael, 2006). These studies have focused on Benin in addition to other countries. In the 
case of Benin, they have only established that causality runs from electricity consumption to 
economic growth (proxied by GDP or GDP per capita) (the growth hypothesis). In the case of other 
countries, they have established either a causal relationship running from economic growth to 
electricity consumption (the conservation hypothesis), or a bidirectional causality beween electricity 
consumption and economic growth (the feedback hypothesis), or the absence of causality between 
electricity consumption and economic growth (the neutrality hypothesis), or the growth hypothesis. 
For example, using the bound testing and Toda Yamamoto approaches to Granger causality, 
Wolde-Rufael (2006) investigated the relationship between electricity consumption per capita and 
GDP per capita for 17 African countries using a bivariate framework where the dependent variable 
was electricity consumption per capita. For four of these countries, including Benin, he established 
a long-run relationship between GDP per capita and electricity consumption per capita. However, 
for three of these four countries, including Benin, the coefficient on the error correction term of his 
model was positive and not significant. Such coefficient, also called speed of adjustment to the 
long run equilibrium represents the pace at which the dependent variable goes back to equilibrium 
when there is a variation in the explanatory variables.  
If the speed of adjustment is positive, it indicates that the dependent variable is not returning to the 
long run equilibrium, and this can be due to issues such as misspecification of the model, failure to 
account for structural change (existence of structural breaks). For the dependent variable to return 
to equilibrium, the speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium needs to be negative and 
significant. For the Democratic Republic of Congo and Benin, Wolde-Rufael established a positive 
causal relationship running from electricity consumption per capita to GDP per capita, while for 
Tunisia he established a negative causal relationship running from electricity consumption to GDP 
per capita. The explanation provided by his study for the negative causality found in the case of 
Tunisia is that as the Tunisian economy grows, it requires less energy. However, Tunisia’s energy 
consumption has been growing and the country has been a net exporter of electricity for many 
years (see USEIA (2018)). Hence, disruptions to electricity supply are not common in this country 
as they are in countries such as Benin (See World Bank (2016)). Therefore, the negaitive causality 
found could be due to the omitted variable bias, because Wolde-Rufael’ study is a bivariate 
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analysis, In the case of Gabon, he established a bidirectional causality between electricity 
consumption and GDP per capita. However, the sign of the causal relationship was positive when 
the direction of causality was from GDP per capita to electricity consumption per capita, and the 
sign was negative when the direction of causality was from electricity consumption per capita to 
GDP per capita. While his study provided no explanation for the negative causality observed, it is 
important to notice that Gabon has been selfsufficient in term of electricity supply for many years 
(see USEIA (2018)). Hence, the negative causality observed cannot be due essentially to an 
electricity supply deficit. Again, it could be due to the omitted variable bias, as the study of Wold-
Rufael (2006) is a bivariate analysis.  
As reported previously, Ouedraogo (2013) investigated the causal relationship between energy 
consumption and economic growth for ECOWAS countries, including Benin. Her study was not 
limited to the relationship between energy consumption and economic growth: she also examined 
the relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth, and established a causal 
relationship running from electricity consumption to economic growth in the long run for all these 
countries. 
The main limitation of these studies is that many of them are cross-country studies, and hence, 
they are limited in terms of policy recommendations for Benin. As mentioned by Lindmark (2002), 
Stern et al. (1996) and Ang (2008), cross-country studies are very general and limited in terms of 
policy recommendation for a specific country. Moreover, only a few of these studies have focused 
on electricity consumption. No study on Benin has evaluated the losses in GDP resulting from 
electricity losses. This study fills these gaps by evaluating the losses of GDP due to electricity 
losses in the Beninese context. It estimates both the effects of electricity supply and consumption 
on GDP, and then derives the net effect of electricity losses on GDP. It aligns with the objective of 
the national policy framework for electricity aiming at reducing electricity losses in Benin. It will thus 
contribute to advancing policies on electricity efficiency and electricity security aiming at reducing 
disruption risks to electricity supply caused by electricity losses. The study will also add value to 
the existing literature on electricity supply efficiency and electricity supply security. 
3.2.3 Summary of the current study’s contribution 
Three main areas of contribution are possible in a dissertation: methodology, theory and 
application. Most of the contributions of this study are in the area of application. The main limitation 
of previous studies that this study has examined is the lack of evidence on the effect of electricity 
supply disruption (in the form of electricity losses) on GDP in previous studies on Benin. 
Knowledge of the effect of electricity losses on GDP can be of great importance for planning 
policies on electricity efficiency and electricity supply security in Benin. As mentioned in the 
introduction, this study is an assessment of the feasibility of the indirect financing mechanism 
proposed by the national policy framework for electricity to fund the costs of reductions of 
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electricity. As explained previously, it will advance electricity efficiency policies aiming at reducing 
disruption risks to electricity supply such as electricity losses, and it will also add value to the 
existing literature on electricity supply security and electricity supply efficiency on Benin. Prior to 
this study, there has been no empirical evaluation of the loss of GDP resulting from electricity 
losses in Benin. 
3.3  METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1  Empirical model specification 
There is theoretical consensus on the positive correlation between electricity supply and growth. 
However, there is no empirical consensus on the direction of causality between these two 
variables. For Neoclassic economists, labour, capital and technology are the factors of production. 
According to the growth models of Harrod-Domar and Solow-Swan, energy is not to be considered 
as a factor of production. However, authors such as Stern (1997) stipulated that energy can be 
considered as a factor of production or as a final product. Following Stern (1997), studies such as 
Pokrovski (2003) stipulated that equipment which involves the use of energy rather than the use of 
manual labour is to be considered as a production factor. After the oil crisis of the 1970s and the 
resulting shocks on many economies, many authors realized the importance of energy as a 
production factor. As a result, authors such as Thompson (2006), Beaudreau (2005), Ghali and El 
Sakka (2004), Alam (2006) and Stern (1993, 2000) argued that energy is one of the main variables 
of production, therefore, it should be considered as a factor of production as are labour and capital. 
Following the work of Shabaz (2015) and Odularu and Okonkwo (2009), an endogenous growth 
model was developed for this specific study where energy is one of the independent variables. This 
model is: 
,( , , , )                                                                                                                       (3.1)t j t t tG f A E K L
 
where A, E, L and K are respectively technology, energy supply, labour and capital. G represents 
output (real GDP). Energy supply (E) is limited in this study to electricity supply; j represents either 
one of the following alternatives: the first is the case where the energy supply variable (E) in 
Equation 3.1 is electricity supply under the hypothesis of absence of losses (ES); the second is the 
case where the energy supply variable (E) in Equation 3.1 is electricity supply net of losses (in 
other words electricity consumption) (EC). The aim here is to investigate the effects of losses of 
electricity on aggregate output (real GDP). In other words, if there were no losses of electricity 
during the transmission and the distribution, what would be the gain in terms of an increase in real 
GDP? In other words, what is the loss in terms of real GDP as a result of electricity losses? There 
are two scenarios in Equation 3.1: in the first, G is a function of technology (A), labour (L), capital 
(K) and electricity supply (ES) under the hypothesis of absence of losses, and in the second, G is a 
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function of technology (A), capital (K), labour (L) and electricity supply net of losses (also called 
electricity consumption (EC)). When assuming constant elasticities Equation 3.1 becomes: 
, ,                                                                                                                       (3.2)
j j j
t j t t t j tG AE K L
  

where θ, ϕ, and ρ, are the elasticities of output with respect to labour, electricity 
supply/consumption and capital, respectively, and where εt represents the residual term, j remains 
as described in Equation 3.1. 
When taking the logarithm of Equation 3.2 we obtain:  
 , ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )                                                  (3.3)t j j t j t j t j tLn G Ln A Ln E Ln K Ln L Ln          
where ϕ, ρ and θ, respectively represent the output elasticities of electricity supply/consumption 
(E), capital (K), and labour (L); j remains as described in Equation 3.1. Equation 3.3 can be re-
expressed as follows: 
, ,( ) ( ) ( )                                                                       (3.4)t j j t j t j t j tLnG Ln E Ln K Ln L          
In Equation 3.4, β is a constant term and is equal to Ln(A) (see Equation 3.3), and ωt represents 
the residual terms and is equal to Ln(εt) (see Equation 3.3). From Equation 3.4, we can infer that 
growth in output is a function of growth in labour, electricity supply/consumption and capital. The 
study first analyses the relationship between electricity supply (in the absence of losses) (ES) and 
aggregate output (real GDP), and the relationship between electricity consumption (electricity 
supply net of losses) (EC) and aggregate output (real GDP) using the framework of Equation 4.4. 
Second, the study compares the estimated coefficient of electricity supply net of losses (EC) to the 
estimated coefficient of electricity supply under the hypothesis of absence of losses (ES). This will 
allow us to estimate the loss in terms of real GDP as a result of electricity losses. Following Soytas 
and Sari (2006), Yuan, Kang, Zhao and Hu (2008), Narayan and Smyth (2008), Sari and Soytas 
(2007), Lee and Chang (2008), we proxy the stock of capital (K) by Gross Capital formation (GCF). 
In alignment with Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2010), Dogan (2015), Soytas and Sari (2009), 
Streimikienne and Kasperowicz (2016), Soytas, Sari and Ewing (2007), this study uses labour 
force (population (number of individuals) whose age is between 15 and 64) (LF) as a proxy for 
labour. The aim of this study is not to investigate the relationship between gross capital formation, 
labour force and economic growth. Labour force and gross capital formation are not the variables 
of interest in this model. The variables of interest here are electricity supply (ES), electricity 
consumption (EC) and real GDP.  
3.3.2  Data  
We have gathered secondary data composed of annual series of real GDP (RGDP) at constant 
2010 US$, real gross capital formation (GCF) at constant 2010 US$, labour force (LF) defined as 
the population whose age is between 15 and 64 years, electricity consumption (electricity supplied 
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net of losses (EC)) in billions of kWh and total electricity supplied (electricity supplied under the 
hypothesis of absence of losses (ES)) in billions of kWh. Series on RGDP and GCF have been 
collected from the World Development Indicators’ (2016) website, while series on electricity 
consumption (EC) and total electricity supplied (ES) were collected from the USEIA (2016) 
website. The series on labour force (LF) were collected from the US Census Bureau (2016) 
website. All series were collected over the period 1980-2014. There were no missing values in the 
series. Following Shabaz, Mallick, Mahalik and Sadorsky (2016) and Shahbaz, Hoang, Mahalik 
and Roubaud (2017), all series were converted into their logarithmic form in order to ensure proper 
distributional properties of the data. 
3.3.3  Analytical framework 
The Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) was used to select the optimal lag in the models in this study. 
It is crucial to check for the stationarity of the study’sseries in order to avoid supurious regressions. 
There are several different unit root tests (Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) (DF-GLS), 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Ng and Perron (2001), Phillip Perron (PP) test, Zivot Andrew test, 
Modified Augmented Dickey Fuller (MADF) test with breakpoint) which test the null hypothesis of 
evidence of a unit root against the alternative hypothesis of no evidence of a unit root. There are 
also some stationarity tests such as Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) which test the 
null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative hypothesis of no stationarity. Perron (1989) 
argued that the use of the ADF test can lead to biased results when there is evidence of breaks in 
series. Leybourne, Mills and Newbold (1998) and Leybourne and Newbold (2000) argued that the 
rejection of the null hypothesis can be biased with the ADF test when there is evidence of a break 
in the beginning of the series. As a result, Perron and Vogelsang (1992), Perron (1997) and other 
studies developed different unit root tests which allow for one structural break. However, these 
tests omit the possibility of the existence of more than one structural break in the data, as the unit 
root test shows only the most significant break. Consequently, the results of these tests can be 
biased as the conclusions on stationarity of variables can be caused by an omitted break 
(Vogelsang, 1994). Consequently, Lee and Strazicich (2003), Narayan and Popp (2010), 
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) and Bai (1997) developed other unit 
root tests which allow for more than one structural break. 
As mentioned previously, the Beninese economy has encountered several shocks: the devaluation 
of the CFA currency by 50% in 1994, the consecutive electricity crises in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s, and the change in political and economic structure with the shift from a socialist regime to 
private ownership, democracy and free market in 1990 (Constant, 2012; Hounkpatin, 2013; 
Schneider, 2000). Hence, it becomes necessary to apply to this study’s series a unit root test which 
accounts for structural breaks. Because of the small size of the sample (35 observations), more 
than one breakpoint in the series was not accounted for, hence the Narayan and Popp (2010), 
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Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), Lee and Strazicich (2003), Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), and Bai 
(1997) unit root tests were not applied. Instead, the MADF (which can be found in eviews 9.5 or 
10), and the Zivot Andrew test (ZA), which determine one break date endogenously, have been 
used. The results of these unit roots with structural break have also been cross-checked with a 
stationarity test (KPSS). The next step was to investigate the existence of a cointegration 
relationship among variables of the models.The autoregressive distributive lags (ARDL) bound 
testing approach developed by Pesaran and Shin (1999), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) and 
Pesaran and Pesaran (2009) was used to investigate the existence of a cointegration relationship 
among the variables. There are several advantages related to the use of the ARDL. It 
simultaneously estimates both short- and long-run relationships. The ARDL allows the use of both 
I(0) and I(1) variables. Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran (1997) mentioned that a sufficient 
increase of the order of the ARDL will simultaneously correct for serial correlation and endogeneity. 
Haug (2002) and Pesaran and Shin (1999) argued that the bound testing approach performs better 
on small sample sizes than do other cointegration techniques such as Johansen and Juselius 
(1990), Engle and Granger (1987) and Philips and Hansen (1990). The sample size in this study 
was 35 observations. Using the Johansen test on small samples size may lead to inconsistent 
results.  
Following Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001), the following dynamic unrestricted 
error correction models (UECM) were developed: 
Model F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) with real GDP (logRGDP) as dependent variable: 
1 2 2
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Model F(logE\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF) with electricity supply or consumption (logEj) as 
dependent variable: 
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Model F(logGCF\logRGDP, logE, logLF) with gross capital formation (logGCF) as dependent 
variable: 
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1 2 2
2
30 31, 32, , , 33,
1 0 0
34, 31 1 32, , 1 33 1 34 1 3,
0
log log log log
log log log log log                                   (3.7)
q q q
t i t i j i j t i i t i
i i i
q
i t i t j j t t t t
i
GCF a GCF E RGDP
LF GCF E RGDP LF
  
     
  
  
    

       
      
  

 
Model F(logLF\logRGDP, logE, logGCF) with labour force (logLF) as dependent variable: 
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where all independent variables with a difference operator (∆) represent short-run dynamics and all 
independent variables without a difference operator represent long-run dynamics. βh,i represents 
short run coefficients, while ϕh,i represents long run coefficients, for h = 1, 2, 3, 4 and i = 1, 2, 3, 4; 
εh,t is a white noise, q1 and q2 represent the optimal lag for the dependent and independent 
variables respectively; j represents either the presence or the absence of electricity losses. Ej 
represents either electricity supply under the hypothesis of absence of electricity losses (ES) or 
electricity consumption (electricity supply net of losses) (EC). RGDP, GCF and LF represent real 
GDP, gross capital formation and labour force respectively. As noted in previous sections, AIC was 
used for the optimal lag selection. Enders (2004) argued that the optimal lag for annual series 
should be 1, 2 or 3. While four UECMs are described in Equations 3.5 to 3.8, the main interest for 
purposes of this study is the relationship between electricity supply/consumption and economic 
growth of Equation 3.5. UECMs of Equations 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 represent the other possible 
cointegration vectors that could exist using linear combinations of electricity consumption (logEC), 
real GDP (logRGDP), gross capital formation (logGCF), and labour force (logLF), or linear 
combinations of electricity supply (logES), real GDP (logRGDP), gross capital formation (logGCF), 
and labour force (logLF).  
Using ARDL to estimate Equation 3.5, implies an assumption that the UECM in Equation 3.5 is the 
only viable cointegration vector and the UECMs of equations 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 are not viable. In 
order to verify such an assumption, the weak exogeneity test is used, which applies a Wald 
restriction on the error correction terms (ECT) of each of the models 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. If the p-
value of the Chi-square statistic is not significant then the corresponding UECM is not viable. In 
other words, the cointegration vector represented by such UECM does not exist. In addition to the 
weak exogeneity test, it is also important to check the sign and the significance of the coefficient of 
the error correction term (ECT) of each UECM of Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. If the coefficient 
of the ECT (such coefficient is also called speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium) is not 
negative, or if it is not significant, then the corresponding UECM is not viable. 
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In Equation 3.5, both the UECMs F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) (model with electricity 
consumption or electricity supply net of losses) and F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF) (model with 
electricity supply under the hypothesis of absence of losses) are affected by heteroskedasticity and 
by the presence of unstable parameters at lag 1 and 3 (further details are provided in Table 3.2 
and Figures 3.2 and 3.3 in the section 3.4.1 on descriptive statistics and optimal lag selection). 
Hence, we have chosen 2 as the maximum lag during the lag selection procedure in both models 
and in other UECMs (F(logEC\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF), F(logGCF\logRGDP, logEC, logLF), 
F(logLF\logRGDP, logEC, logGCF), F(logES\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF), F(logGCF\logES, 
logRGDP, logLF) and F(logLF\logES, logGCF, logRGDP) in Equations 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8). The result 
of the lag selection criteria are discussed further (see the section 3.4.1 on descriptive statistics and 
optimal lag selection). As said previously, j represents either the absence or the presence of 
electricity losses.  
The next step is cointegration analysis. The bounds test developed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
was used to investigate the existence of a cointegration relationship among the variables of 
Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. The null hypothesis (H0) for each UECM stipulates that there is no 
cointegration relationship and is: 
H0: 
  , =               ( , ) 1,2,3,4            x 1,2,3,4             (3.9),  0h ih i  
 
and the alternative hypothesis (HA) stipulates that there is a cointegration relationship which is: 
HA: 
  , ,) 1,2,3,4 x 1,2,3,4 ,  ,  0                                                              (3.1 0( , )h i h ih i     
 
where ϕh,i represents the long-run coefficients of each of the UECMs of Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 
3.8. In other words: 
For the UECM of Equation 3.5, the null hypothesis is: 
11 12 13 1401: 0                                                                                                         (3.11)H          
and the alternative hypothesis is: 
11 12 13 141: 0;  or 0;  or 0;  or 0                                                                              (3.12)HA         
For the UECM of Equation 3.6, the null hypothesis is: 
21 22 23 2402 : 0                                                                                                       (3.13)H          
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and the alternative hypothesis is: 
21 22 23 242 : 0;  or 0;  or 0;  or 0                                                                            (3.14)HA         
For the UECM of Equation 3.7, the null hypothesis is: 
31 32 33 3403: 0                                                                                                        (3.15)H          
and the alternative hypothesis is: 
31 32 33 343: 0;  or 0;  or 0;  or 0                                                                             (3.16)HA         
For the UECM of Equation 3.8, the null hypothesis is: 
41 42 43 4404 : 0                                                                                                        (3.17)H          
and the alternative hypothesis is: 
41 42 43 443: 0;  or 0;  or 0;  or 0                                                                             (3.18)HA       
 
Narayan (2004) stipulated that critical values of Pesaran et al. (2001) were computed on sample 
sizes that range from 500 to 1000 and are not consistent with small sample sizes. He established a 
new set of critical values for small samples that range between 30 and 80 observations. Because 
of the small size of the annual series (35 observations), the reformulated critical value of Narayan 
(2004), which is more consistent with small samples, will be used, instead of the critical value of 
Pesaran et al. (2001). The F statistic of the bounds test has a distribution that depends on the 
number of explanatory variables in the ARDL model, the order of integration of the variables 
included in the ARDL model, and the existence or not of intercept and/or trend in the ARDL model 
(see Narayan, 2004, p. 13). Because there is no trend specification, but only an intercept in the 
unrestricted error correction models (UECM) described previously in equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 
3.8, a critical values’ table on restricted intercept and no trend at 5% significance level will be used, 
when comparing the value of the bounds test’s F statistic to the reformulated critical values of 
Narayan (2004). If the F statistic of the bounds test falls inside the bound’s interval, then the result 
of the bounds test becomes inconclusive. If it is larger than the upper bound critical value of 
Narayan (2004), then there is evidence of a cointegration relationship between the variables. If the 
F statistic is less than the lower bound critical value of Narayan (2004), then there is no 
cointegration relationship between the variables.  
In case there is a cointegration relationship among the variables, and particularly if a cointegration 
relationship exists in the models of interest (F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) for the model with 
electricity consumption or electricity supply net of losses and F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF) 
for the model with electricity supply under the hypothesis of absence of losses), the next step will 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
124 
 
be to verify that the models of interest are the only cointegrating vectors and all other possible 
cointegrating vectors are not viable. As said before, this will be done using the weak exogeneity 
test, and by observing the sign and the significance of the coefficient associated to the error 
correction term of each cointegrating vector. If the only viable cointegrating vectors are our models 
of interest, then the next step will be to check the consistency of the models of interest of Equation 
3.5 (F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF)) by conducting 
residuals and stability diagnostic tests (normality test, Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial 
correlation, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity, CUSUM and CUSUM of squares 
tests for parameter stability, Ramsey reset test). If the models of interest are consistent, in other 
words, if there is no serial correlation, no heteroskedasticity, if residuals are normal, if the model is 
well specified and if the parameters are stable, then the next step will be to estimate the long- and 
short-run effects of electricity supply/consumption (logEj), gross capital formation (logGCF), and 
labour force (logLF) on real GDP (logRGDP) as follows: 
Long-run model: 
0 1, 2, , , 3, 4,
1 0 0 0
log log log log log              (3.19)
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Short-run model (restricted error correction model): 
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where b0, b1, b2, b3, b4 are long-run parameters and c0, c1, c2, c3,c4 are short-run parameters, j 
represents either the presence or the absence of electricity losses. RGDP represents real GDP, 
GCF represents gross capital formation, LF represents labour force, and Ej, represents either 
electricity consumption (EC) or electricity supply in the absence of electricity losses (ES); λ 
represents the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium and must be negative and 
significant before long-run causality can be inferred; as mentioned before, λ is defined as the pace 
at which the dependent variables go back to equilibrium, when there is a change in the explanatory 
variables. If it is positive, then the dependent variable is not returning to equilibrium, and this can 
be due to structural change issues (failure to account for existing breaks), or a misspecification of 
the model; for the dependent variable to return to equilibrium, λ must be negative; k, l, m, n, 
represent the optimal lag, ect is the error correction term, and μ and ε represent error terms. Based 
on the assumption that the stability diagnostic tests reveal that parameters of the model of interest 
are stable, it is not necessary to insert a dummy variable in the long- and short-run specifications of 
these models in order to account for a structural break. In case such an assumption might appear 
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to be wrong, it is necessary to ensure the parameters’ stability by inserting a dummy variable in the 
long- and short-run specification of these models in order to account for a structural break. 
The main purpose of this study is to compute the loss in terms of GDP resulting from losses of 
electricity in both the long- and the short-run. The long-run loss of GDP (LR_LGDP) resulting from 
electricity losses will be equal to the long-run coefficient on electricity supply in the absence of loss 
(ES) (ES is equal to Ej in the absence of electricity losses) minus the long-run coefficient of 
electricity consumption (EC) (EC is equal to Ej in the presence of electricity losses). The short-run 
loss of GDP (SR_LGDP) resulting from electricity losses will be equal to the short-run coefficient of 
electricity supply (ES) minus the short-run coefficient of electricity consumption (EC).  
3.4  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.4.1  Descriptive statistics and optimal lag selection 
Table 3.1 shows that all the variables have a normal distribution and electricity consumption 
(logEC)/electricity supply (logES), gross capital formation (logGCF) and labour force (logLF) are 
positively correlated with real GDP (logRGDP). This aligns with the a priori expectation explained 
previously (in section 3.2.1 on theoretical foundation). Enders (2004) argued that the optimal lag 
for annual series should range between 1 and 3. At lags 1 and 3, the models of interest 
F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF) are affected by 
heteroskedasticity and instability of parameters (see Table 3.2 and Figures 3.2 and 3.3 below). 
Hence, lag 2 has been chosen as maximal lag in the lag selection procedure for the annual series. 
In Table 3.3, all lag selection criteria revealed 2 as the optimal lag for the UECM 
F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and 1 as optimal lag for the UECM F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, 
logLF). Because of the nuisance due to heteroskedasticity and instability of parameters occurring 
at lag 1, we have chosen lag 2 when specifying the UECM F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF). 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Descriptive statistics Real GDP 
(logRGDP) 
Electricity 
consump-
tion (logEC) 
Electricity 
supply 
(logES) 
Gross 
capital 
formation 
(logGCF) 
Labour 
force 
(logLF) 
Mean 9.6223 -0.5157 -0.4148 8.9974 6.4796 
Median 9.6140 -0.5228 -0.4538 9.0033 6.4870 
Maximum 9.9332 0.0094 0.1058 9.4371 6.7346 
Minimum 9.3437 -1.0000 -0.9788 8.6180 6.2218 
Std. Dev. 0.1772 0.3340 0.3108 0.1891 0.1573 
Skewness 0.1193 -0.0404 0.1594 0.1996 -0.0518 
Kurtosis 1.6895 1.8119 1.9094 2.8219 1.7623 
Jarque-Bera 2.5873 2.0677 1.8826 0.2787 2.2495 
Probability 0.2742 0.3556 0.3901 0.8699 0.3247 
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Correlation  
LogRGDP 1     
LogEC 0.9568 1    
LogES 0.9804 0.9558 1   
LogGCF 0.8362 0.8541 0.8182 1  
logLF 0.9944 0.9586 0.9725 0.8092 1 
Observations: 35      
Source: Author’s estimation 
Table 3.2: Heteroskedasticity test (Breusch Pagan-Godfrey) at lag 1 for UECMs 
F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF) 
Models 
Dependent 
variables in the 
model 
Number of lags Chi-square P-values 
F(logRGDP\logEC, 
logGCF, logLF) 
logRGDP 1 14.33208 0.0063 
F(logRGDP\logES, 
logGCF, logLF) 
logRGDP 1 19.19069 0.0018 
Source: Author’s estimation 
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Figure 3.2: Stability test (CUSUM test) at lag 3 for the UECM F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, 
logLF) 
Source: Author’s estimation 
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Figure 3.3: Stability test (CUSUM test) at lag 3 for the UECM F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, 
logLF) 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
Table 3.3: Results of lag selection criteria  
 
F(logRGDP, logEC, 
logGCF, logLF) 
 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 170.8653 NA 4.77e-10 -10.1130 -9.9316 -10.0520 
1 343.7070 293.3071 3.58e-14 -19.6186 -18.7116* -19.3134 
2 367.8343 35.0943* 2.29e-14* -20.1111* -18.4786 -19.5618* 
 
F(logRGDP, logES, 
logGCF, logLF),  
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 190.7814 NA 1.43e-10 -11.3200 -11.13869 -11.2590 
1 374.8220 312.3113* 5.43e-15* -21.5043* -20.59739* -21.1991* 
2 390.0068 22.0870 5.98e-15 -21.4549 -19.8224 -20.9056 
 
Notes: (*) indicates the optimal lag length selected by the criterion  
LR: sequential modified LR statistic 
AIC: Akaike information criterion  
FPE: Final prediction error  
SC: Schwarz information criterion  
HQ: Hanan-Quinn information criterion 
Source: Author’s estimation 
3.4.2  Results of unit root and stationarity tests 
Graphs of the series were first observed and it was noticed that they all have a trend and an 
intercept (Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8). Next, the ZA unit root, the MADF test with breakpoint, 
and the KPSS test were applied to each series at level with intercept and trend and at first 
difference with intercept and trend. The maximal lag used was 2. The tests revealed that the 
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variables are either I(1) or I(0). Results are presented in Table 3.4 below. The existence of a 
cointegration relationship among the variables was then investigated, using the bounds testing 
approach to cointegration. 
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Figure 3.4: History of real GDP (logRGDP) in Benin (1980-2014)  
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from World Development Indicators (2016) 
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Figure 3.5: History of electricity consumption (logEC) in Benin (1980-2014)  
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from USEIA (2016) 
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Figure 3.6: History of electricity supply (logES) in Benin (1980-2014)  
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from USEIA (2016) 
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Figure 3.7: History of gross capital formation (logGCF) in Benin (1980-2014)  
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from World Development Indicators (2016) 
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
logLF
 
Figure 3.8: History of labour force (logLF) in Benin (1980-2014) 
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from US Census Bureau (2016) 
Table 3.4: Results of unit root tests 
Unit root tests Variables 
logRGDP logEC logES logGCF logLF 
KPSS Level Intercept 
and trend 
0.144485 0.094474 0.135728 0.134771 0.151169** 
1
st
 
difference 
Intercept 
and trend 
--- --- --- --- 0.121166 
ZA Level Intercept 
and trend 
-4.569203 (2) 
[1987] 
-6.250517 
(2)*** 
[1989] 
-4.408400 (2) 
[1995] 
-4.631197 (2) 
[1987] 
-16.60632 
(2)*** 
[1993] 
1
st
 
difference 
Intercept 
and trend 
-6.401279 
(2)*** 
[1990] 
--- -7.840395 
(2)*** 
[2003] 
-7.352964 
(2)*** [1996] 
--- 
MADF Level Intercept 
and trend 
-4.4396 (2) 
[1986] 
-8.4120 (2)*** 
[1988] 
-10.5039 (2)*** 
[1994] 
-4.5204 (2) 
[1987] 
-16.2215 
(2)*** 
[1992] 
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1
st
 
difference 
Intercept 
and trend 
-6.9210 (2)*** 
[1987] 
--- --- -7.1472 (2)*** 
[1991] 
--- 
 
Notes:  (***) and (**) indicate 1% and 5% significance levels respectively 
The numbers in round brackets represent the maximum lag selected to run the unit root 
test.   
The numbers in square brackets represent the break dates.  
Source: Author’s estimation 
3.4.3  Results of cointegration and diagnostic tests 
Table 3.5 shows that for both model 1 F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and model 2 
F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF), the F statistic of the bound test is superior to the upper bound 
critical value of Narayan’s (2004) table (restricted intercept with no trend) at 5% and 1% 
respectively (model 1 and 2 are in bold in Table 3.5). This shows that there is evidence of a 
cointegration relationship among the variables of model 1 (real GDP (logRGDP), electricity 
consumption (logEC), gross capital formation (logGCF), labour force (LF)) and variables of model 2 
(real GDP (logRGDP), electricity supply (logES), gross capital formation (logGCF), and labour 
force (LF)).  
Table 3.5: Cointegration results for all UECMs  
 
 
 
Models F-
statistic 
(Bounds 
test) 
ARDL DW test Adj-R
2
 R
2
 F-statistic 
(cointe-
gration 
test 
equation) 
Probability 
F-statistic 
(cointe-
gration 
test 
equation) 
Model (with 
electricity 
consumption 
(EC)) 
F(logRGDP\log
EC, logGCF, 
logLF) 
5.5533*
* 
ARDL 
(1,2,2,2) 
1.9888 0.6415 0.7535 6.7266*
** 
0.0001 
F(logEC\logRG
DP, logGCF, 
logLF) 
2.3584 ARDL 
(1,2,0,0) 
1.5261 0.4991 0.5930 6.3148*
** 
0.0003 
 F(logGCF\logR
GDP, logEC, 
logLF) 
6.0597*
** 
ARDL 
(1,2,2,0) 
1.8667 0.5199 0.6399 5.3326*
** 
0.0006 
 F(logLF\logRG
DP, logEC, 
logGCF) 
2.6934 ARDL 
(2,0,0,0) 
1.6753 0.1078 0.2472 1.7738 0.1520 
Model (with 
electricity 
supply (ES)) 
F(logRGDP\log
ES, logGCF, 
logLF) 
12.2598
*** 
ARDL 
(2,0,2,2) 
2.0470 0.5082 0.6465 4.6745*
** 
0.0013 
F(logES\logRG
DP, logGCF, 
logLF)  
10.5689
*** 
ARDL 
(1,2,1,0) 
1.1504 0.6262 0.7079 8.6582*
** 
0.00002 
F(logGCF\logE
S, logRGDP, 
3.3518 ARDL 
(1,1,0,0) 
2.1937 0.3499 0.4484 4.5537
*** 
0.0036 
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logLF) 
F(logLF\logES, 
logGCF, 
logRGDP) 
2.5741 ARDL 
(2,0,0,0) 
1.7620 0.0945 0.2360 1.6681 0.1763 
Significance 
level of F-
statistic from 
the bound test 
Narayan critical 
value for lower 
bound I(0) (in the 
restricted 
intercept with no 
trend’s table) 
Narayan 
critical 
value for 
upper 
bound 
I(1) (in 
the 
restricted 
intercept 
with no 
trend’s 
table) 
      
1% 4.578 5.864       
5% 3.198 4.202       
10% 2.644 3.548       
 
Notes:  (*), (**), (***) indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
The cells in bold represent the models of interest.  
Source: Author’s estimation 
The next step was to verify if the UECMs (F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and 
F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF) were the only cointegrating vectors or if other UECMs 
((F(logEC\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF), F(logGCF\logRGDP, logEC, logLF), F(logLF\logRGDP, 
logEC, logGCF), F(logES\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF), F(logGCF\logES, logRGDP, logLF) and 
F(logLF\logES, logGCF, logRGDP)) also constituted cointegrating vectors. This was done using 
the weak exogeneity test and by observing the sign and the significance of the coefficient on the 
error correction terms of each UECM. If the coefficient of the error correction term is not negative 
or not significant, the corresponding UECM is not viable. As said before, the weak exogeneity test 
applies a Wald restriction on the coefficient of the error correction term. If the Chi-square statistic is 
not significant, then the corresponding UECM is not viable, in other words, such UECM is not a 
cointegrating vector. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the results of the weak exogeneity test. 
Table 3.6: Results of the weak exogeneity test (models with logEC as one of the variables) 
Models Dependent 
variable 
Coefficient 
of the error 
correction 
term (ECT) 
P-value of 
ECT 
Chi-square 
(Wald test) 
P-value of 
Chi-square 
F(logRGDP\logEC, 
logGCF, logLF) 
∆logRGDP -0.348799*** 0.0003 17.74745*** 0.0000 
F(logEC\logRGDP, 
logGCF, logLF) 
∆logEC 1.835386**
(a)
 
 
0.0293 5.294696**
 
0.0214 
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F(logGCF\logRGDP, 
logEC, logLF) 
∆logGCF 0.247019
(a)
 0.7528 0.101236 0.7504 
F(logLF\logRGDP, 
logEC, logGCF) 
∆logLF 0.005818
(a)
 0.7641 0.091864 0.7618 
 
Notes: (***) and (**) indicate 1% and 5% significance levels respectively. 
(a) indicates that the coefficient of the error correction term is positive.  
Source: Author’s estimation 
Table 3.7: Results of the weak exogeneity test (models with logES as one of the variables) 
Models Dependent 
variable 
Coefficient 
of the error 
correction 
term (ECT) 
P-value of 
ECT 
Chi-square 
(Wald test) 
P-value of 
Chi-square 
F(logRGDP\logES, 
logGCF, logLF) 
∆logRGDP -0.233617* 0.0585 3.903758** 0.0482 
F(logES\logRGDP, 
logGCF, logLF) 
∆logES 2.435854***
(a)
 0.0000 28.01633***
 
0.0000 
F(logGCF\logRGDP, 
logES, logLF) 
∆logGCF 0.444062
(a)
 0.6634 0.193588 0.6599 
F(logLF\logRGDP, 
logES, logGCF) 
∆logLF 0.001540
(a)
 0.9495 0.004090 0.9490 
 
Notes: (***), (**), and (*) indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. 
(a) indicates that the coefficient of the error correction term is positive.  
Source: Author’s estimation 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 above show that only the coefficient on the error correction of the models of 
interest (models in bold in Tables 3.6 and 3.7) (F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and 
F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF)) are significant at 1% and 10%. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 also show 
that only these coefficients are negative. Coefficients of the error correction term of other models 
are all positive. This indicates that only the cointegration vectors represented by the model of 
interest are viable. Cointegration vectors represented by other models are not viable. 
When looking at the results of the Wald test, it can be seen that the chi-square statistic is 
significant in the case of the two models of interest (F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and 
F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF)). In the other models, only the chi-square statistic of models 
F(logEC\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF) and F(logES\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF) are significant; 
however, as noted previously, the coefficient of the error correction term for these models 
(F(logEC\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF) and F(logES\logRGDP, logGCF, logLF)) is positive. All these 
indicate that only the cointegrating vectors represented by the models of interest 
(F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF)) are viable. 
Cointegrating vectors represented by other models are not viable. These results confirm that the 
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use of the ARDL model in this study was appropriate because the assumption stating that the 
model of interest should be the only cointegrating vector in an ARDL framework has been verified. 
The next step was to check for the consistency of the models of interest by applying residuals and 
stability diagnostic tests. It was established that the models of interest (model 1 for 
F(logRGDP\logEC, logGCF, logLF) and model 2 for F(logRGDP\logES, logGCF, logLF)) were 
stable, well-specified according to the Ramsey test, not affected by serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity, and their residuals were normal (Table 3.8 below). The following step was to 
specify the short- and long-run dynamics of the models of interest (models 1 and 2) and to assess 
the GDP losses resulting from electricity losses. Because model 1 and 2 were stable, there was no 
need to ensure parameter stability by inserting a dummy variable which accounts for structural 
break in the long and short run specifications of these models. 
Table 3.8: Diagnostic test results for our models of interest  
 Models Normality 
(Jarque-
Bera) 
(LM test) 
Serial 
correlatio
n 
Hetero-
skedastici
ty test 
(Breusch 
Pagan-
Godfrey) 
Ramsey 
test 
CUSUM CUSUM 
of Sq 
Model with 
electricity 
consumption 
(EC) (Model 
1) 
F(logRGDP\log
EC, logGCF, 
logLF) 
3.5607 
(0.1685) 
(0.5565) (0.9610) (0.9889) stable stable 
Model with 
electricity 
supply (ES) 
(Model 2) 
F(logRGDP\log
ES, logGCF, 
logLF) 
1.0427 
(0.5937) 
(0.9262) (0.5445) (0.1033) stable stable 
 
Notes:   
Numbers in parentheses represent probability.  
Source: Author’s estimation 
3.4.4  Long- and short-run dynamics and losses of GDP  
As stated previously, the models of interest are F(logRGDP/logEC,logGCF,logLF) for model 1 and 
F(logRGDP/logES,logGCF,logLF) for model 2. The long-run estimates are presented in Table 3.9. 
It can be seen that a 1% increase in electricity consumption is associated with a 0.05% increase in 
real GDP in the long run. However, such increase in real GDP is not significant. Conversely, a 1% 
increase in electricity supply is associated with a significant 0.16% increase in real GDP in the long 
run. As the increase in real GDP associated with an increase in electricity consumption is not 
significant, it can be ignored. This indicates that in the long run, Benin loses on average 0.16% of 
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its real GDP per year as a result of electricity losses. This represents a huge amount of inefficiency 
in the economy and has important policy implications.  
In the short run, it can be seen (in Table 3.10) in the current period that the short-run effect of 
electricity supply on real GDP is positive (even though it is not significant), while the short-run 
effect of electricity consumption on real GDP is significant but negative due to the consecutive 
electricity shortages encountered in the country. In the past periods, the negative effect of 
electricity consumption on real GDP (due to the consecutive electricity shortages) would have been 
worse in the absence of electricity losses. In other words, in the past periods, if the losses of 
electricity are added to the shortages already occurring, the total negative effect on real GDP 
would be greater. This situation is illustrated by the greater coefficient of ES(-1) (-0.0793) in terms 
of absolute value than the coefficient of EC(-1) (.-0.0533). This indicates that in the absence of 
electricity losses, in the short run, the country gains in terms of real GDP in the current period even 
though the gain is not significant (because the short-run coefficient on ES is positive but not 
significant), while in past periods the country loses 0.026% (the difference between the short-run 
coefficients of ES (-1) and EC(-1)) of its real GDP as a result of electricity losses and electricity 
shortages.  
In both the short and long run (Tables 3.9 and 3.10), a positive sign on the coefficient on gross 
capital formation and labour force in the current period is observed. This aligns with the a priori 
expectation (see Barro, 1999 and 2003; Hamilton and Monteagudo, 1998; Anaman, 2004; Fischer, 
1992; Acikgoz and Mert, 2014; Anyanwu, 2014; Bayraktar, 2006; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 
2012; Bleaney et al., 2001; Chang and Mendy, 2012; Most and Vann de Berg, 1996; Knight et al., 
1993; Freire-Seren, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Chen and Feng, 2000;  Hamilton and 
Monteagudo (1998); Benos and Zotou (2014)) which states that the correlation between real GDP 
and each of the independent variables (gross capital formation and labour force) depends on the 
country context: it can be positive or negative based on the country’s economic context. A negative 
sign on the coefficients on gross capital formation in the past period (GCF(-1)) was observed: this 
negative effect is related to the specific Beninese context where the economy has encountered 
consecutive energy crises (oil shortages, electricity shortages, etc.) which impeded productivity 
and growth.  
Table 3.9: Long-run models  
Model 1: F(logRGDP/logEC,logGCF,logLF) LogRGDP as dependent variable 
 
Variables Coefficients Probability 
LogEC 0.0550 0.4803 
LogGCF 0.0715 0.2644 
LogLF 0.9754*** 0.0000 
Constant 2.7788** 0.0301 
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Model 2: F(logRGDP/logES,logGCF,logLF) LogRGDP as dependent variable 
 
Variable Coefficients Probability 
LogES 0.1634*** 0.0076 
 
LogGCF 0.0864* 0.0944 
LogLF 0.7576*** 0.0000 
Constant 4.0149*** 0.0001 
(*), (**), (***) indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Source: Author‘s estimation 
Table 3.10: Short-run models  
Model 1: F(logRGDP/logEC,logGCF,logLF) 
 
LogRGDP as dependent variable  
Variables Coefficients Probability 
LogEC -0.0318** 0.0245 
LogEC(-1) -0.0533*** 0.0003 
LogGCF 0.0694*** 0.0001 
LogGCF(-1) -0.0324** 0.0358 
LogLF 0.1894 0.7333 
LogLF(-1) -1.2335** 0.0467 
ECTa1 -0.3691*** 0.0000 
Model 2: F(logRGDP/logES,logGCF,logLF) 
 
LogRGDP as dependent variable 
variable Coefficients Probability 
LogRGDP(-1) 0.2794* 0.0611 
LogES 0.0318 0.2880 
LogES(-1) -0.0793** 0.0124 
LogGCF 0.0422** 0.0255 
LogGCF(-1) -0.0517*** 0.0096 
LogLF 0.0010* 0.0721 
ECTa2 -0.5607*** 0.0001 
 
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Source: Author‘s estimation 
3.4.5  Discussion and policy recommendations 
Previous studies on the electricity-growth nexus did not evaluate empirically the effect of electricity 
losses on GDP, comparing both long- and short-run estimated coefficients of electricity supply and 
consumption. A study by Obafemi and Ifere (2013) on the Calabar region of Cross River State in 
Nigeria identified the different types of non-technical electricity losses related to human illegal 
behaviour in the region. They did not go further to evaluate the effect of these electricity losses on 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
136 
 
the GDP of the region. Their study is a descriptive analysis using cross-sectional data. This study 
is the first to evaluate empirically the net effect of electricity losses on GDP in the Beninese 
context. Losses of electricity are one of the challenges of the Beninese electricity sector. As noted 
in the introduction chapter, based on data from USEIA (2018), in 2015 Benin was ranked as the 
ninth country in Africa and the 20th in the world in terms of share of electricity losses in total supply 
of electricity.  
From the results of the current study, it is clear that in the absence of electricity losses, Benin 
would have gained in terms of real GDP in both the short and long run. Technical and non-
technical losses generate inefficiency in the economy, as the country loses on average in the long 
run 0.16% of its GDP per year because of electricity losses. In 2014, for instance, Benin lost about 
US$ 13,7 million constant 2010 because of losses of electricity (Figure 3.9). Based on statistics 
from the World Development Indicators (2018), such loss represents 1.022% of total government 
expenditure in 2014. These amounts converted into CFA, the currency used by Benin and other 
francophone countries in Africa, represent billions of CFA and a great waste of wealth for the 
country. Consequently, Benin’s efforts to alleviate poverty and reduce income inequality are 
negatively affected by these losses of GDP resulting from electricity losses. If there were no 
electricity losses, these GDP losses would have meant some economic gains for the country. As 
Figure 3.9 shows, the annual GDP losses due to electricity losses have been increasing from 1980 
to 2014. 
 
Figure 3.9: History of losses of GDP due to losses of electricity (in US$ constant 2010, and 
as 0.16% of GDP) in Benin (1980-2014)  
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from USEIA (2016) and the World Development 
Indicators (2016) 
The current study has established that a 1% increase in electricity losses leads to a 0.16% 
increase in GDP losses. It has revealed that on average Benin loses 0.16% of GDP annually 
because of electricity losses. In other words, in the absence of electricity losses, the country would 
have gained on average 0.16% of its GDP annually. As said before, according to République du 
Bénin (2008), one of the pillars of the second objective of the national strategy for access to 
0
500000000
1E+09
1.5E+09
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
3
Annual loss of GDP due to
electricity losses in US$
constant 2010 (as 0.16%
of real GDP)
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
137 
 
electricity is to ensure electricity efficiency in Benin. In order to align with such a pillar, the 
Beninese Ministry of Energy has planned to reduce electricity losses to 14% from 2020 to 2025 
(République du Bénin, 2008). Based on the results on the effect of electricity losses on GDP 
established in this study, such 14% reduction of electricity losses would allow the country to gain in 
terms of GDP every year from 2020 to 2025. As explained previously, in order to achieve such a 
goal, the national policy framework for electricity has planned to modernize the distribution lines 
with equipment that is electricity-efficient in order to reduce technical losses of electricity. The 
country also has an emergency plan to fight against corruption and the theft of electricity, and to 
improve the billing system of electricity supply and consumption in order to reduce non-technical 
losses of electricity (see République du Bénin, 2008, pp. 54–55). All these actions are costly and 
funding is required to finance them.  
As mentioned before, the Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (2018) reported that Benin 
does not have a direct financing mechanism of activities aiming at reducing electricity losses, and 
in this context the national policy framework for electricity proposed an indirect financing 
mechanism of activities aiming at reducing electricity losses. Such a mechanism proposed to use 
funds from donors or the national budget to finance the costs of activities that would reduce 
electricity losses. Then, it suggested using the gain in GDP resulting from reductions in electricity 
losses to reimburse the donors or the national budget (see République du Bénin, 2008, p. 65). The 
current study has empirically established that a 1% reduction in electricity losses leads to a 0.16% 
increase in GDP. This indicates that the indirect financing mechanism proposed by the national 
policy framework for electricity is feasible, because there will be some gains in terms of GDP due 
to reduction in electricity losses. As explained previously, such a gain could represent an increase 
in government revenues related to sales of electricity, because of reductions in commercial losses 
of electricity encountered by the SBEE and the CEB (which are state-owned electricity distribution 
companies). Commercial losses of electricity can be reduced by improving the billing system of 
electricity consumption and supply and by reducing theft of electricity. For instance, the distribution 
companies can adopt the “prepaid” electricity approach instead of the “post-paid” approach which 
is in use currently. The “prepaid” approach means that consumers purchase electricity before 
consumption, in other words consumers pay electricity bills before consumption, while the post-
paid approach means that consumers only pay the electricity bills after consumption. The post-paid 
approach has limitations because the distribution companies encounter a huge amount of default 
in electricity bill payments. 
The gain in terms of GDP resulting from a reduction in electricity losses can also represent a 
reduction in the cost of imported electricity. If there is a reduction of electricity losses, the quantity 
of electricity supply that reaches consumers will increase by an amount corresponding to the 
reduction in electricity losses. For a country such as Benin, which aims to improve its self-
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sufficiency rate of electricity supply by limiting its dependency on importation of electricity, such an 
increase will correspond to a reduction in electricity imports. Consequently, the government will 
save some of its revenues allocated to importation of electricity. As said previously, government 
revenues are included in the calculation of GDP. Hence, increases in government revenues 
because of reductions in electricity losses constitute gains in terms of GDP. These gains can be 
used to reimburse the costs of activities aiming at reducing electricity losses as suggested by the 
financing mechanism proposed by the national policy framework for electricity. 
By demonstrating that the indirect financing mechanism proposed in the national policy framework 
for electricity is feasible in Benin, the current study contributes to the advancement of electricity 
efficiency policy and electricity security policy, which target to reduce disruptions to electricity 
supply caused by electricity losses.  
3.5  CONCLUSION  
This study has established that in the long run, Benin loses 0.16% of GDP as a result of electricity 
losses, which is a huge amount of resource for a low income country. Definitively, the government 
should attempt to minimize electricity losses by improving the technology and the monitoring 
system related to the distribution of electricity. By demonstrating empirically that there will be some 
gains in terms of GDP if reductions of electricity losses occur, this study has shown that the indirect 
financing mechanism proposed by the national policy framework for electricity to fund the costs of 
reduction of electricity losses, is feasible. The current study therefore contributes to advance 
electricity efficiency and electricity security policy aiming at reducing disruption to electricity supply 
caused by electricity losses. It also adds value to the existing literature on electricity efficiency and 
electricity security in Benin.  
Although losses of electricity constitute a major source of vulnerability of the Beninese electricity 
sector, they are just one challenge among many. The country has also encountered significant 
shortages of electricity. These shortages of electricity constitute negative shocks on electricity 
supply (electricity supply net of losses; see definition in section 3.3.1). The national policy 
framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008) has reported that these negative shocks to 
electricity supply cause negative shocks to economic growth in Benin. There is no empirical study 
on Benin which has verified whether negative shocks to electricity supply cause negative shocks to 
economic growth. As reported by the World Development Indicators (2017), the share of electricity 
consumption (electricity supply net of losses or electricity supply minus electricity losses (in the 
case of Benin); see IEA statistics (2018)) in total primary energy consumption is very low, and has 
remained less than 2.07% over 44 years (1971-2014). Because of this, it is possible that negative 
shocks to electricity consumption or electricity supply net of losses have no causal effect on 
negative shocks to economic growth. It therefore becomes important to verify empirically whether 
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or not negative shocks to electricity consumption or electricity supply net of losses cause negative 
shocks to economic growth. This constitutes the focus of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 43 
THE EFFECT OF NEGATIVE SHOCKS TO ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ON 
NEGATIVE SHOCKS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As explained in chapter 1 (section 1.3), the electricity that is distributed to consumers after 
exclusion of electricity losses is the electricity supply net of losses, and is also called electricity 
consumption. In this chapter, electricity supply should be understood as electricity supply net of 
losses. In general, there are four different hypotheses that have been established in the literature 
on the causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth (Payne, 2010; Lee, 
2006; Apergis and Payne, 2011; Ozturk, 2010, Ewing, Sari and Soytas, 2007; Soytas and Sari, 
2003; Apergis and Payne 2009a, 2009b; Bowden and Payne, 2009, 2010). The first is the growth 
hypothesis, which stipulates that causality runs from energy consumption to economic growth. The 
second is the conservation hypothesis, which stipulates that causality runs from economic growth 
to energy consumption. The third is the feedback hypothesis, which states that there is 
bidirectional causality between energy consumption and economic growth. The fourth is the 
neutrality hypothesis, which stipulates that no causal relationship exists between energy 
consumption and economic growth. These four hypotheses are largely discussed among the very 
few studies which have investigated the relationship between economic growth and 
energy/electricity consumption for Benin. Most of these studies are cross-country analyses.  
Wolde-Rufael’s (2009) study of 17 African countries, using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model 
comprising variables such as growth, energy consumption, capital and labour, established for three 
of these countries, including Benin, the existence of a causal relationship that runs from energy 
consumption to economic growth. He argued that in these three countries any energy conservation 
policy would harm economic growth. He suggested that a country like Benin must increase its 
energy use in terms of quantity and quality for sustainable economic growth. However, Wolde-
Ruafel’s (2005) study of 19 African countries, using the bound test and Toda Yamamoto 
approaches to Granger causality in a bivariate framework, established for nine of these countries, 
including Benin, that there is no causal relationship between energy and growth. This absence of 
causality can be the result of omitted variables bias related to bivariate models as explained earlier 
by Lütkepohl (1982) and further by Wolde-Rufael (2009). 
                                               
3
 This chapter has been accepted (with few revisions) for publication in the Energy Journal. The chapter was 
a section of the paper titled “Symmetric and asymmetric effect of growth and financial development on 
electricity consumption revisited with structural break: evidence from Benin”, presented at the first 
International Conference on Energy, Finance, and the Macroeconomy (ICEFM), held in November 22, 2017, 
at Montpellier Business School, in France. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
141 
 
Al-mulali and Binti Che Sab (2012) established for 30 African countries including Benin, that total 
primary energy consumption causes economic growth and financial development but with CO2 
pollution in these countries. Rault et al. (2014) using a VAR model and 16 African countries, 
including Benin, established a causal relationship that runs from economic growth to energy 
consumption for Algeria. They established a bidirectional causal relationship between economic 
growth and energy consumption for Ethiopia, and a positive causal relationship that runs from 
energy consumption to economic growth for seven of these countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Kenya, 
Senegal, Tanzania, DRC, Morocco). They established a negative causal relationship that runs from 
energy consumption to economic growth for South Africa, Zambia and Cameroun. They found no 
causal relationship between economic growth and energy consumption in the case of Benin.  
Dogan (2014) established a causal relationship that runs from energy consumption to economic 
growth in the case of Kenya. However, he posited that no causality exists between energy 
consumption and economic growth in the case of Benin, Zimbabwe and Congo. Menegaki and 
Tugcu (2016) found no evidence of causality between GDP and energy consumption for 42 African 
countries, including Benin. Ouedraogo (2013) for countries of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), including Benin, found opposite results: causality from GDP to energy 
consumption in the short run and causality from energy consumption to GDP in the long run. She 
also established a causal relationship that runs from electricity consumption to GDP in the long 
run. Fatai (2014) investigated the causal relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption for 18 sub-Sahara African countries, and established the absence of a causal 
relationship between energy consumption and economic growth in Central and Western Africa, 
including Benin, while in Eastern and Southern Africa he established a causal relationship that runs 
from energy consumption to economic growth.  
Zerbo (2017) investigated the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption for 
13 sub-Saharan African economies, including Benin, and established a long-run relationship 
between economic growth and energy consumption for eight of these 13 economies. He also 
established the absence of a causal relationship between energy consumption and economic 
growth for Benin, Togo, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo, Ghana, and South Africa. For Kenya, 
Gabon and Nigeria, he established a causal relationship that runs from energy consumption to 
economic growth, while for Zambia and Sudan; he established a causal relationship that runs from 
economic growth to energy consumption. He established a bidirectional causal relationship 
between economic growth and energy consumption for Cameroon. Kahsai, Nondo, Schaeffer and 
Gebremedhin (2012) for a group of 40 sub-Saharan African countries, including Benin, established 
a long run bidirectional causality between economic growth and energy consumption. In the short 
run, their finding supports the neutrality hypothesis for the low-income countries of this group, 
including Benin.  
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Very few of the studies which have investigated the relationship between energy consumption and 
economic growth in Benin, have focused on electricity consumption (Wolde-Rufael (2006), 
Ouedraogo (2013)). Wolde-Rufael (2006) considered 17 African countries, including Benin, using 
the bound testing and Toda Yamamoto approaches to Granger causality in a bivariate framework 
with electricity consumption per capita as dependent variable. He established for four of these 
countries, including Benin, a long-run relationship between GDP per capita and electricity 
consumption per capita. However, in the case of Benin and two other African countries the error 
correction term was neither negative nor significant. In addition, there was a positive unidirectional 
causality running from electricity consumption per capita to GDP per capita in the case of Benin 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while in Tunisia the same unidirectional causality was 
established but was negative. In Gabon, there was a positive causal relationship running from GDP 
per capita to electricity consumption per capita, and a negative unidirectional causality running 
from electricity consumption per capita to GDP per capita. As mentioned previously, Ouedraogo 
(2013) established a causal relationship that runs from electricity consumption to GDP in the long 
run for ECOWAS countries, including Benin. 
While these studies have attempted to analyse the causal relationship between energy and 
economic growth in different countries, including Benin, it is important to acknowledge that with the 
differing results provided by these studies, it becomes impossible to conclude the true direction of 
the causal relationship between energy/electricity consumption and economic growth. These 
differing results highlight the complexity of the causal relationship between economic growth and 
energy/electricity consumption, and indicate the necessity of investigating the possibility of a 
nonlinear or asymmetric relationship between these two variables. Accounting for asymmetry is 
important as positive shocks or negative shocks on one variable may not necessarily have the 
same impact on another variable. The existence of an asymmetric relationship can be the result of 
the complexity of the structure of the economy and the various channels through which one 
variable influences the other. As argued by Chiou-Wei, Chen and Zhu (2008) such complexity 
appears because of economic shocks, regime change, and change in the economic structure and 
environment such as modifications in energy prices and policy.  
In the case of Benin, the country’s economic and political regime has encountered different 
changes. From 1960 to 1971 the country allowed free market and free enterprise, but was shaken 
by several military coups which have affected its macroeconomic and political stability. From 1972 
to 1989, the country was under a socialist and military regime where free market, free enterprise 
and democracy were restricted. Most major companies and banks were owned by the state, and 
because of government political and social agenda, most energy prices were subsidised. Since 
1990, when the country returned to democracy, free market and free enterprise (Schneider, 2000), 
energy prices (oil and electricity prices) are still subsidised (Hounkpatin, 2013) but to a lower extent 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
143 
 
compared to the previous period. These changes in the economic system (from an economy with a 
restricted free market and free enterprise to an economy with total free market and free enterprise), 
and changes in the political regime (from a socialist and military dictatorship to a democracy), are 
some of the causes of the complexity of the economic structure in Benin, as well as the complexity 
of the various channels through which economic growth and energy consumption influence each 
other. Therefore, this study uses an asymmetric approach to differentiate between the effect on 
economic growth of positive and negative shocks to electricity supply, in keeping with the aim of 
the study which is to verify if negative shocks to electricity supply (electricity supply net of losses or 
electricity consumption) cause a negative shock on real GDP in Benin. 
As mentioned before, there have been several electricity crises in Benin due to outages of 
electricity supply to consumers: in 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013 for instance. 
These outages of electricity supply to consumers (electricity consumption) or negative shocks on 
electricity consumption were mainly due to factors such as high dependency on the importation of 
electricity, high rates of electricity losses, a growing domestic demand for electricity, and the 
inability of the country to invest sufficiently in electricity infrastructure (République du Bénin, 2008). 
Benin depends on countries such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria for the importation of 
electricity, while these countries also face a growing domestic demand for electricity. Whenever 
electricity outages occur in these countries, there are severe electricity outages in Benin. This has 
been the case especially with Ghana, which faced droughts in 1983, 1994 and 1998 which reduced 
the level of water in the Akossombo hydroelectric dam and limited Ghana’s capacity for domestic 
electricity production. In order to fill its domestic electricity supply gap that was caused by these 
droughts, Ghana reduced its exports of electricity to Benin and Togo.  
During the drought of 1983, Ghana reduced its exportation of electricity to Benin and Togo by 50%. 
During the drought of 1994, exportation of electricity toward Benin and Togo was reduced to 40 
Mw whereas the initial quantity to be exported was 50 Mw. The drought of 1998 affected both 
Akossombo and Nangbeto dams. The Nangbeto dam owned by Benin and Togo contributes to the 
domestic production of electricity of these two countries. In 1998, Benin and Togo both faced a 
reduction in exports of electricity from Ghana, and a reduction of their domestic production of 
electricity. The initial quantity of electricity that the Beninese Electrical Community (CEB), which 
ensures the importation of electricity from Ghana, was supposed to supply to Benin and Togo 
suddenly decreased from 40 Mw to 16 Mw in February 1998, and to 4 Mw in April of the same year 
(République du Bénin, 2008; Hounkpatin, 2013).  
These reductions in the imports of electricity resulted in severe electricity outages in Benin and 
have affected the revenues of firms in the country as well as the ease of doing business. As 
reported by the World Development Indicators (2016), because of electricity outages in 2009 and 
2016, firms lost 6.2% and 9.4% respectively of their sales value in Benin.  
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Table 4.1 presents the state of access to electricity by firms in Benin in 2016. It can be seen that 
95.6% of firms in Benin experienced electricity outages in that year. The number of electrical 
outages per month was 28; the average duration for the total outages per month was 103.6 hours, 
while each outage lasted for 3.7 hours on average (Table 4.1). This situation generated additional 
costs for firms because they had to acquire electrical generators in order to reduce the impact of 
electricity outages. Hence, 59.9% of firms in the country own or share a generator, which supplies 
them with only 37% of their need in terms of electricity (Table 4.1). This indicates that although 
many firms use or share a generator, 63% of their electricity consumption is still exposed to 
outages. With all these significant electricity outages encountered by firms in the country, 60.4% of 
them have identified electricity as a major constraint for the ease of doing business in Benin (Table 
4.1). 
Table 4.1: The state of access to electricity by firms in Benin in 2016  
 Indicators of ease of doing business as related 
to access to electricity  
All countries 
average 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa average 
Benin average 
Percentage of firms experiencing electrical outages 59.1 78.7 95.6 
Number of electrical outages in a typical month 6.3 8.5 28.0 
If there were outages, average duration of a typical 
electrical outage (hours) 
4.5 5.8 3.7 
Average duration of the total outages in a typical 
month (hours) 
28.35 49.3 103.6 
Percentage of firms owning or sharing a generator 34.4 53.2 59.9 
If a generator is used, average proportion of 
electricity from a generator (%) 
20.7 28.2 37.0 
Percentage of firms identifying electricity as a 
major constraint 
31.3 39.8 60.4 
Source: World Bank (2016) (enterprise survey data) 
While electricity outages have negatively affected the ease of doing business and firms’ sales 
values, it is not obvious that they have impeded economic growth. The national policy framework 
for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008) reported that these electricity outages have impeded 
economic growth. However, to the best of the writer’s knowledge, there is no empirical evidence 
which has demonstrated that negative shocks on electricity supply have caused negative shocks 
on economic growth in Benin. In addition, according to the World Development Indicators (2017), 
over 44 years (1971-2014) (the period for which data was available at the time of analysis), the 
share of electricity consumption in total primary energy consumption in the country has been very 
low: it never exceeded 2.07%. This indicates that it is possible that negative shocks on electricity 
consumption have not caused negative shocks on economic growth, because the proportion of 
electricity consumption in total primary energy consumption is very low.  
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It becomes necessary therefore to verify empirically if negative shocks on electricity consumption 
have caused negative shocks on economic growth. The current study conducts such verification. 
As stated previously, the study uses an asymmetric approach to separate the effect on economic 
growth of negative shocks on electricity supply (electricity supply net of losses, in other words 
electricity consumption) from that of positive shocks on electricity supply. Using a symmetric 
approach would not allow such separation, which is essential as the study focuses specifically on 
the effect of negative shocks. The study seeks to verify if negative shocks on electricity supply 
have caused negative shocks on real GDP, since this will add value to the policy dialogue on 
electricity security in Benin, and will contribute to the formulation of the national policy framework 
on electricity security in the country. It will also add value to the existing literature on asymmetric 
causality between energy supply/consumption and economic growth. This chapter now goes on to 
review the theoretical foundation of the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption, as well as previous studies on the asymmetric relationship between electricity 
consumption and economic growth. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1  Theoretical foundation of the relationship between energy and economic growth 
For several decades, energy was not considered as factor of production as are capital and labour. 
Growth models of Solow (1956) which consider technological change as exogenous, and 
endogenous growth models such as the Schumpeterian model, the “learning by doing“ model 
developed by Arrow (1962), and the “induced innovation” model of Hicks (1932), do not account for 
energy among factor of production.  
Differing from theorists of these growth models, ecological economists (Ayres and Warr, 2005, 
2009; Costanza, 1980; Georgescu-Roegen (1971), Murphy and Hall, 2010; Cleveland et al., 1984; 
Hall et al., 1986, 2001, 2003) argued that energy is fundamental for economic growth. In alignment 
with them, some scholars in economic history (Allen, 2009; Wrigley, 1988) and geography (Smil, 
1994) argued that energy is an important factor of economic growth and was also one of the main 
factors which determined the industrial revolution. Wrigley (1998) argued that the use of a new 
type of energy such as fossil fuel has leveraged existing constraints on the supply of energy, the 
production process, and economic growth. He compared British and Dutch economies: in the 
Dutch economy, capital accumulation was constrained by the lack of a continuous availability of 
energy, while that constraint was lifted in the British economy because of the availability of coal 
mines. Hence, the industrial revolution occurred in the British economy while it could have 
occurred in both economies. In alignment with Wrigley (1988), Allen (2009) and Stern (2010) point 
out the importance of energy in the industrial revolution in the British economy. Ecological 
economists such as Hall et al. (1986, 2003) and Cleveland et al. (1984) argued that an increase in 
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productivity is mainly the result of an increase in the use of energy, and economic growth occurs 
only as a result of increases in the use of energy. 
In contrast to Solow (1956) and theorists of the endogenous growth model, Stern (2010) argued 
that energy is fundamental for economic growth and should be considered as a factor of 
production, as are capital and labour. His view differs from the ecological economists’ views as he 
posits that energy is not the only factor of production. According to Stern (1997), there is a limit to 
the substitution of capital and labour for energy, hence energy remains an important factor of 
production as are capital and labour. Stern (2010) posits that energy is fundamental for economic 
growth; and the production process requires energy, labour and capital. He proposed a modified 
version of Solow’s (1956) model of economic growth by including energy as a factor of production. 
Based on these theories on the relationship between energy and economic growth, a positive 
correlation between economic growth and energy can be expected. In other words, positive shocks 
on energy supply/consumption are associated with positive shocks on economic growth, while 
negative shocks on energy supply/consumption are associated with negative shocks on economic 
growth. 
4.2.2  Empirical literature on the asymmetric relationship between energy/electricity 
consumption and economic growth  
There have been very few studies which have used an asymmetric approach to differentiate 
between the effect of positive and negative shocks when investigating the relationship between 
energy/electricity consumption and economic growth. The main reason is that the ability to make 
such differentiation was only made possible recently with Granger and Yoon’s (2002) asymmetric 
cointegration (denoted “hidden cointegration”) and Hatemi-J’s (2012) asymmetric causality test. 
Because the aim of this study is to investigate the causal effect on the economic growth of 
negative shocks on electricity supply (electricity supply net of losses, in other words electricity 
consumption), the focus is mostly on studies that have investigated the asymmetric causal 
relationship between economic growth and energy/electricity consumption, and differentiated 
between the causal effect of positive and negative shocks. Among the few studies which have 
done such an investigation, some have focused on total renewable energy, others on total energy, 
but very few have focused on disaggregated energy.  
Shahbaz et al. (2017) investigated the asymmetric causal relationship between growth and energy 
consumption in India, and established an asymmetric causality that runs from negative shocks on 
energy consumption to economic growth. Ranjbar, Chang, Nel and Gupta (2017) investigated the 
growth-energy nexus in South Africa using the asymmetric frequency domain methodology, and 
established that negative shocks on energy consumption cause negative shocks to economic 
growth. One of their main conclusions was that when energy consumption decreases, economic 
growth also decreases, however an increase in energy consumption will not necessarily lead to an 
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increase in economic growth. Destek (2016) established that negative shocks on renewable 
energy consumption in newly industrialized countries lead to positive shocks in real GDP for 
Mexico and South Africa, while negative shocks in renewable energy consumption lead to negative 
shocks in real GDP for India. There was no causal relationship between renewable energy 
consumption and real GDP for Malaysia and Brazil. He argued that investments made by these 
countries in their renewable energy sector are initially expensive. Hence, an increase in these 
costly investments can temporarily be harmful to the economy, while a reduction can temporarily 
be beneficial. This was the case with South Africa and Mexico.  
Bayramoglu and Yildirim (2017) established an asymmetric relationship between energy 
consumption and economic growth in the long run in the USA, while there was no asymmetric 
relationship between these two variables in the short run. Ocal, Ozturk and Aslan (2013) found no 
asymmetric causality between coal consumption and economic growth in Turkey. Alper and Oguz 
(2016), in a study of new members of the European Union, found mixed results on the relationship 
between renewable energy consumption and economic growth from a group of countries to 
another: the growth hypothesis was supported for some countries while the neutrality hypothesis 
was supported for others, and the conservation hypothesis was supported for Czech Republic.  
Bayat, Kayhan and Senturk (2017) established that positive shocks on electricity consumption in 
Turkey do not induce an increase in economic growth, while negative shocks on electricity 
consumption induce a reduction in economic growth. They also established that both positive and 
negative shocks on economic growth have a causal effect on electricity consumption. Chen, 
Inglesi-Lotz and Chang (2017) established the existence of an asymmetric causal relationship 
between energy consumption (coal and oil) and economic growth in China. Tugcu and Topcu 
(2018) established an asymmetric relationship between total energy consumption and economic 
growth in G7 countries. Hatemi-J and Uddin (2012) established that negative shocks on energy 
consumption per capita cause negative shocks on GDP per capita in the USA, while no evidence 
of causality was found between positive shocks on energy consumption per capita and positive 
shocks on GDP per capita.  
Tiwari (2014) established an asymmetric causality between economic growth and growths of coal 
consumption, natural gas consumption, total primary energy consumption, total renewable energy 
consumption, and electricity consumption in the US economy. Particularly, he established that 
positive shocks on economic growth caused positive shocks on coal consumption, while positive 
shocks to electricity consumption caused positive shocks on economic growth. In addition, he 
established a bidirectional causal relationship between economic growth and growth of natural gas 
consumption, growth of total primary energy consumption and economic growth, and growth of 
total renewable energy and economic growth. Moreover, Tiwari (2014) ascertained that negative 
shocks on the growth of coal consumption caused negative shocks on economic growth, and 
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negative shocks on the growth of total renewable energy caused negative shocks on economic 
growth.  
One of the limitations of these studies is that many of them are cross-country analyses, hence are 
very limited in terms of country-specific policy recommendations. Some, even though they have 
focused on a specific country, have investigated the link between total energy (aggregate energy) 
and growth; therefore, they are very limited in terms of policy recommendations for disaggregated 
energy. Only a few have focused on specific types of energy such as coal, oil, and electricity 
(Tiwari, 2014; Bayat et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Ocal et al., 2013). As mentioned previously, 
not all types of energy have the same weight in an economy: some countries are oil dependent, 
while others rely heavily on imports of electricity, and yet others rely heavily on natural gas 
revenues. Hence, studies on the disaggregate energy-growth nexus are important for policy 
recommendations on specific types of energy.  
Olayeni (2012) used the hidden cointegration approach to analyse the growth-energy nexus of 12 
sub-Saharan African countries, including Benin. He did not extend the analysis to the asymmetric 
causal relationship between energy consumption and growth, and his study focused on total 
energy. No study thus far has investigated the causal effect on economic growth of negative 
shocks on electricity consumption in the context of Benin in a country-specific analysis. As 
mentioned before, investigating such a causal effect involves a separation of the effect on 
economic growth of negative shocks on electricity consumption from that of positive shocks on 
electricity consumption. As mentioned previously, using a symmetric approach will not allow such 
differentiation, but an asymmetric approach will allow such differentiation. As the relationship 
between electricity consumption and economic growth can be asymmetric because of the 
complexity of the channels and mechanisms through which these two variables influence each 
other, an asymmetric approach will be used when investigating the effect on economic growth of 
negative shocks on electricity consumption. The current study therefore investigates the causal 
effect on economic growth (real GDP) of negative shocks on electricity consumption using an 
asymmetric approach.  
4.2.3  Contribution of the study 
The current study contributes to the dialogue on the economic burden of disruption risks to the 
electricity supply in Benin. It also contributes to the formulation of policies for electricity supply 
security in that country. As noted previously, although the national policy framework for electricity 
has stipulated that electricity shortages caused a reduction in economic growth in Benin, there is 
no empirical evidence (to the best of the writer’s knowledge) which has demonstrated that negative 
shocks on electricity consumption have caused negative shocks on economic growth. The current 
study will ascertain for the national policy framework for electricity the existence or not of a causal 
effect of electricity shortages on economic growth. In addition to its contribution to electricity supply 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
149 
 
policy in Benin, the current study will also add value to the literature on electricity security and 
economic growth. 
4.3  METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Empirical model  
Unlike neoclassic economists who consider labour, capital and technology as factors of production, 
Alam (2006) indicated the necessity to include energy among factors of production. He indicated 
that energy was used as a factor of production, and is a driver of economic growth, therefore it 
should be considered as a factor of production such as capital and labour. Following the work of 
Odularu and Okonkwo (2009) andShabaz (2015), an endogenous growth model (where electricity 
is among the independent variables) was developed to describe the relationship between electricity 
consumption (electricity supply net of losses) and economic growth. This model is as: 
( , , , )                                                                                                                         4.1t t t tY f A EC K L   
where, A, EC, L and K are respectively technology, electricity consumption, labour and capital, and 
where Y represents real GDP.  
However, the focus of this study is not to model the relationship between electricity consumption 
and economic growth and to estimate the coefficients on the different explanatory variables 
(electricity consumption, labour and capital). Rather, the focus is to verify if negative shocks on 
electricity consumption have caused negative shocks on economic growth. As discussed 
previously, such verification will be done using an asymmetric approach described in the analytical 
framework. 
4.3.2 Analytical framework 
First, in order to avoid spurious regression, it is important to check the stationarity of the series. A 
variety of unit root procedures tests the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root against the 
alternative hypothesis of the absence of a unit root. Significant among them are the Elliott, 
Rothenberg and Stock (1996) (DF-GLS), Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), and Phillip Perron (PP) 
tests. Other tests such as Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test the null hypothesis of 
the absence of a unit root (evidence of stationarity) against the alternative hypothesis of the 
presence of a unit root. However, the PP and ADF tests have a lower power in testing for unit roots 
when compared to DF-GLS, because they fail to detect I(0) series with patterns which resemble 
I(1) series. Hence, the unit root tests used in this study were the ADF, PP, KPSS and DF-GLS 
tests.  
Perron (1989) argued that the results of the ADF test are biased when there is evidence of 
structural breaks among data. The Beninese economy encountered several different shocks over 
the last few years: the devaluation of the CFA currency by 50% in 1994, the electricity crises of 
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1984, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013, and the shift from a socialist regime to free 
market, private ownership and democracy in 1990 (Hounkpatin, 2013; Schneider, 2000; Constant, 
2012). Hence it was important to also apply to the series, a unit root test which accounts for 
structural breaks in addition to the above tests. Such a unit root test with structural break is the 
Zivot Andrews (ZA) unit root test, which allows a single breakpoint. A unit root test with single 
breakpoint was therefore applied rather than a unit root test with multiple breakpoints because of 
the small size of the series (44 observations). 
Second, the asymmetric causality test proposed by Hatemi-J (2012) was used to investigate the 
causal relationship between the variables. It follows the procedure of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
and separates the effect of positive shocks from that of negative shocks. The idea of separating 
the effect of positive shocks from that of negative shocks was initially developed by Granger and 
Yoon (2002). Their work was limited to cointegration analysis where they differentiated between 
the effect of positive and negative shocks. As stated before, their asymmetric cointegration was 
denoted the “hidden cointegration”. Hatemi-J (2012) extended their work to asymmetric causality. 
He defined integrated variables Z1 and Z2 as a random walk in the following general expressions:
1 1 1 1 10 1
1
,      *                                      4.2
t
t t t i
i
Z Z e Z e t

    
2 2 1 2 20 2
1
,      *                                    4.3
t
t t t i
i
Z Z e Z e t

    
where Z10, Z20 represent the initial values of Z1t and Z2t, respectively, and e1i, e2i represent the error 
terms (white noise) in equations 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Hatemi-J (2012) argued that the error 
terms could be decomposed into positive and negative shocks in the following equations: 
1 1 1                                               *                     4.4i i ie e e i
   
 
2 2 2                                               *                    4.5i i ie e e i
   
 
where e1i
+ and e1i
- represent respectively the positive and negative shocks on the variable Z1, and 
e2i
+ and e2i
- represent respectively the positive and negative shocks on the variable Z2. These 
positive and negative shocks can also be expressed as follows: 
1 1 1 1(max ,0) and (min ,0),     *                       4.6i i i ie e e e i
   
 
2 2 2 2(max ,0) and (min ,0),     *                     4.7i i i ie e e e i
   
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where the expression (max ei, 0) indicates that the values of ei (whether e1i or e2i) are superior to 0, 
while the expression (min ei, 0) indicates that values of ei (whether e1i or e2i) are smaller than 0.  
Hence, Equations 4.2 and 4.3 can respectively be re-expressed in an asymmetric framework as: 
1 1 1 1 10 1 1
1 1
+ ,      *                        4.8
t t
t t t i i
i i
Z Z e Z e e t 
 
     
 
2 2 1 2 20 2 2
1 1
+ ,      *                      4.9
t t
t t t i i
i i
Z Z e Z e e t 
 
     
 
where Z1t is a function of its initial value Z10 and the sum of its positive and negative variations 
(shocks) (∑e1i
+ and ∑e1i
-), and Z2t is a function of its initial value Z20 and the sum of its positive and 
negative variations (shocks) (∑e2i
+ and ∑e2i
-). The graphs of electricity consumption and real GDP, 
as well as the unit root tests results, showed that these two variables followed random walk 
processes (see empirical results section). Following the asymmetric framework of Hatemi-J (2012) 
which separates negative shocks from positive shocks in Equations 4.8 and 4.9, the real GDP 
(RGDP) and electricity consumption (EC) (both variables are random walks; see Section 4.3.3 for 
further explanation) have been expressed as a function of their initial value and the sum of their 
positive and negative shocks as:  
0
1 1
                                                                          4.10
t t
t i i
i i
RGDP RGDP RGDP RGDP 
 
     
 
0
1 1
                                                                                              4.11
t t
t i i
i i
EC EC EC EC 
 
       
where RGDP0 and EC0, represent the initial value of real GDP and total electricity consumption in 
their respective series, ∆RGDP+ and ∆EC+ represent the positive variations of real GDP and 
electricity consumption respectively, and ∆RGDP- and ∆EC- represent the negative variations of 
real GDP and electricity consumption respectively. For simplicity, the sum of positive variations of 
any variables will be denoted by the name of the variable and the suffix Pos and the sum of 
negative variations of any variables will be denoted by the name of the variable and the suffix Neg. 
In other words as seen in the following: 
For real GDP:  
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For electricity consumption: 
1 1
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t t
i i t
i i
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where RGDPPos and ECPos represent the sums of the positive variation of real GDP and 
electricity consumption respectively; and RGDPNeg and ECNeg represent the sums of the 
negative variation of real GDP and electricity consumption respectively. As said previously, max 
(variable, 0) indicates that the values of such variable (either ∆RGDP or ∆EC) are positive, while 
min (variable, 0) indicates that the values of such a variable (either ∆RGDP or ∆EC) are negative. 
Positive shocks on real GDP and electricity consumption are represented respectively by 
RGDPPos and ECPos, while RGDPNeg and ECNeg represent negative shocks on real GDP and 
electricity consumption respectively. The aim of the study is to verify if negative shocks on 
electricity consumption have caused negative shocks on economic growth (proxied here by real 
GDP). In other words, the aim is to verify if ECNeg has caused RGDPNeg. To make such 
verification, the asymmetric causality test of Hatemi-J (2012) is used, which separates the effect of 
negative shocks from that of positive shocks. 
Hatemi-J (2012) used the following VAR framework to run the asymmetric causality test: 
In the case of causality between positive shocks:  
1 1 ..... +                                                  4.16t t p t p tZ w B Z B Z 
   
      
In the case of causality between negative shocks: 
1 1 ..... +                                                  4.17t t p t p tZ w B Z B Z 
   
      
In the case of causality between positive shocks and negative shocks 
1 1 ..... +                                                         4.18t t p t p tZ w BZ B Z     
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where w represents a 2x1 intercepts’ vectors, Zt
+ represents a 2x1 variables’ vector (Z1t
+, Z2t
+), Zt
- 
represents a 2x1 variables’ vector (Z1t
-, Z2t
-), Zt represents a 2x1 variables’ vector (Z1t
+, Z2t
-) or a 
2x1 variables’ vector (Z1t
-, Z2t
+), Bk represent a 2x2 matrix parameters with lag order k (k = 1,….p), 
εt
+, εt
+ and εt
- represent a 2x1 error terms’ vector. Prior to running a causality test using a VAR 
framework, it is necessary to identify the optimal lag length of such a VAR framework. Hatemi-J 
(2012) developed a new lag selection criterion as: 
 2 2ln( ) [ ln 2 ln(ln ) / 2T],     0,...,            4.19kHJC k n T n T k p     
where │θk│represents the determinant of the computed variance-covariance matrix of the VAR 
model’s residuals, k represents the lag order in the VAR model, and T and n represent respectively 
the number of observations and the number of equations in the VAR model with lag order k. The 
lag order that minimizes Hatemi-J’s (2012) new criteria is the optimal. Hatemi-J (2012) also argued 
that a Wald test could be used to investigate asymmetric causality between variables. This is 
possible as long as the asymptotic properties of the Wald test are not violated. Once the selection 
of the optimal lag is completed, the next step is to test the validity of the null hypothesis stated as: 
i) in the case of the causal effects of positive shocks: 
the kth element of Z1t
+ does not impact on the wth element of Z2t
+  
ii) in the case of the causal effect of negative shocks: 
the kth element of Z1t
- does not impact on the wth element of Z2t
- 
iii) in the case where positive shocks cause negative shocks: 
the kth element of Z1t
+ does not impact on the wth element of Z2t
- 
iv) in the case where negative shocks cause positive shocks: 
the kth element of Z1t
- does not impact on the wth element of Z2t
+. 
In other words and according to Hatemi-J (2012) the null hypothesis (H0) in all cases is: 
  H0: the row w, column k element in Br equals zero for r = 1,…p. 
In general, causality tests designed on the basis of bootstrapping distributions have superior power 
and size properties compared to causality tests designed on the basis of asymptotic distribution, 
especially in cases where the asymptotic properties of the latter are violated (Hatemi-J, 2012). One 
of the advantages of using the asymmetric causality test of Hatemi-J (2012) is that it overcomes 
the limitation of the Wald test in terms of normality and the ARCH effect. When there is the 
presence of the ARCH effect and when the data does not have a normal distribution, then the 
asymptotic properties of the Wald test are violated.  
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To solve these issues, Hatemi-J (2012) proposed the use of bootstrapping simulations. These 
simulations are done repeatedly for ten thousand times and during each simulation the Wald test 
statistic is calculated. This approach helps to generate the distribution of the Wald test. After 
generating the distribution of the bootstrapped Wald test, the next step is to calculate the 
bootstrapped critical values. For any β-level of significance, the bootstrapped critical values (CVβ) 
are estimated by identifying the βth upper quantile of the bootstrapped Wald test’s distribution.  
Lastly, the Wald test statistic is estimated based on the original data, and its value is compared to 
the bootstrapped critical values (CVβ). If the value of the Wald test statistic estimated last 
(estimated based on the original data) is greater than the bootstrapped critical values (CVβ), then 
the null hypothesis stating that there is no causality is rejected. In other words, there is evidence of 
an asymmetric causality between the variables (either between the positive shocks Z1t
+ and Z2t
+, or 
between the negative shocks Z1t
- and Z2t
-
, or between positive and negative shocks (Z1t
+ and Z2t
-
; or 
Z1t
- and Z2t
+)).  
Apart from the statistical development of his asymmetric causality test, Hatemi-J (2012) also 
developed some written codes in GAUSS which are used to run the test. This study makes use of 
such GAUSS codes to run the asymmetric causality test between the variables.  
4.3.3  Data 
As said previously, following Shabaz et al. (2017) and Hoang, Lhiani and Heller (2016), initially all 
variables were converted into their logarithmic form, in order for them to have proper distributional 
properties. The annual series of real GDP (RGDP) and electricity consumption (EC) were collected 
over the period 1971-2014. Series of RGDP are expressed in constant 2010 US$, while series of 
EC are expressed in kilowatt-hours (kWh). All series (RGDP and total EC) have been collected 
from the World Development Indicators (2018) website. Data on total electricity consumption was 
not available on the World Development Indicators (2018) website. It was available on the United 
States Energy Information Administration (2018) website, but not for the period prior to 1980. Data 
on electricity consumption per capita was available on the World Development Indicators (2018) 
website for the period 1971-2014. In other to have a larger sample size by taking into account the 
data existing prior to 1980, the series for total EC was not collected from the United States Energy 
Information Administration (2018) website; rather, it was obtained by multiplying total EC per capita 
by total population (also collected from the World Development Indicators (2018) website). Graphs 
of all variables (EC, RGDP, logEC, logRGDP) show that they all have an intercept and a trend 
(Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).  
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Figure 4.1: History of electricity consumption (in kWh) in Benin (1971-2014)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
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Figure 4.2: History of real GDP at constant 2010 US$ in Benin (1971-2014)   
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
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Figure 4.3: History of the logarithm of real GDP in Benin (1971-2014)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
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Figure 4.4: History of the logarithm of electricity consumption in Benin (1971-2014)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Hatemi-J, Chang, Chen, Lin and Gupta (2015) argued that it is important to ensure that variables 
are a random walk before using an asymmetric approach to decompose them into the cumulative 
sum of their positive and negative variations. On one hand the different unit root tests (ADF test, 
PP and KPSS tests, and ZA test with structural break) revealed that the logarithm of electricity 
consumption (logEC) is stationary at level with intercept and trend (see empirical results on unit 
root tests in Section 4.4 for further details). Hence, logEC does not follow the pattern of a random 
walk, and therefore in alignment with Hatemi-J et al. (2015) logEC cannot be decomposed in the 
partial cumulative sum of its positive and negative variation. On the other hand, the different unit 
root tests applied at both level and first difference with intercept and trend revealed that both EC 
and RGDP (in their natural form) are I(1) (stationary at first difference). Hence, they follow the 
patterns of a random walk, and in alignment with Hatemi-J et al. (2015) can be decomposed in the 
partial cumulative sum of their positive and negative variation. Consequently, this study did not use 
the variables (EC and RGDP) in their logarithmic form; rather these variables were used in their 
natural form without any transformation. In other words, the variables used in this study were EC 
and RGDP rather than logEC and logRGDP.  
4.4  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.4.1  Results of the lag selection procedures and unit root tests  
Before running unit root tests for each of these variables, it is important to identify the optimal lag. 
Enders (2004) stipulates that the selection of lags for annual data should be in the range of 1 to 3. 
Hence, first 1, then 2, and finally 3 were chosen as the maximum lag when proceeding for lag 
specification in the optimum lag selection procedure. The results of the lag selection criteria are 
described below in Table 4.2, which shows that three criteria (the sequential modified LR statistic, 
Schwarz information criterion, and Hannan-Quinn information criterion) out of five (sequential 
modified LR statistic, Akaike information criterion, Final prediction error, Schwarz information 
criterion, Hanan-Quinn information criterion) selected one (01) as the optimal lag when the 
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maximum lag chosen is two (02) or three (03). When the maximum lag chosen is one (01), all five 
criteria choose one (01) as optimal lag. Hence, one (01) was chosen as the maximum lag when 
running unit root tests (see maximum lag in round brackets, in table 4.3). However, two (02) was 
chosen as the maximum lag when running the Zivot Andrews (ZA) unit root test on electricity 
consumption (EC) at first difference with intercept and trend (see maximum lag in round brackets, 
in table 4.3): the ZA test cannot be run with one (01) as the maximum lag in that specific case (the 
ZA test run with one (01) as the maximum lag is inconclusive in that specific case). 
As noted previously (in Section 4.3.3), graphs of both electricity consumption and real GDP show 
that both variables (EC and RGDP) have an intercept and a trend. Hence, different unit root tests 
have been applied at level with intercept and trend and at first difference with intercept and trend. 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the different unit root tests (DF-GLS, ADF, PP, KPSS and ZA 
tests). All tests revealed that EC and RGDP are I(1) (non-stationary at level, but stationary at first 
difference). Hence, as said before, they have the pattern of a random walk, and in alignment with 
Hatemi-J et al. (2015), they can be split into the partial cumulative sum of their positive and 
negative variations. As mentioned previously, the logarithm of EC (logEC) is stationary at level 
according to the result of the ADF, PP, KPSS and ZA tests. Hence, it does not follow strictly the 
patterns of a random walk, and in alignment with Hatemi-J et al. (2015), log(EC) cannot be split 
into the partial cumulative sum of its positive and negative variations. As explained previously, 
because the logarithm of EC (logEC) is not a random walk, logEC and the logarithm of real GDP 
(logRGDP) was not used in this study. Instead, EC and RGDP, which are random walks, were 
used. Both RGDP and EC have been split into the partial cumulative sum of their positive and 
negative variations in order to run an asymmetric causality test. 
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Table 4.2: Results of the optimal lag selection  
Choice of 1 as maximum lag 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -1800.284 NA 8.72e+33 83.82717 83.90909 83.85738 
1 -1648.780  281.8681* 9.15e+30* 76.96652*  77.21226* 77.05714* 
Choice of 2 as maximum lag 
0 -1758.565 NA 8.81e+33 83.83642 83.91917 83.86675 
1 -1611.205  273.6689* 9.55e+30  77.00975 77.25798* 77.10073* 
2 -1606.239  8.748740 9.14e+30* 76.96377* 77.37750 77.11542 
Choice of 3 as maximum lag 
0 -1716.631 NA 8.80e+33  83.83567 83.91926 83.86611 
1 -1573.453  265.4032* 9.91e+30 77.04650 77.29726* 77.13781* 
2 -1568.563  8.586780 9.51e+30* 77.00310* 77.42104 77.15529 
3 -1566.278  3.789997 1.04e+31 77.08675 77.67187 77.29982 
 
Notes:  (*) indicates the optimal length selected by the criterion  
LR: sequential modified LR statistic  
FPE: Final prediction error; 
AIC: Akaike information criterion  
SC: Schwarz information criterion  
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion  
Source: Author’s estimation 
Table 4.3: Unit root tests results 
Unit root tests Variables 
RGDP EC logRGDP logEC 
ADF Level Intercept 
and trend 
1.372837 (1) 0.798372 (1) -2.285061 (1) -6.173720 
(1)*** 
1
st
 
difference 
Intercept 
and trend 
-4.883822 
(1)*** 
-10.19749 
(1)*** 
-6.270955 
(1)*** 
--- 
DF-
GLS 
Level Intercept 
and trend 
-0.201127 (1) -0.227188 (1) -2.115119 (1) -3.155564 (1) 
1
st
 
difference 
Intercept 
and trend 
-4.793749 
(1)*** 
-10.39263 
(1)*** 
-6.068452 
(1)*** 
-8.448562 
(1)*** 
PP Level Intercept 
and trend 
2.650053  0.765350 -1.979705 -6.173717*** 
1
st
 
difference 
Intercept 
and trend 
-4.603013*** -10.19749*** -6.875425*** . 
KPSS Level Intercept 
and trend 
0.226184*** 0.216648*** 0.186708** 0.079509 
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1
st
 
difference 
Intercept 
and trend 
0.119100 0.118253 0.146000** --- 
ZA Level Intercept 
and trend 
-0.942944 (1) 
[1987] 
-3.595469 (1) 
[1997] 
-3.696128 (1) 
[1987] 
-8.065377 
(1)*** [1982] 
1
st
 
difference 
Intercept 
and trend 
-5.470700 (1)** 
[2005] 
-11.67329 
(2)*** [1979] 
-6.753444 
(1)*** [1982] 
--- 
 
Notes: (***) and (**) indicate 1% and 5% significance levels respectively 
The numbers in round brackets represent the maximum lag selected to run the unit root 
test.  
The numbers in square brackets represent the break dates.  
Source: Author’s estimation 
4.4.2 Causality test results 
4.4.2.1  History of the partial sums of positive and negative variations of electricity 
consumption and real GDP 
Figure 4.5 represents the history of the partial cumulative sums of positive variations (ECPos) and 
negative variations (ECNeg) of EC, while Figure 4.6 represents the history of the partial cumulative 
sums of positive and negative variations of RGDP in Benin. It can be seen in both figures that the 
partial cumulative sums of positive variations tend to grow faster than the partial cumulative sums 
of negative variations. However, this does not indicate that the partial cumulative sums of positive 
variations of one variable may cause the partial cumulative sums of positive variations of the other 
variable. This also does not indicate that the partial cumulative sums of negative variations of one 
variable may cause the partial cumulative sums of negative variations of the other variable.  
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Figure 4.5: History of the partial cumulative sums of positive and negative variations of 
electricity consumption in Benin (1972-2014)  
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018) 
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Figure 4.6: History of the partial cumulative sums of positive and negative variations of real 
GDP in Benin (1972-2014)  
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018) 
4.4.2.2  Results of the Doornik-Hansen (2008) multivariate normality test and the 
multivariate ARCH test of Hacker and Hatemi-J (2005) 
Before using Hatemi-J’s (2012) asymmetric causality test, it was ascertained if it was possible to 
use a Wald test that has an asymptotic distribution to investigate the asymmetric causality between 
ECNeg and RGDPNeg, ECPos and RGDPPos, ECNeg and RGDPPos, and between ECPos and 
RGDPNeg. To do this, whether there was an ARCH effect present in the data, and whether the 
data had a normal distribution property, were verified. Therefore, the Doornik-Hansen (2008) 
multivariate normality test and the multivariate ARCH test of Hacker and Hatemi-J (2005) were 
applied to the partial cumulative sums of negative variations of both variables (ECNeg, RGDPNeg), 
to the partial cumulative sums of positive variations of both variables (ECPos, RGDPPos), and to 
the partial cumulative sums of positive and negatve variations of both variables ((ECNeg, 
RGDPPos), and (ECPos, RGDPNeg)). Table 4.4 presents the results of the multivariate ARCH test 
of Hacker and Hatemi-J (2005) applied to the models (ECNeg, RGDPNeg), (ECPos, RGDPPos), 
(ECNeg, RGDPPos), and the model (ECPos, RGDPNeg). Both p-values based on asymptotic and 
the p-value based on bootstrapping are more than 5% (and even more than 10%) for all models. 
This indicates that there is no ARCH effect among the data in the models (ECNeg, RGDPNeg), 
(ECPos, RGDPPos), (ECNeg, RGDPPos), and (ECPos, RGDPNeg). However, it was necessary to 
ensure the normality property of the data before running an asymmetric causality test using the 
Wald test. 
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Table 4.4: Results of the multivariate ARCH test of Hacker and Hatemi-J (2005) for the 
models (ECNeg, RGDPNeg), (ECPos, RGDPPos), (ECNeg, RGPPos) and (ECPos, RGDPNeg)  
Model (ECNeg, RGDPNeg) 
p-values based on asymptotics, for ARCH orders of 1, 2, 3 respectively. 0.595280 
p-values based on bootstrapping, for ARCH orders of 1, 2, 3 respectively. 0.272000 
Model (ECPos, RGDPPos) 
p-values based on asymptotics, for ARCH orders of 1, 2, 3 respectively. 0.668370 
p-values based on bootstrapping, for ARCH orders of 1, 2, 3 respectively. 0.602000 
Model (ECNeg, RGDPPos)  
p-values based on asymptotics, for ARCH orders of 1, 2, 3 respectively. 0.870032 
p-values based on bootstrapping, for ARCH orders of 1, 2, 3 respectively. 0.760000 
Model (ECPos, RGDPNeg)  
p-values based on asymptotics, for ARCH orders of 1, 2, 3 respectively. 0.973169 
pvalues based on bootstrapping, for ARCH orders of 1, 2, 3 respectively 0.934000 
Source: Author’s estimation in using the GAUSS codes provided by Hacker and Hatemi-J (2005) 
and based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018) 
Before running the Doornik-Hansen’s (2008) multivariate normality test, a lag selection was first 
performed. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the results of the lag selection procedures for VAR models 
(ECNeg, RGDPNeg; ECPos, RGDPPos; ECNeg, RGDPPos; and ECPos, RGDPNeg). It can be 
seen that all five criteria (sequential modified LR statistic, Akaike information criterion (AIC), Final 
prediction error (FPE), Schwarz information criterion (SC), Hanan-Quinn information criterion (HQ)) 
suggested one (01) as optimal lag in all VAR models.  
Table 4.5: Results of the optimal lag selection for the VAR model (ECNeg, RGDPNeg) and 
(ECNeg, RGDPPos) 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
Model (ECNeg, RGDPNeg) 
Choice of 1 as maximum lag 
0 -1608.974 NA  7.10e+30  76.71306  76.79581  76.74339 
1 -1514.309  175.8067*  9.47e+28*  72.39567*  72.64391*  72.48666* 
Choice of 2 as maximum lag 
0 -1568.645 NA  6.45e+30  76.61681  76.70040  76.64725 
1 -1477.716  168.5498*  9.29e+28*  72.37641*  72.62718*  72.46773* 
2 -1476.533  2.077772  1.07e+29  72.51382  72.93176  72.66601 
Choice of 3 as maximum lag 
0 -1527.777 NA  5.67e+30  76.48886  76.57331  76.51939 
1 -1440.899  160.7256*  9.00e+28*  72.34493*  72.59826*  72.43653* 
2 -1439.146  3.066548  1.01e+29  72.45731  72.87953  72.60997 
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3 -1433.778  8.857151  9.47e+28  72.38891  72.98002  72.60264 
Model (ECNeg, RGDPPos) 
Choice of 1 as maximum lag 
0 -1754.851 NA 7.38e+33 83.65956 83.74231 83.68989 
1 -1573.446 336.8941* 1.58e+30* 75.21173* 75.45997* 75.30272* 
Choice of 2 as maximum lag 
0 -1711.129 NA 6.73e+33 83.56726 83.65085 83.59770 
1 -1536.351 323.9782* 1.62e+30* 75.23664* 75.48741* 75.32795* 
2 -1534.643 2.999831 1.82e+30 75.34843 75.76638 75.50063 
Choice of 3 as maximum lag 
0 -1667.089 NA 6.01e+33 83.45446 83.53891 83.48499 
1 -1499.400 310.2253* 1.68e+30* 75.26999* 75.52333* 75.36159* 
2 -1497.641 3.077382 1.88e+30 75.38207 75.80429 75.53473 
3 -1493.465 6.891524 1.87e+30 75.37323 75.96434 75.58696 
 
Notes:  (*) indicates the optimal length selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR statistic  
 FPE: Final prediction error; 
 AIC: Akaike information criterion  
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
 HQ: Hanan-Quinn information criterion 
Source: Author’s estimation 
Table 4.6: Results of the optimal lag selection for the VAR model (ECPos, RGDPPos) and 
(ECPos, RGDPNeg)  
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
Model (ECPos, RGDPPos) 
Choice of 1 as maximum lag 
0 -1750.432 NA  5.98e+33  83.44916  83.53190  83.47949 
1 -1595.021  288.6201*  4.42e+30*  76.23912*  76.48736*  76.33011* 
Choice of 2 as maximum lag 
0 -1708.804 NA  6.01e+33  83.45385  83.53744  83.48428 
1 -1557.995  279.5477*  4.66e+30*  76.29245*  76.54322*  76.38376* 
2 -1555.442  4.482903  5.01e+30  76.36305  76.78099  76.51524 
.Choice of 3 as maximum lag 
0 -1666.944 NA  5.97e+33  83.44721  83.53165  83.47774 
1 -1520.730  270.4958*  4.87e+30*  76.33651*  76.58984*  76.42811* 
2 -1518.305  4.243825  5.28e+30  76.41526  76.83748  76.56792 
3 -1517.385  1.517566  6.19e+30  76.56927  77.16038  76.78300 
Model (ECPos, RGDPNeg) 
Choice of 1 as maximum lag 
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0 -1703.869 NA 6.51e+32 81.231.85 81.31459 81.26218 
1 -1544.998 295.0458* 4.08e+29* 73.85705* 74.10529* 73.94804* 
Choice of 2 as maximum lag 
0 -1661.142 NA 5.87e+32 81.12890 81.21249 81.15934 
1 -1508.393 283.1462* 4.15e+29* 73.87281* 74.12357* 73.96412* 
2 -1505.761 4.620571 4.44e+29 73.93958 74.35752 74.09177 
.Choice of 3 as maximum lag 
0 -1617.787 NA 5.11e+32 80.98937 81.07382 81.01991 
1 -1471.431 270.7586* 4.14e+29* 73.87157* 74.12491* 73.96317* 
2 -1468.712 4.759852 4.43e+29 73.93558 74.35780 74.08824 
3 -1467.365 2.222600 5.08e+29 74.06823 74.65933 74.28195 
 
Notes:  (*) indicates the optimal length selected by the criterion  
LR: sequential modified LR statistic  
FPE: Final prediction error; 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
SC: Schwarz information criterion  
HQ: Hanan-Quinn information criterion  
Source: Author’s estimation 
The Doornik-Hansen (2008) multivariate normality test was then run for all VAR models ((ECNeg, 
RGDPNeg), (ECPos, RGDPPos), (ECNeg, RGDPPos), and (ECPos, RGDPNeg)). Tables 4.7 and 
4.8 present the results of the Doornik-Hansen multivariate normality tests. It can be seen that on 
both tables the p value for joint normality is significant: this indicates that the residuals are not 
normal. In addition, ECNeg and RGDPNeg do not have a normal distribution property (the p value 
for the Jarque-Bera statistic is significant). These results indicate that the asymptotic property of 
the Wald test will be violated if it is used to run an asymmetric causality test between ECNeg and 
RGDPNeg, between ECPos and RGDPPos, between ECNeg and RGDPPos, and between ECPos 
and RGDPNeg. Consequently, the Hatemi-J’s (2012) asymmetric causality test was used instead 
of the Wald test to investigate the causal relationship between negative shocks (ECNeg and 
RGDPNeg), between positive shocks (ECPos and RGDPPos), and between positive and negative 
shocks ((ECNeg and RGDPPos), (ECPos and RGDPNeg)). 
Table 4.7: Results of the Doornik-Hansen multivariate normality test for the VAR model 
(ECNeg, RGDPNeg), and (ECNeg, RGDPPos) 
Variables Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
Model (ECNeg, RGDPNeg) 
ECNeg 101.1020 2 0.0000 
RGDPNeg 17.82731 2 0.0001 
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Joint 118.9293 4 0.0000 
Model (ECNeg, RGDPPos) 
ECNeg 103.4870 2 0.0000 
RGDPPos 0.039593 2 0.9804 
Joint 103.5266 4 0.0000 
Source: Author’s estimation in eviews 10 based on data from the World Development Indicators 
(2018) 
Table 4.8: Results of the Doornik-Hansen multivariate normality test for the VAR model 
(ECPos, RGDPPos), and (ECPos, RGDPNeg) 
Variables Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
Model (ECPos, RGDPPos) 
ECPos 10.67402 2 0.0048 
RGDPPos 0.186097 2 0.9111 
Joint 10.86011 4 0.0282 
Model (ECPos, RGDPNeg) 
ECPos 5.930785 2 0.0515 
RGDPNeg 81.18373 2 0.0000 
Joint 87.11452 4 0.0000 
Source: Author’s estimation in eviews 10 based on data from the World Development Indicators 
(2018) 
4.4.2.3  Results of the Hatemi-J (2012) asymmetric causality test  
As noted previously, the Hatemi-J’s (2012) asymmetric causality test is based on a bootstrapping 
distribution and has superior power and size properties compared to the Wald test that has an 
asymptotic distribution. It overcomes the limitation of such a Wald test in terms of the violation of 
normality property and the presence of an ARCH effect among the data. There was no ARCH 
effect among the data used in the models (ECNeg, RGDPNeg), (ECPos, RGDPPos), (ECNeg, 
RGDPPos), and (ECPos, RGDPNeg); however, the data used in these models do not have a 
normal distribution property. All these justified the use of a causality based on a bootstrapping 
distribution such as Hatemi-J’s (2012) asymmetric causality test. The results of this test are 
presented in Table 4.9.  
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Table 4.9: The Hatemi-J (2012) asymmetric causality test results 
Direction of 
Causality 
Test value  
(Wald statistic) 
Level of 
significance 
Bootstrapped 
critical value 
Decision 
From ECNeg to 
RGDPNeg 
22.883** 1% 23.291 Causality at 5% 
significance 
level 
 
5% 13.275 
10% 9.630 
From RGDPNeg 
to ECNeg 
11.632** 1% 16.554 Causality at 5% 
significance 
level 
 
5% 11.428 
10% 8.236 
From ECPos to 
RGDPPos 
0.016 1% 7.556 No causality 
 5% 4.258 
10% 3.005 
From RGDPPos 
to ECPos 
0.750 1% 8.527 No causality 
 5% 4.578  
 10% 3.149  
From ECNeg to 
RGDPPos 
0.024 1% 8.208 No causality 
 5% 4.309  
 10% 3.011  
From RGDPPos 
to ECNeg 
0.173 1% 6.998 No causality 
 5% 4.095  
 10% 2.712  
From ECPos to 
RGDPNeg 
0.605 1% 8.290 No causality 
 5% 4.583  
 10% 3.304  
From RGDPNeg 
to ECPos 
0.735 1% 7.863 No causality 
 5% 4.158  
 10% 2.710  
(**) indicates 5% significance level 
Source: Author’s estimation using Hatemi-J’s (2012) GAUSS code for asymmetric causality, and 
based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018) 
On one hand, it can be seen that the estimated Wald statistic is greater than the bootstrapped 
critical value at 5% significance level for cases of causality from ECNeg to RGDPNeg and from 
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RGDPNeg to ECNeg (see Table 4.9 above). This indicates that there is bidirectional4 causality 
between negative shocks on electricity consumption (ECNeg) and negative shocks on real GDP 
(RGDPNeg). This result answers the research question Q.3 (stated in the introduction chapter) 
which was to verify if negative shocks on electricity consumption have caused negative shocks on 
economic growth, proxied here by real GDP. Negative shocks on electricity consumption have 
caused negative shocks on real GDP; therefore it can be inferred that shortages of electricity have 
contributed to cause reductions in real GDP in Benin over the period 1971-2014, even though the 
share of electricity consumption in total primary energy consumption is still very low in the country. 
According to the World Development Indicators (2017), it was less than 2.07% of total primary 
energy consumption over the period 1971-2014. This result also ascertains the conclusions of the 
national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008), which stipulated that 
shortages or disruptions to electricity supply have been a burden to economic growth in Benin. 
On the other hand, it can be seen in Table 4.9 above that the estimated Wald statistic is lower than 
the bootstrapped critical values at all levels of significance (1%, 5% and 10%) for cases of 
causality from ECPos to RGDPPos, from RGDPPos to ECPos, from ECNeg to RGDPPos, from 
RGDPPos to ECNeg, from ECPos to RGDPNeg, and from RGDPNeg to ECPos. This indicates 
that there is no causality between positive shocks on electricity consumption (ECPos) and positive 
shocks on real GDP (RGDPPos); between positive shocks on electricity consumption (ECPos) and 
negative shocks on real GDP (RGDPNeg); and between negative shocks on electricity 
consumption (ECNeg) and positive shocks on real GDP (RGDPPos). This result aligns with the 
historical fact in the Beninese context, where according to the World Development Indicators 
(2017), the share of total electricity consumption has remained less than 2.07% of the total primary 
energy consumption over 44 years (1971-2014) and the highest rate of access to electricity in the 
country over the period 1990-2016 is 41.40%. In other words, over the period 1990-2016, less than 
50% of the population had access to electricity. Electricity consumption is still very low in Benin 
and did not yet reach the threshold at which it can begin causing an increase in economic growth. 
Positive shocks on economic growth do not cause positive shocks on electricity consumption 
although electricity is used in different sectors of the economy, such as the service sector, the 
industrial sector and the residential sector (households’ use of electricity is classified as the 
residential sector’s use of electricity or residential electricity consumption).  
                                               
4
 A bidirectional causality means a causality from the first variable to the second variable and from the 
second variable to the first variable. In this specific case, it means a causality from negative shocks on 
electricity consumption to negative shocks on real GDP, and a causality from negative shocks on real GDP 
to negative shocks on electricity consumption. 
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4.4.2.4 Results of the Scott Hacker and Hatemi-J (2006) symmetric bootstrapped causality 
test  
While the aim of this study is not to investigate the causal relationship between electricity 
consumption and economic growth using a symmetric approach, the results of the symmetric 
causality between these two variables is presented in Table 4.10 below in order to confirm the 
importance of applying an asymmetric approach. Table 4.10 shows that there is no symmetric 
causal relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth. This result does not 
allow us to understand the causal effect of negative shocks on both variables, nor does it allow us 
to understand the causal effect of positive shocks on both variables. Based on the symmetric 
approach we cannot understand that there is bidirectional causality between negative shocks on 
electricity consumption and negative shocks on economic growth, while there is no causal 
relationship between positive shocks on electricity consumption and positive shocks on economic 
growth. All these highlight the limitation of the symmetric approach, and confirm the complexity of 
channels through which economic growth and electricity/energy consumption influence each other 
and the necessity of applying an asymmetric approach. 
Table 4.10: Results of the Scott Hacker and Hatemi-J (2006) symmetric bootstrapped 
causality test  
Direction of 
Causality 
Test value 
Level of 
significance 
Critical value Decision 
From EC to RGDP 0.017 1% 7.062 No causality 
 5% 3.954 
10% 2.646 
From EC to RGDP 0.752 1% 8.494 No causality 
 5% 4.999 
10% 3.326 
Source: Author’s estimation using Hatemi-J’s (2012)s GAUSS code for symmetric causality  
The aim of this study is to verify if negative shocks on electricity consumption have caused 
negative shocks on the real GDP in Benin over the period (1971-2014). Hence, the conclusions, 
recommendations and policy implications that follow will focus on this. 
4.5  CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study has fundamentally established that negative shocks on electricity consumption have 
caused negative shocks on real GDP in Benin, although the World Development Indicators (2018) 
reported that electricity consumption is very low in the country, compared to biomass or oil 
consumption. In other words, disruptions of electricity in Benin have been a burden on the 
economy and caused reductions in real GDP. As stated previously, this study has ascertained the 
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conclusions of the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008) stipulating 
that shortages of electricity have caused a reduction of economic growth. Until this study no 
empirical evidence had verified such conclusions. The results of this study highlight the importance 
of electricity security in Benin. It is important for the country to ensure its electricity security as 
disruptions of electricity have caused reductions in economic growth.  
Until recently (2015), Benin imported 77.575% of its electricity supply. As noted previously, 
dependency on the importation of electricity and losses of electricity have been major causes of 
electricity disruptions. Dependency on the importation of electricity from neighbouring countries 
such as Ghana resulted in major disruptions of electricity in Benin in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s 
and has been a burden on the economy. It is therefore important for Benin to reduce its 
dependency on the importation of electricity by increasing its self-sufficiency rate of electricity 
supply. The national policy framework for electricity has targeted to increase the self-sufficiency 
rate of the electricity supply to 70% by 2025 (see République du Bénin, 2008, pp. 54, 56). Losses 
of electricity caused a reduction in the available quantity of electricity that is supplied to consumers, 
and they also constitute a burden on the economy. The national policy framework for electricity has 
targeted to reduce losses of electricity to 14% from 2020 to 2025 (see République du Bénin, 2008, 
pp. 38, 41). The results of this study emphasize the importance of these policy decisions 
concerning the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply and the reduction of losses of electricity. 
Dependency on the importation of electricity and electricity losses are disruption risks to electricity, 
which have led to negative shocks on electricity consumption, while negative shocks on electricity 
consumption have caused negative shocks on real GDP over the period 1971-2014.  
Results of this study showed that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between negative 
shocks on electricity consumption and negative shocks on real GDP, and that the level of electricity 
consumption is not yet high enough to start impacting positively on economic growth in Benin. This 
aligns with the theoretical views of Stern (1997, 2010), Hall et al. (1986, 2003) and Cleveland et al. 
(1984), which stipulate that there is a positive correlation between energy supply/consumption and 
economic growth. This also aligns with some of the studies found in the empirical literature which 
have established that negative shocks on total energy/disaggregated energy consumption cause 
negative shocks on economic growth. Significant among these few studies are Ranjbar et al. 
(2017) on South Africa, Tiwari (2014) on the US economy, Hatemi-J and Uddin (2012) on the US 
economy, Bayat et al. (2017) on Turkey, Shahbaz et al. (2017) on India, and Destek (2016) on 
India. However, throughout the empirical literature on the asymmetric causal relationship between 
economic growth and energy consumption, no study has investigated whether negative shocks on 
electricity consumption cause negative shocks on economic growth in the Beninese context. This 
study has filled this gap, and is a contribution to the existing literature on electricity security and 
economic growth in general, and particularly a contribution to the existing literature on disruptions 
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of electricity and economic growth. This study will be of importance for the current debate and 
formulation of electricity security policy in Benin where disruption of electricity supply is a major 
concern. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION, FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
Turkson and Wohlgemuth (2001) argued that there is a consensus on the fundamental role of 
access to electricity in African countries regarding sustainable economic growth and poverty 
reduction. However, access to electricity is still low in many African countries, including Benin. As 
reported by the World Development Indicators (2018), access to electricity in Benin has never 
exceeded 41.5% over 26 years (1990-2016). The Beninese electricity sector faces three major 
challenges. The first is its dependency on the importation of electricity. There is a huge supply gap 
of electricity, hence the country has to rely on the importation of electricity from neighbouring 
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, which have also faced a growing domestic 
demand of electricity. A country such as Ghana has, furthermore, faced droughts, which has 
limited the generation capacity of its Akossombo hydroelectric dam. The consequence of this was 
the reduction of Ghana’s exports of electricity to Benin. This situation, added to Benin’s weak 
capacity to produce its electricity domestically, resulted in several disruptions to the electricity 
supply in Benin in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (République du Bénin, 2008).  
The second challenge, which is a cause of disruption to the electricity supply in Benin, is electricity 
losses. Benin has encountered important transmission and distribution losses of electricity. 
According to the United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA, 2018), transmission and 
distribution losses of electricity ranged between 9.35% and 25.14% of total electricity supply over 
the period 1980-2015. Their value in 2015 was 19.358% of total electricity supply (USEIA, 2018), 
while the ECA (2008) has defined the international standard in terms of maximum electricity losses 
as 12% of total electricity supply. Electricity losses reduce the quantity of electricity supplied that 
reaches legal consumers. In other words, they reduce the quantity of electricity available for 
consumers. Hence, they constitute a source of disruptions to electricity supply. 
The third challenge which contributes to increasing disruptions to electricity supply in Benin is the 
dependency on oil to generate electricity domestically. According to the World Development 
Indicators (2017), more than 95% of electricity generated domestically in Benin over 42 years 
(1973-2014) was based on oil, and so the country’s domestic production of electricity is vulnerable 
to fluctuations in oil prices. Whenever oil prices rise, the production costs of electricity increase, 
and this limits Benin’s capacity to generate electricity domestically. Such a reduction in domestic 
capacity of electricity production increases disruption risks to the overall supply of electricity in the 
country. 
The World Development Indicators (2018) reported that disruptions to electricity supply have 
negatively affected sales values in Benin. According to the World Bank (2016), 60.4% of firms in 
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Benin have identified outages or disruptions to the electricity supply as a major constraint for the 
ease of doing business. The national policy framework for electricity has reported that these 
electricity shortages have impeded economic growth. However, there is no empirical evidence on 
Benin which has evaluated the effect of such disruption risks to electricity supply on economic 
growth. In addition, according to the World Development Indicators (2018), electricity consumption 
has never exceeded 2.07% of the total energy consumption over 34 years (1971-2014) in the 
country. Because of this, it is, arguably, possible that such disruptions to electricity supply have no 
effect on economic growth, as consumption of electricity is still low in the country. It was therefore 
important to assess the effect of disruptions to the electricity supply on economic growth, which 
formed the focus of the current study. The study first measured the disruption risks to the electricity 
supply in Benin by constructing a composite index of disruption risks to electricity supply. It then 
assessed the effect of disruptions such as electricity losses to the electricity supply on real GDP. 
Finally, the study verified if shortages or negative shocks to electricity consumption caused 
negative shocks to economic growth. Summaries of the findings of these three assessments and 
investigations as well as their policy implications and recommendations are presented in the next 
sections. 
5.2  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDTIONS 
This section presents a summary of the findings and policy implications related to, first, the 
composite index of disruption risks to electricity supply; second, the effect of electricity losses on 
real GDP; and third, the causal effect of negative shocks to electricity supply on negative shocks to 
economic growth. This is followed by policy recommendations and a discussion of priorities going 
forward. 
5.2.1  Measuring electricity security risks 
Prior to the current study, there was no performance indicator that could measure electricity supply 
security in Benin and other countries of the world, while taking into account the whole spectrum of 
energy supply security (“affordability”, “acceptability”, “accessibility” and “availability” of energy). 
The African Development Bank has designed a composite index of electricity, but it only focuses 
on the generation of electricity and only targets African countries: it does not take into account 
disruption risks to the electricity supply, which represent an important challenge not only in Benin, 
but also in Africa and in many other countries of the world. The World Bank (2018a) developed, as 
part of the second pillar of its global competitiveness index, an indicator measuring the quality of 
electricity supply for countries of the world. This indicator is based on surveys where respondents 
in each country are asked to rank the reliability of the electricity supply in their country in terms of 
“lack of interruptions” and “low voltage”, based on a score ranging from 1 (the worst quality) to 7 
(the best quality). Respondents’ opinions and allocation of scores can be very subjective. In 
addition, such an indicator does not take into account the whole spectrum of energy supply 
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security (“affordability”, “acceptability”, “accessibility” and “availability” of energy), it focuses only on 
the “availability” of electricity, and values obtained can be subjective as they depend on 
respondents’ answers rather than on a quantitative measurement of the availability of electricity 
supply. Aspects such as the sustainability of electricity supply using renewable energy and the 
affordability of electricity are not considered when using such an indicator.  
In alignment with one of the sub-objectives of the national policy framework for electricity 
(République du Bénin, 2008), which is the definition and improvement of performance indicators for 
the electricity sector as a whole as well for the national distribution company, the current study has 
constructed a composite index of disruption risks to electricity supply, which take into account the 
whole spectrum of energy security (“affordability”, “acceptability”, “accessibility” and “availability” of 
energy). According to such an index, Benin is among the countries in the world with a very high 
level of disruption risk to electricity supply. Averages of the annual index over the periods 2002-
2005 and 2006-2010 are 2.157 and 2.036 respectively. Based on these averages, Benin has been 
ranked fourth in the world with a very high level of disruption risk to electricity supply over these 
periods. Over the period 2011-2015, Benin has remained among the countries of the world with a 
very high level of disruptions to electricity supply, being ranked third highest in the world according 
to the level of disruption to electricity supply. The value of the index for that period was 2.132. Such 
an index constitutes an important tool that can be used to monitor and evaluate a country’s 
performance in terms of security of electricity supply.  
The construction of such a composite index is a contribution to the achievement of the national 
policy framework for electricity’s goal of defining and improving performance indicators for the 
Beninese electricity sector. In Benin, this index can be used by policy makers to evaluate the 
effectivess of policies related to the security of electricity supply. As mentioned before, the World 
Bank (2016) reported that 60.4% of firms have identified electricity as a major constraint for the 
ease of doing business, and 95.6% of them have experienced electricity outages. In its effort to 
attract private investments and to improve the ease of doing business in the country, the 
government of Benin can use this index as a barometer to annually evaluate the country’s effort in 
terms of infrastructure development in the electricity sector. The more effective the infrastructure 
development in the electricity sector and the policies related to the security of electricity supply will 
be, the lower the annual values of the index will be (see the index values classified according to 
the level of disruption risk to electricity supply, in Appendix B, Tables B1, B2, and B3).  
This index has shown that Benin has a low performance in terms of effort to avoid disruptions to 
electricity supply. It has shown that a sustainable security of electricity supply in Benin should not 
just be limited to reducing the supply gap of electricity: other aspects such as governance in the 
country (control of corruption, rule of law, quality of the regulatory system, government 
effectiveness), more use of renewable electricity, and urbanization, also matter. For a sustainable 
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security of electricity supply, reducing the supply gap of electricity is important, but not sufficient in 
Benin. The country must improve the quality of its regulatory system, and its government 
effectiveness, and it must also reduce corruption. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the quality of 
governance affects the delivery of electricity to consumers. For instance, the lack of competition in 
the distribution of electricity has been a great handicap to an effective supply of electricity in Benin, 
as the importation and transportation of electricity have been for decades allocated to the CEB (the 
Electrical Community of Benin), which is a state-owned monopoly. This has prevented private firms 
from investing in the electricity sector (République du Bénin, 2008).  
On April 13th 2018, the Beninese parliament withdrew the monopoly of importation and 
transportation of electricity to the CEB and liberalized the importation and transportation of 
electricity through an amended act.  However, such legislation is still recent and its impact on the 
willingness of the private sector to invest in the Beninese electricity sector is yet to be seen. 
Sustainable security of electricity supply also requires Benin to increase the share of renewable 
electricity in the total electricity supply and to rely less on fossil fuels for its domestic electricity 
production. Fossil fuels are limited energy resources and the volatility of their prices affects the 
domestic capacity of Benin to produce electricity. Sustainable security of electricity supply also 
involves aspects related to urbanization. Improving the living conditions of the rural population will 
contribute to reduce its massive migration toward urban areas, and slow down rapid urbanization. 
As explained before, when the urbanization rate exceeds the rate of urban access to electricity 
there will always be a supply gap of electricity in urban areas. 
5.2.2  The effect of electricity losses on GDP 
By investigating the effect of electricity losses on GDP, the current study has contributed to 
assessing the feasibility of the indirect financing mechanism proposed by the national policy 
framework for electricity to fund the cost of reducing electricity losses. Electricity efficiency is one of 
the pillars of the second objective of the national strategy for access to electricity in Benin. In 
alignment with this pillar, the Beninese Ministry of Energy has planed to reduce electricity losses to 
14% from 2020 to 2025. Achieving such targets requires Benin to modernize its distribution lines 
and improve its electricity billing system. These requirements have significant financial costs 
(République du Bénin, 2008).  
As mentioned previously, the Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (2018) reported that 
there is no direct financing mechanism in Benin to fund the costs of activities, implementation of 
which will contribute to reduce electricity losses. To solve this problem, the national policy 
framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 65) proposed an indirect financing 
mechanism of the costs associated with reducing electricity losses. As explained previously, such 
a mechanism proposed to finance the costs associated with reducing electricity losses with funding 
by donors or the national budget, and using the gains in GDP resulting from reductions in electricity 
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losses to reimburse donors or the national budget for the funds allocated to reduction of electricity 
losses. It was therefore important to assess the effect of electricity losses on GDP. In other words, 
it was important to assess the gain in GDP resulting from reductions in electricity losses. This was 
a focus of this study. The third chapter of this study established that a 1% reduction in electricity 
losses will lead to a 0.16% increase in GDP. By doing so, the current study has assessed the 
feasibility of the indirect financing mechanism proposed by the national policy framework for 
electricity. It has provided some evidence on the viability of such a mechanism. In other words, 
results of the current study have provided some valuable evidence, which will help Benin’s strategy 
of financing its electricity efficiency policy. They also align with Antmann (2009) who stipulated that 
there are GDP losses in sub-Saharan African countries because of electricity losses. Based on 
these results, and because of its limited financial resources, Benin, should implement the indirect 
financing mechanism proposed in its policy framework for electricity. 
5.2.3  The effect of negative shocks to electricity supply on negative shocks to economic 
growth 
The fourth chapter of this study established that negative shocks to electricity consumption 
(electricity supply net of losses) cause negative shocks to real GDP. It also demonstrated that 
negative shocks to real GDP cause negative shocks to electricity consumption, and that there was 
no causal relationship between positive shocks to electricity consumption and positive shocks to 
real GDP. However, reductions in the quantity of electricity consumed have a negative effect on 
economic growth. As reported by the Republic of Benin (République du Bénin, 2008), there have 
been many negative shocks to electricity consumption in Benin such as shortages of electricity 
supply caused by sudden reductions in the importation of electricity. The national policy framework 
for electricity stipulated that these negative shocks to electricity consumption have caused negative 
shocks to economic growth. However, there has been no empirical study which has verified if 
negative shocks to electricity consumption have in fact caused negative shocks to economic 
growth. In addition, the share of electricity consumption in total primary energy consumption is very 
low, and because of this, it is possible that negative shocks to electricity consumption have no 
causal effect on negative shocks to economic growth. Therefore, it was necessary to verify 
empirically if negative shocks to electricity consumption caused negative shocks to real GDP (a 
proxy for economic growth).  
Results of this study have ascertained the conclusions of the national policy framework stating that 
negative shocks to electricity consumption have impeded economic growth. They highlight the fact 
that the electricity security policy in Benin must, as a priority, avoid disruptions to the electricity 
supply, as they constitute a burden for economic growth. The electricity security policy in Benin 
must consist of diversifying the production sources of electricity and having a security park 
composed of installed power plants, which can at any time fill any supply gap caused by sudden 
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disruptions to the electricity supply. The distribution of electricity must be decentralised. There 
must be local or municipal solar farms which can fill any supply gap of electricity whithin a given 
municipality. In addition, more effort must be made to develop the off grid distribution of electricity, 
in order to provide electricity to the remote villages where the grid distribution of electricity is 
inexistent. For example, solar lanterns can be provided to schools, health centers, and households 
located in remote villages where there is no electricity. The provision of solar lanterns should be a 
temporary solution, and should not prevent the country from extending the provision of grid 
electricity to remote villages, when financially able. 
5.2.4  Recommendations 
Results of this study call for four main policy recommendations. The first is the limitation of the 
dependency on the importation of electricity, and oil as the main source of domestically generated 
electricity. This study recommends that Benin should try to minimize the high level of vulnerability 
of its electricity sector concerning shocks related to sudden decreases in imports of electricity, and 
increases in oil prices, which can limit the domestic capacity of electricity generation. The country 
should attempt to increase its domestic generation of electricity to mitigate risks related to a 
sudden decrease in electricity imports. This will require a large amount of investments in electricity 
infrastructure. As mentioned in the chapter 1 section 1.1.4, a new law called “The bill authorizing 
the ratification of the international agreement on the amended Beninese-Togolese Act for 
Electricity”, voted by the Beninese parliament on April 13th 2018, has opened the electricity market 
to private firms. This will allow private investments to flow in the Beninese electricity sector. Private 
investments will complement public investments in financing the electricity infrastructure that will 
help to meet both the present and the future demand of electricity. If Benin as a small economy is 
unable to absorb all the electric power generated through these investments in electricity 
infrastructure, the country will ultimately become an exporter of electricity like Nigeria and Ghana.  .  
Benin should diversify its sources of domestically-generated electricity in order to leverage its 
heavy reliance on oil. The country must increase the share of electricity produced based on 
renewable sources, such as solar and wind electricity, in the total domestically-generated 
electricity. Heavy reliance on hydroelectric dams is also a risk which can lead to outages of 
electricity, as severe droughts can occur and reduce the speed of flow and the level of water in the 
dams, limiting its capacity for electricity generation.  
The second recommendation is to increase access to electricity and minimize electricity losses. 
Results of this study showed that a reduction in electricity consumption would cause reductions in 
GDP. It is therefore recommended that when implementing its energy efficiency strategy, Benin 
must not accept an energy conservation policy which aims to decrease electricity consumption, as 
a reduction in electricity consumption will impede economic growth. The country should rather 
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increase access and consumption of electricity and save wasted electricity by minimizing both 
technical and non-technical losses.  
The third policy recommendation is law enforcement with regard to non-technical losses of 
electricity. The study recommends that the government must enforce laws and regulations to 
protect the transmission and distribution lines of electricity against illegal behaviour such as theft of 
electricity. The national company for electricity distribution (SBEE) also has an important role to 
play with regard to the reduction of defaults in electricity bill payments, which constitutes 
inefficiency in the economy.  
This leads to the fourth policy recommendation, which is the adoption for instance of the prepaid 
system in the electricity sector. The SBEE should adopt the prepaid electricity system, in which 
consumers purchase their consumption of electricity before usage. In other words, with the prepaid 
system consumers will be required to purchase electricity as they purchase any items or food in 
the supermarket, paying the costs of such items or food before consuming them. This system is 
economically more effective than the post-paid system in which consumers pay for electricity after 
usage. In the post-paid system, consumers make use of electricity without paying the cost initially. 
Every month, the SBEE will send the electricity bill to consumers who then can decide whether to 
pay the bill or not. In addition, many errors occur in the calculation of bills sent by the SBEE to 
consumers. These reasons help to explain why the post-paid system is economically inefficient 
and generates important commercial losses of electricity. Technical losses can be avoided by 
improving the technology used for transmission and distribution of electricity. This requires 
investments in electricity infrastructure, which should be among the first priorities of the 
government in its effort to promote economic growth and reduce poverty and inequality. The 
implementation of the indirect financing mechanism proposed by the national policy framework for 
electricity will enable the country to fund these investments in electricity infrastructure. As 
explained before, this study has proven that such indirect financing mechanism is feasible. 
5.2.5  Priorities  
Benin has targeted to increase its self-sufficiency rate in terms of electricity supply to 70% by 2025 
according to the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008). This will 
require important investment in electricity infrastructure. The public sector alone will not be able to 
fund these investments: it will require a partnership with the private sector and international donors 
through multilateral and bilateral cooperation. The country has recently benefited from an 
investment in electricity infrastructure by the United States Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). 
Such support from the US started in 2017, and will last until 2022 (see MCA, 2014) for further 
details). Other sources of funds for electricity infrastructure must be explored. Above all, it is 
important for the country to invest in solar electricity. Solar energy can never be depleted, unlike 
fossil fuel, coal, etc. Benin is located next to the equator in the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone 
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(ICZ), where the solar rays are almost perpendicular; hence it receives a huge intensity of solar 
heat. Benin naturally has the potential to develop solar electricity in order to diversify its sources of 
domestically-generated electricity.  
5.3  CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The contribution of a dissertation can be in terms of concept and theory, in terms of policy or in 
terms of methodology. The current study did not contribute to the advancement of theories; rather, 
its contribution is in terms of concept, policy and methodology. 
5.3.1  Contribution for policy on electricity supply efficiency and electricity supply 
security in Benin 
First, by investigating the effect of electricity losses on GDP, the current study has theoretically 
assessed the feasibility of the indirect financing mechanism proposed by the national policy 
framework for electricity to fund the cost associated with reduction of electricity losses. The current 
study has proved that such a financing mechanism is feasible. Therefore, it has contributed to 
advance the implementation of the national policy framework for electricity. More specifically, the 
study has contributed to advance the implementation of the Beninese Act for electricity efficiency 
and the national strategy for electricity efficiency. Results of the study provide government with a 
reliable option for financing costs associated with the reduction of electricity losses.  
Second, by constructing a composite index of disruption risks to electricity supply to measure the 
performance of Benin in terms of electricity supply security, the current study has contributed to the 
achievement of one of the sub-objectives of the national policy framework for electricity, namely 
the definition and improvement of performance indicators for the electricity sector and the national 
distribution company. The composite index of disruption risks to electricity supply measures the 
overall performance of Benin in terms of efforts to avoid disruption risks to electricity supply. It 
takes into account the country’s performance in terms of electricity efficiency, the self-sufficiency 
rate of electricity supply, sustainable electricity production (through the share of renewable 
electricity in total supply), and effectiveness of the delivery of electricity (through the governance 
index). It is an important tool which can be used to monitor the progress of the country in terms of 
sustainable security of electricity supply. 
By establishing that negative shocks to electricity consumption cause negative shocks to GDP, the 
current study has ascertained the conclusions of the national policy framework for electricity 
stipulating that shortages of electricity have impeded economic growth. In so doing, it highlights the 
importance of the national policy framework’s objective aiming to increase Benin’s self-sufficiency 
rate of electricity supply to 70% by 2025. Being able to produce 70% of its electricity supply 
domestically will contribute to reducing electricity shortages in Benin, as the country will rely less 
on the importation of electricity. The study has also established that electricity consumption is not 
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yet high enough to cause increases in economic growth. In other words, shortages of electricity 
consumption are a burden for economic growth, while increases of electricity consumption do not 
yet cause increases in economic growth. Hence, it is very important for the country to avoid 
electricity shortages and to continue investing in electricity infrastructure until electricity 
consumption reaches the threshold at which it can start boosting economic growth. 
5.3.2  Contribution to international policies in terms of security of electricity supply 
The current study has created data that did not exist before by calculating the annual values of the 
composite index of disruption risk to electricity supply for at least 172 countries over the period 
2002-2015 and for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000 (see the data for measuring electricity security 
risk, in Dakpogan (2018)). Such data constitutes the annual series of each country’s composite 
index of disruption risks to electricity supply. Future studies all over the world can examine the 
relationship between electricity security and economic growth using the annual series of such an 
index. The series of the constructed composite index of disruption risks to electricity supply has 
revealed that Norway is the country with the lowest level of disruption risk to electricity supply. The 
data also revealed that OECD countries have the lowest level of disruption risk to electricity supply 
while most African countries and low-income economies have the highest levels of disruption risk 
to electricity supply, and most emerging economies and middle-income countries have medium 
disruption risks to electricity supply. These results are important for global security of electricity 
supplies and they constitute relevant information that can help development finance and business 
finance institutions in their analysis of the ease of doing business in various regions of the world in 
order to advise investors or allocate investments. Countries where disruption risks to electricity 
supply are high or very high have investment needs in terms of electricity infrastructure, or capacity 
building in terms of governance, and so forth. Two countries A and B may have a high level of 
disruption risk to electricity supply. If the value of their governance index (GI) shows that country A 
has a better governance system than country B, then country A is more likely to attract investments 
in terms of electricity infrastructure than country B.  
5.3.3  Contribution in terms of methodology 
Apart from its contribution to the advancement of policy related to electricity supply efficiency and 
electricity supply security in Benin and in the world, this study has also brought some contributions 
in terms of methodology. It has designed a new way of measuring electricity supply security using 
a set of indicators/index. More precisely, this study has designed a new formula that can be used 
to measure the disruption risk to electricity supply, while taking into account the whole spectrum of 
energy/electricity security (accessibility, availability, affordability, and acceptability of 
energy/electricity). Such a formula is the inverse of the geometric mean of a set of indicators/index 
and did not exist previously. Some of these indicators, such as the ratio of growth of urban access 
to electricity to growth of urbanization rate (RUB) and the governance index (GI), did not exist 
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previously (to the best of the writer’s knowledge). They have been designed for the purpose of 
constructing the composite index of disruption risks to electricity supply (MESRI). They constitute 
new ways of measuring some components of electricity supply security. 
5.3.4    Contribution in terms of concepts 
First, the current study has extended the understanding of the concepts of accessibility of 
electricity to issues related to governance, corruption, and rule of law. As explained previously, 
corruption, the quality of the regulatory system, and the rule of law, affect the delivery of electricity 
in a country. Previous studies did not consider these aspects in their description of the concept of 
accessibility. Second, the current study has also extended the understanding of the concept of 
availability to issues related to electricity losses, rapid urbanization and supply gap of electricity in 
urban areas. As explained previously, losses of electricity reduce the electricity supplied to legal 
consumers; rapid urbanisation increases the urban demand of electricity, and if the rate of urban 
access to electricity is smaller than the urbanisation rate, there will be supply gap of electricity in an 
urban area. Previous studies did not take into account these aspects in their definitions of the 
concept of availability. 
5.4  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Because of the shortness of series on industrial and service sectors’ electricity consumption, the 
current study was not able to investigate the causal effect of negative shocks to electricity 
consumption on negative shocks to industrial value added or negative shocks to service value 
added. Knowledge of the type of causal relationship which exists at the disaggregated level 
between electricity consumption and economic growth will be of great importance for electricity 
security policy in each economic sector. Electricity consumption patterns vary from one sector to 
another, and electricity security policy may differ from one sector to another. Electricity efficiency 
policies may also differ from one sector to another. Losses of electricity encountered in the 
industrial sector may not be the same as in the residential sector (households), and the costs 
associated with a reduction of electricity losses in the residential sector may not be the same as 
the costs associated with reduction of electricity losses in the industrial sector. It is therefore 
important to verify if the relationship observed between electricity consumption/supply and 
economic growth at the aggregated level remains the same at the disaggregated or sectorial level. 
However, there is no data for electricity supply under the hypothesis of an absence of losses at the 
disaggregated level (industry, service, residential). Further research can reflect on ways to 
overcome these constraints related to a lack of data or shortness of time series data in order to 
investigate the relationship between electricity consumption/supply and economic growth at the 
disaggregated level in Benin.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
RANKING OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE SUB-INDICATORS OF THE 
COMPOSITE INDEX (MESRI) 
Table A1: African countries’ ranking according to their performance in terms of governance 
(GI) (average 2011-2015) (only countries for which data are available) 
Countries 
Average GI  
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Libya 98.38290638 2 1 
Congo (Kinshasa) 98.38827761 3 2 
Sudan 98.43187786 4 3 
Central African Republic 98.47710277 5 4 
Zimbabwe 98.64315481 8 5 
Chad 98.72074994 10 6 
Guinea-Bissau 98.77794398 11 7 
Nigeria 98.78024322 12 8 
Equatorial Guinea 98.81305282 14 9 
Burundi 98.81754307 15 10 
Guinea 98.87508104 18 11 
Congo (Brazzaville) 98.97011097 21 12 
Angola 98.9891335 22 13 
Comoros 99.03208796 23 14 
Cameroon 99.06118556 25 15 
Mali 99.1157457 27 16 
Liberia 99.12312191 28 17 
Mauritania 99.12677987 29 18 
Côte d’Ivoire 99.13355442 30 19 
Algeria 99.13702376 31 20 
Togo 99.15103423 34 21 
Ethiopia 99.16483503 35 22 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 99.17798929 36 23 
Madagascar 99.21350248 38 24 
Sierra Leone 99.21569522 39 25 
Kenya 99.26972217 41 26 
Niger 99.27185802 42 27 
Uganda 99.39480897 54 28 
Mozambique 99.49538401 56 29 
Gabon 99.50819165 57 30 
Tanzania 99.51362915 59 31 
Burkina Faso 99.520991 60 32 
Gambia, The 99.5233781 61 33 
Swaziland 99.53366145 62 34 
São Tomé and Principe 99.54344147 65 35 
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Malawi 99.57168156 68 36 
Benin 99.59274034 70 37 
Tunisia 99.73909142 84 38 
Zambia 99.74832098 85 39 
Senegal 99.76983258 87 40 
Morocco 99.77281892 88 41 
Lesotho 99.81741275 94 42 
Ghana 99.97996793 105 43 
Rwanda 100.0681044 109 44 
South Africa 100.1478267 115 45 
Seychelles 100.279436 120 46 
Namibia 100.3037207 121 47 
Cape Verde 100.4389105 127 48 
Botswana 100.7178659 141 49 
Mauritius 100.8287029 147 50 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018) 
Table A.2: African countries’ ranking according to their performance in terms of the ratio of 
growth of urban access to electricity to growth of urbanization (RUB) (average 2011-2015) 
(only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average RUB 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Rwanda 94.24252036 4 1 
Burkina Faso 94.37520092 5 2 
Burundi 94.77205278 6 3 
Uganda 94.81692181 7 4 
Tanzania 94.84446582 9 5 
Angola 94.92335282 11 6 
Niger 95.13831153 13 7 
Mali 95.27612607 14 8 
Ethiopia 95.29776228 15 9 
Madagascar 95.60521901 17 10 
Equatorial Guinea 95.60979508 18 11 
Nigeria 95.65355695 19 12 
Congo (Kinshasa) 95.67035186 20 13 
Namibia 95.71273182 21 14 
Kenya 95.90904976 26 15 
Gambia, The 95.92410973 27 16 
Zambia 96.10948939 28 17 
Guinea-Bissau 96.12526088 29 18 
Mauritania 96.15142574 30 19 
Côte d’Ivoire 96.29174699 31 20 
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Togo 96.30984121 32 21 
Malawi 96.35111274 33 22 
Cameroon 96.38441995 35 23 
Benin 96.38850118 36 24 
Senegal 96.48816319 38 25 
Mozambique 96.49618401 39 26 
Ghana 96.50294122 40 27 
Chad 96.53196795 41 28 
Gabon 96.53602863 42 29 
Guinea 96.59176672 43 30 
São Tomé and Principe 96.86267582 47 31 
Congo (Brazzaville) 96.89308672 49 32 
Lesotho 96.92138832 51 33 
Liberia 96.98889964 54 34 
Sierra Leone 96.99710808 56 35 
Algeria 97.1782761 61 36 
Sudan 97.3096598 63 37 
Comoros 97.4256678 66 38 
Cape Verde 97.71694638 75 39 
Morocco 97.77843067 77 40 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 97.81882693 79 41 
Botswana 97.82009676 80 42 
South Africa 97.85122947 81 43 
Zimbabwe 98.25427882 93 44 
Swaziland 98.39942375 103 45 
Tunisia 98.58967243 108 46 
Seychelles 98.6616994 109 47 
Central African Republic 99.02075133 125 48 
Libya 99.55653212 149 49 
Mauritius 100.2538186 172 50 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table A.3: African countries’ ranking according to their performance in terms of share of 
GDP not used to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) (only countries for which data 
is available) 
Countries 
Average RNEEX 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Mozambique 89.89835382 5 1 
Zimbabwe 96.08402116 18 2 
Libya 96.28013947 20 3 
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Egypt, Arab Rep. 96.59577449 22 4 
South Africa 96.91035609 27 5 
Zambia 97.27247539 34 6 
Tunisia 98.11899677 53 7 
Congo (Kinshasa) 98.36107382 64 8 
Algeria 98.39890283 69 9 
Namibia 98.41045591 70 10 
Togo 98.47229599 74 11 
Morocco 98.49489588 76 12 
Seychelles 98.53827752 78 13 
Swaziland 98.5583192 80 14 
Lesotho 98.56171802 81 15 
Ghana 98.56993606 82 16 
São Tomé and Principe 98.61461637 87 17 
Côte d’Ivoire 98.74602536 98 18 
Gambia, The 98.7548455 102 19 
Botswana 98.75610133 104 20 
Malawi 98.7694487 106 21 
Mauritius 98.77364831 107 22 
Cameroon 98.85465186 114 23 
Senegal 98.85766483 115 24 
Cape Verde 98.87534255 116 25 
Ethiopia 98.96554568 129 26 
Mauritania 99.03035476 136 27 
Liberia 99.0367424 137 28 
Kenya 99.08301584 141 29 
Mali 99.20019467 149 30 
Niger 99.22392626 152 31 
Madagascar 99.24878248 155 32 
Benin 99.25073761 156 33 
Sudan 99.25784214 157 34 
Tanzania 99.26241206 158 35 
Gabon 99.35797079 163 36 
Congo (Brazzaville) 99.40204725 165 37 
Uganda 99.40268114 166 38 
Guinea 99.4168149 168 39 
Burundi 99.42799911 169 40 
Burkina Faso 99.43341101 170 41 
Central African Republic 99.45800361 172 42 
Comoros 99.50838943 174 43 
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Angola 99.61164683 177 44 
Rwanda 99.63458391 178 45 
Nigeria 99.6733151 179 46 
Sierra Leone 99.7395526 180 47 
Guinea-Bissau 99.82639839 181 48 
Equatorial Guinea 99.8909833 182 49 
Chad 99.91430533 183 50 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from USEIA (2018), World Bank (2018b), and 
World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table A.4: Ranking of African countries according to their average score related to the 
share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity (average 2011-2015) 
(only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average RRE 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Chad 100.0000000 1 1 
Comoros 100.0000000 1 1 
Gambia, The 100.0000000 1 1 
Guinea-Bissau 100.0000000 1 1 
Liberia 100.0000000 1 1 
Libya 100.0000000 1 1 
Botswana 100.0370561 22 7 
Niger 100.5118329 28 8 
Algeria 100.6665527 31 9 
Benin 101.1111111 34 10 
South Africa 101.1357147 36 11 
Seychelles 101.2985909 38 12 
Tunisia 102.190804 45 13 
Mauritania 104.6463238 51 14 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 108.8436646 61 15 
São Tomé and Principe 109.3011241 63 16 
Senegal 110.3547894 66 17 
Morocco 112.1528063 71 18 
Burkina Faso 113.0202246 76 19 
Cape Verde 116.6294332 86 20 
Nigeria 119.140297 89 21 
Mauritius 120.9062318 92 22 
Côte d’Ivoire 123.8231839 97 23 
Equatorial Guinea 125.3664093 100 24 
Tanzania 135.5877234 114 25 
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Gabon 142.6372076 121 26 
Rwanda 145.2775501 123 27 
Swaziland 147.0459505 126 28 
Madagascar 151.2768005 129 29 
Mali 152.2608527 130 30 
Zimbabwe 156.1036698 137 31 
Congo (Brazzaville) 156.8217494 138 32 
Angola 159.2156513 142 33 
Ghana 162.8488429 146 34 
Sierra Leone 168.7838795 150 35 
Guinea 170.8747503 151 36 
Sudan 174.0744704 152 37 
Cameroon 175.4868921 154 38 
Kenya 175.9876044 156 39 
Togo 182.9278807 162 40 
Uganda 185.7379413 164 41 
Burundi 187.8535743 165 42 
Malawi 191.1693512 166 43 
Central African Republic 193.4505669 169 44 
Mozambique 194.9936181 170 45 
Namibia 197.6953163 173 46 
Zambia 198.7475990 174 47 
Congo (Kinshasa) 199.6710700 176 48 
Ethiopia 199.8192374 178 49 
Lesotho 200.0000000 183 50 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table A.5: Ranking of African countries according to their self-sufficiency rate of electricity 
supply (ESS) (Average 2011-2015) (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average ESS 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Togo 9.862617174 1 1 
Benin 12.3593826 2 2 
Botswana 33.41263613 5 3 
Namibia 37.51515785 6 4 
Niger 37.65697224 7 5 
Swaziland 38.58293401 8 6 
Cameroon 51.22466602 11 7 
Burkina Faso 58.97757748 13 8 
Liberia 66.20746827 15 9 
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Madagascar 69.17464028 16 10 
Rwanda 83.58873605 24 11 
Mozambique 83.68722615 25 12 
Morocco 85.00837286 28 13 
Mauritania 90.76176035 35 14 
Gambia, The 92.13495134 38 15 
Djibouti 92.68070243 39 16 
Equatorial Guinea 95.03307144 44 17 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 97.02400069 49 18 
Zimbabwe 97.18919606 50 19 
Lesotho 97.43798323 52 20 
Tanzania 98.91422371 58 21 
Congo (Kinshasa) 98.94142518 59 22 
Côte d’Ivoire 99.76524247 64 23 
Kenya 99.92685877 68 24 
Angola 100.00000000 72 25 
Burundi 100.00000000 72 25 
Central African Republic 100.00000000 72 25 
Chad 100.00000000 72 25 
Congo (Brazzaville) 100.00000000 72 25 
Eritrea 100.00000000 72 25 
Guinea-Bissau 100.00000000 72 25 
Libya 100.00000000 72 25 
Malawi 100.00000000 72 25 
Mali 100.00000000 72 25 
Mauritius 100.00000000 72 25 
Nigeria 100.00000000 72 25 
São Tomé and Principe 100.00000000 72 25 
Senegal 100.00000000 72 25 
Seychelles 100.00000000 72 25 
Sierra Leone 100.00000000 72 25 
Somalia 100.00000000 72 25 
Sudan 100.00000000 72 25 
Algeria 100.1794753 151 43 
Tunisia 100.3529335 155 44 
South Africa 101.3508327 160 45 
Comoros 101.4984976 162 46 
Guinea 101.7920328 164 47 
Uganda 102.5272239 169 48 
Ghana 104.3359451 172 49 
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Zambia 104.978801 174 50 
Cape Verde 107.4761353 179 51 
Gabon 110.2680772 184 52 
Ethiopia 117.7773539 190 53 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on USEIA (2018) data 
Table A.6: Ranking of African countries according to their rate of electricity supply 
efficiency (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average ESE 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Libya 37.49682826 2 1 
Congo (Brazzaville) 53.35449536 3 2 
Cameroon 74.54729069 10 3 
Ghana 77.64081428 13 4 
Côte d’Ivoire 79.44146525 16 5 
Gabon 79.77281677 17 6 
Tanzania 80.02139063 18 7 
Sudan 80.49059024 21 8 
Algeria 80.98891141 22 9 
Ethiopia 81.02990656 23 10 
Benin 81.04121372 24 11 
Kenya 81.65983843 25 12 
Senegal 82.23062219 27 13 
Zimbabwe 84.15358445 32 14 
Tunisia 84.289576 34 15 
Niger 84.48230799 36 16 
Eritrea 84.66502736 38 17 
Nigeria 86.06372319 46 18 
Zambia 87.17433755 53 19 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 87.92315088 59 20 
Morocco 87.94276629 60 21 
Angola 88.3782508 64 22 
Mozambique 89.50814057 73 23 
Botswana 89.71851966 76 24 
Congo (Kinshasa) 89.78523629 77 25 
Namibia 90.49429483 83 26 
Togo 91.29580153 87 27 
South Africa 91.42614439 91 28 
Cape Verde 92.97878788 106 29 
Central African Republic 93.00000000 107 30 
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Chad 93.00000000 107 30 
Comoros 93.00000000 107 30 
Djibouti 93.00000000 107 30 
Equatorial Guinea 93.00000000 107 30 
Gambia, The 93.00000000 107 30 
Guinea 93.00000000 107 30 
Guinea-Bissau 93.00000000 107 30 
Liberia 93.00000000 107 30 
Madagascar 93.00000000 107 30 
Malawi 93.00000000 107 30 
Mali 93.00000000 107 30 
São Tomé and Principe 93.00000000 107 30 
Seychelles 93.00000000 107 30 
Sierra Leone 93.00000000 107 30 
Somalia 93.00405797 143 45 
Uganda 93.09802424 145 46 
Mauritania 93.09937598 146 47 
Mauritius 93.19316922 149 48 
Rwanda 94.19389814 162 49 
Lesotho 95.36547722 171 50 
Burundi 95.58587586 175 51 
Burkina Faso 95.87156958 177 52 
Swaziland 97.29919462 188 53 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on USEIA (2018) data 
Table A.7: Ranking of African countries according to their rate of access to electricity 
(RACE) (Average 2011-2015) (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average RACE 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
South Sudan 5.921040773 1 1 
Burundi 6.654797745 2 2 
Chad 7.372249832 3 3 
Liberia 9.147955093 4 4 
Malawi 9.340000000 5 5 
Central African Republic 12.19305954 6 6 
Guinea-Bissau 13.48163208 7 7 
Congo (Kinshasa) 14.76484974 8 8 
Niger 14.95419975 9 9 
Sierra Leone 15.07525162 10 10 
Madagascar 16.5128157 11 11 
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Tanzania 16.66203583 12 12 
Uganda 16.72299278 13 13 
Rwanda 16.93395531 14 14 
Burkina Faso 17.37564377 15 15 
Mozambique 21.26170906 17 16 
Lesotho 24.65037857 18 17 
Somalia 25.10658989 19 18 
Zambia 26.73860245 20 19 
Ethiopia 28.40510506 21 20 
Guinea 28.55957359 22 21 
Mali 30.44441093 23 22 
Kenya 33.68440201 24 23 
Zimbabwe 35.34113815 26 24 
Angola 36.28249084 27 25 
Mauritania 37.03605591 28 26 
Benin 37.34653671 29 27 
Sudan 38.46251953 31 28 
Togo 42.20080536 33 29 
Eritrea 43.18904495 35 30 
Gambia, The 44.06586838 36 31 
Namibia 48.32556351 38 32 
Congo (Brazzaville) 49.64273224 39 33 
Djibouti 52.8882457 40 34 
Botswana 54.88303418 42 35 
Nigeria 54.9283638 43 36 
Cameroon 56.21290131 44 37 
Swaziland 58.37334824 46 38 
Senegal 58.43111954 47 39 
Côte d’Ivoire 60.40220932 48 40 
São Tomé and Principe 62.89689407 50 41 
Equatorial Guinea 66.70395233 51 42 
Comoros 70.72298981 54 43 
Ghana 71.61287974 55 44 
South Africa 85.38000000 63 45 
Cape Verde 85.51855621 64 46 
Gabon 88.24295868 68 47 
Morocco 95.34494354 83 48 
Libya 98.52285156 94 49 
Seychelles 98.66741638 95 50 
Mauritius 98.82798584 97 51 
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Algeria 99.08559963 98 52 
Tunisia 99.70000000 110 53 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 99.86965332 120 54 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table A.8: Ranking of African countries according to their real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) 
(expressed as a percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita) (Average 
2011-2015) (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries Average RGDPcW (2011-2015) World ranking Africa ranking 
Eritrea 1.06001201 1 1 
Burundi 2.361895346 2 2 
Liberia 3.670503183 3 3 
Central African Republic 3.725700527 4 4 
Niger 3.726104872 5 5 
Congo (Kinshasa) 3.778579543 6 6 
Madagascar 4.090782913 7 7 
Ethiopia 4.245007745 8 8 
Mozambique 4.738803454 9 9 
Malawi 4.74634177 10 10 
Sierra Leone 4.87057474 11 11 
Togo 5.205088958 12 12 
Gambia, The 5.339755082 13 13 
Guinea-Bissau 5.599695651 14 14 
Burkina Faso 6.264754628 16 15 
Uganda 6.393076632 17 16 
Rwanda 6.503623674 19 17 
Mali 7.020294394 20 18 
Guinea 7.022463756 21 19 
Comoros 7.770610821 23 20 
Tanzania 7.811387113 24 21 
Benin 8.01050221 25 22 
Zimbabwe 9.098180013 28 23 
Chad 9.306923282 30 24 
Senegal 10.16671357 32 25 
Kenya 10.51066494 34 26 
São Tomé and Principe 12.03610606 37 27 
Mauritania 12.83368055 38 28 
Lesotho 13.00520058 39 29 
Côte d’Ivoire 13.06263215 40 30 
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Cameroon 13.93976004 42 31 
Zambia 15.82861638 47 32 
Ghana 16.01417991 48 33 
Sudan 17.90507698 51 34 
Nigeria 24.82230117 58 35 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 26.15700125 59 36 
Congo (Brazzaville) 28.42688711 60 37 
Morocco 30.70954065 63 38 
Cape Verde 33.94089746 67 39 
Angola 36.69284688 78 40 
Swaziland 38.85854893 80 41 
Tunisia 41.83716562 82 42 
Algeria 46.28733477 85 43 
Namibia 57.18025337 94 44 
Botswana 71.46098775 106 45 
Libya 72.95814748 108 46 
South Africa 75.36093508 110 47 
Mauritius 88.86278849 116 48 
Gabon 93.74590615 119 49 
Seychelles 125.1718355 130 50 
Equatorial Guinea 165.1068608 141 51 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the World Development Indicators (2018) data 
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APPENDIX B 
RANKING OF COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO THE MODIFIED INDEX OF 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY DISRUPTION RISK (MESRI) 
Table B.1: Ranking and classification of countries (for which data are available) according 
to their Modified Electricity Supply Disruption Risk Index (MESRI) (Average 2002-2005) 
Level of overall performance as 
related to electricity supply 
disruption  
Countries 
Average MESRI 
(2002-2005) 
World 
ranking 
Extremely high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is equal to or above 
2.5) Liberia 4.685771643 1 
Very high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is in the interval [2, 
2.5[) Niger 2.307595741 2 
 
Burundi 2.214406178 3 
 
Benin 2.157051004 4 
 
Congo (Kinshasa) 2.146414594 5 
 
Rwanda 2.122691463 6 
 
Chad 2.108546286 7 
 
Guinea-Bissau 2.006223110 8 
High level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is in the interval [1.5, 2[) Malawi 1.968934759 9 
 
Togo 1.963270527 10 
 
Sierra Leone 1.932480649 11 
 
Mozambique 1.918415224 12 
 
Burkina Faso 1.918216995 13 
 
Central African Republic 1.913748313 14 
 
Ethiopia 1.870598191 15 
 
Cambodia 1.849833357 16 
 
Afghanistan 1.841630254 17 
 
Madagascar 1.806467268 18 
 
Tanzania 1.797908137 19 
 
Uganda 1.786997943 20 
 
Lesotho 1.715178870 21 
 
Mali 1.687079263 22 
 
Gambia, The 1.663607179 23 
 
Solomon Islands 1.662571245 24 
 
Eritrea 1.662291718 25 
 
Haiti 1.648202618 26 
 
Guinea 1.625396587 27 
 
Mauritania 1.606457882 28 
 
Bangladesh 1.601982541 29 
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Kenya 1.582577616 30 
 
Myanmar 1.55108931 31 
 
Senegal 1.544726169 32 
 
Papua New Guinea 1.539858288 33 
 
Nepal 1.536824785 34 
 
Zimbabwe 1.521797047 35 
Medium level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is in the interval [1, 
1.5[) Comoros 1.489649621 36 
 
Zambia 1.482523448 37 
 
Sudan 1.482207922 38 
 
Swaziland 1.452515245 39 
 
Yemen, Rep. 1.448529362 40 
 
India 1.44719257 41 
 
Botswana 1.427063891 42 
 
São Tomé and Principe 1.422211189 43 
 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1.392037712 44 
 
Vanuatu 1.384574081 45 
 
Nigeria 1.375305659 46 
 
Pakistan 1.375244369 47 
Angola 1.369902164 48 
 
Ghana 1.36970696 49 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.367522916 50 
 
Lao PDR 1.35451535 51 
 
Tajikistan 1.352703396 52 
 
Mongolia 1.347712804 53 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.342406543 54 
 
Cameroon 1.342142044 55 
 
Uzbekistan 1.324890974 56 
 
Nicaragua 1.323902993 57 
 
Vietnam 1.310108366 58 
 
Moldova 1.307993396 59 
 
Honduras 1.289163584 60 
 
Guyana 1.256052299 61 
 
Bolivia 1.250294084 62 
 
Cape Verde 1.248661206 63 
 
Namibia 1.244374564 64 
 
Philippines 1.242964812 65 
 
Sri Lanka 1.224042662 66 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.21876418 67 
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Indonesia 1.205214911 68 
 
Azerbaijan 1.204725603 69 
 
Bhutan 1.199750135 70 
 
Ukraine 1.189839649 71 
 
China 1.181734429 72 
 
Belize 1.180285978 73 
 
Turkmenistan 1.177772145 74 
 
Guatemala 1.175638231 75 
 
Armenia 1.174188092 76 
 
Cuba 1.157282374 77 
 
Jordan 1.156797111 78 
 
Belarus 1.15308081 79 
 
Tunisia 1.147775256 80 
 
Macedonia, FYR 1.145118051 81 
 
Iraq 1.14452219 82 
 
Georgia 1.14307158 83 
 
Dominican Republic 1.135242808 84 
 
Albania 1.130849679 85 
 
El Salvador 1.130336269 86 
 
Jamaica 1.129580531 87 
 
Algeria 1.12887494 88 
 
Thailand 1.124664479 89 
 
Fiji 1.104190064 90 
 
Lebanon 1.102339257 91 
 
Samoa 1.098591787 92 
 
Peru 1.092922287 93 
 
Ecuador 1.091630656 94 
 
South Africa 1.085307494 95 
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.085154268 96 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.079248233 97 
 
Maldives 1.07827902 98 
 
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 1.06424126 99 
 
Bulgaria 1.063234413 100 
 
Grenada 1.061128514 101 
 
Kazakhstan 1.050735859 102 
 
Dominica 1.04095786 103 
 
Panama 1.040374983 104 
 
Saint Lucia 1.03804551 105 
 
Colombia 1.030749375 106 
 
Libya 1.029544735 107 
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Mauritius 1.028913894 108 
 
Malaysia 1.02695555 109 
 
Romania 1.017877985 110 
 
Paraguay 1.011153523 111 
 
Argentina 1.010396464 112 
 
Seychelles 1.009123549 113 
 
Russian Federation 1.005437524 114 
 
Mexico 1.005064232 115 
 
Turkey 1.000464373 116 
Low level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is in the interval [0.5, 1[) Equatorial Guinea 0.998785526 117 
 
Lithuania 0.996176551 118 
 
Poland 0.992279535 119 
 
Hungary 0.987073837 120 
 
Suriname 0.986951963 121 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.977495904 122 
 
Gabon 0.973724147 123 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.966708254 124 
 
Estonia 0.964309429 125 
 
Uruguay 0.95813056 126 
 
Brazil 0.954895334 127 
 
Venezuela, RB 0.950800797 128 
 
Costa Rica 0.941894147 129 
 
Slovak Republic 0.938941403 130 
 
Barbados 0.938520052 131 
 
Chile 0.937873719 132 
 
Czech Republic 0.924034575 133 
 
Malta 0.92211803 134 
 
Macao SAR, China 0.921789856 135 
 
Korea, Rep. 0.918745766 136 
 
Bahrain 0.900168674 137 
 
Croatia 0.898316557 138 
 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.892775689 139 
 
Latvia 0.890135768 140 
 
Portugal 0.884389261 141 
 
Israel 0.878774734 142 
 
Slovenia 0.873288678 143 
 
Greece 0.872781451 144 
 
Bahamas, The 0.863578454 145 
 
Cyprus 0.86302634 146 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
224 
 
 
Spain 0.848761673 147 
 
Brunei Darussalam 0.84604758 148 
 
Singapore 0.83836002 149 
 
Germany 0.837510671 150 
 
United Kingdom 0.836244909 151 
 
France 0.834357575 152 
 
Belgium 0.830736928 153 
 
Netherlands 0.824005275 154 
 
Italy 0.820578642 155 
 
Japan 0.814403126 156 
 
Ireland 0.810829211 157 
 
Australia 0.807659844 158 
 
United States 0.807643487 159 
 
New Zealand 0.803685271 160 
 
United Arab Emirates 0.802087049 161 
 
Qatar 0.796220806 162 
 
Finland 0.79436511 163 
 
Iceland 0.777427 164 
 
Sweden 0.776728769 165 
 
Austria 0.774607643 166 
 
Canada 0.772876857 167 
 
Denmark 0.758704439 168 
 
Bermuda 0.756669032 169 
 
Switzerland 0.733437378 170 
 
Luxembourg 0.710063639 171 
 Norway 0.695226182 172 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on data from USEIA (2018), World Development 
Indicators (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank (2018b) 
Table B.2: Ranking and classification of countries (for which data are available) according to their 
Modified Electricity Supply Disruption Risk Index (MESRI) (average 2006-2010) 
Level of overall performance as 
related to electricity supply 
disruption  
Countries 
Average MESRI  
(2006-2010) 
World 
ranking 
Extremely high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is equal to or above 
2.5) Liberia 2.656688662 1 
Very high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is in the interval [2, 
2.5[) Niger 2.346248769 2 
 
Burundi 2.160915782 3 
 
Benin 2.036629441 4 
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High level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is in the interval [1.5, 2[) Congo (Kinshasa) 1.995919878 5 
 
Guinea-Bissau 1.992477318 6 
 
Togo 1.978843121 7 
 
Chad 1.977497989 8 
 
Rwanda 1.9631891 9 
 
Malawi 1.942206232 10 
 
Burkina Faso 1.884295247 11 
 
Sierra Leone 1.86441975 12 
 
Central African Republic 1.859601736 13 
 
Mozambique 1.834860809 14 
 
Madagascar 1.834446658 15 
 
Tanzania 1.787739228 16 
 
Uganda 1.771767867 17 
 
Ethiopia 1.737039543 18 
 
Cambodia 1.732122353 19 
 
Afghanistan 1.687328015 20 
 
Haiti 1.682503188 21 
 
Eritrea 1.673424407 22 
 
Gambia, The 1.643827703 23 
 
Mali 1.620053054 24 
 
Solomon Islands 1.595772834 25 
 
Guinea 1.595429997 26 
 
Lesotho 1.564179605 27 
 
Kenya 1.554952272 28 
 
Zimbabwe 1.545649782 29 
 
Bangladesh 1.531935251 30 
 
Mauritania 1.51888985 31 
Medium level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is in the interval [1, 
1.5[) Papua New Guinea 1.498337097 32 
 
Nepal 1.489017892 33 
 
Botswana 1.482518888 34 
 
Senegal 1.478690593 35 
 
Comoros 1.476324024 36 
 
Zambia 1.460428563 37 
 
Sudan 1.443159821 38 
 
Yemen, Rep. 1.436188809 39 
 
Myanmar 1.433334943 40 
 
São Tomé and Principe 1.401494828 41 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.396336492 42 
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Swaziland 1.386533898 43 
 
Cameroon 1.383712075 44 
 
India 1.377807369 45 
 
Pakistan 1.343221065 46 
 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1.341450449 47 
 
Tajikistan 1.338862213 48 
 
Ghana 1.3360555 49 
 
Kiribati 1.334493483 50 
 
Vanuatu 1.330836282 51 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.330010737 52 
 
Nigeria 1.315433205 53 
 
Mongolia 1.303706822 54 
 
Nicaragua 1.301809061 55 
 
Uzbekistan 1.293797803 56 
 
Moldova 1.289964638 57 
 
Vietnam 1.289733862 58 
 
Lao PDR 1.286306979 59 
 
Guyana 1.271183103 60 
 
Honduras 1.259132268 61 
 
Angola 1.252651181 62 
 
Namibia 1.249386028 63 
 
Morocco 1.246989772 64 
 
Macedonia, FYR 1.246718684 65 
 
Bolivia 1.226769043 66 
 
Philippines 1.226328413 67 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.20243546 68 
 
Cape Verde 1.192960498 69 
 
Sri Lanka 1.181597703 70 
 
Indonesia 1.177032089 71 
 
Ukraine 1.164326905 72 
 
Iraq 1.163205584 73 
 
Tonga 1.159765737 74 
 
Guatemala 1.156018811 75 
 
Jordan 1.155969347 76 
 
Belize 1.145052098 77 
 
Jamaica 1.142256509 78 
 
Tunisia 1.138983682 79 
 
Cuba 1.138850693 80 
 
Algeria 1.137946078 81 
 
Turkmenistan 1.135135708 82 
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Albania 1.133379937 83 
 
Bhutan 1.131824448 84 
 
China 1.122816982 85 
 
El Salvador 1.122095799 86 
 
Armenia 1.119443025 87 
 
Belarus 1.105460968 88 
 
Georgia 1.104367934 89 
 
Thailand 1.103888903 90 
 
Azerbaijan 1.098101335 91 
 
Samoa 1.097619692 92 
 
Fiji 1.097318924 93 
 
Dominican Republic 1.094844315 94 
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.079375217 95 
 
Lebanon 1.077798149 96 
 
South Africa 1.076990857 97 
 
Ecuador 1.076457914 98 
 
Peru 1.068085345 99 
 
Serbia 1.066816047 100 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.060344023 101 
 
Maldives 1.058969646 102 
 
Grenada 1.053085603 103 
 
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 1.053022948 104 
 
Dominica 1.042710156 105 
 
Bulgaria 1.036632887 106 
 
Saint Lucia 1.033926933 107 
 
Montenegro 1.021080779 108 
 
Kazakhstan 1.020407772 109 
 
Malaysia 1.018361037 110 
 
Colombia 1.017644174 111 
 
Mauritius 1.017243409 112 
 
Mexico 1.013836369 113 
 
Paraguay 1.013611271 114 
 
Panama 1.013148504 115 
 
Libya 1.007596405 116 
 
Gabon 1.002628957 117 
 
Seychelles 1.000930492 118 
Low level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is in the interval [0.5, 1[) Romania 0.995991826 119 
 
Argentina 0.992913408 120 
 
Turkey 0.987561964 121 
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Russian Federation 0.984484749 122 
 
Suriname 0.981576112 123 
 
Hungary 0.980278212 124 
 
Poland 0.976189434 125 
 
Equatorial Guinea 0.974382486 126 
 
Lithuania 0.96674191 127 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.966456249 128 
 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.963043537 129 
 
Uruguay 0.950496236 130 
 
Brazil 0.946603585 131 
 
Costa Rica 0.945589638 132 
 
Estonia 0.945282352 133 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.938686054 134 
 
Barbados 0.938663559 135 
 
Chile 0.934376643 136 
 
Venezuela, RB 0.930677741 137 
 
Saudi Arabia 0.930183559 138 
 
Slovak Republic 0.923686243 139 
 
Malta 0.923662916 140 
 
Bahrain 0.919839736 141 
 
Czech Republic 0.913041551 142 
 
Korea, Rep. 0.911151335 143 
 
Croatia 0.903875551 144 
 
Macao SAR, China 0.890309516 145 
 
Puerto Rico 0.884024271 146 
 
Portugal 0.883117124 147 
 
Latvia 0.881758364 148 
 
Bahamas, The 0.877471101 149 
 
Israel 0.875543216 150 
 
Guam 0.874146028 151 
 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.871840662 152 
 
Cyprus 0.864296067 153 
 
Slovenia 0.863764415 154 
 
Greece 0.861708373 155 
 
Brunei Darussalam 0.854455004 156 
 
United Arab Emirates 0.847630362 157 
 
Spain 0.8459923 158 
 
France 0.841283871 159 
 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0.839604778 160 
 
United Kingdom 0.838797742 161 
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Singapore 0.829996043 162 
 Belgium 0.829241985 163 
 
Italy 0.824992909 164 
 
Japan 0.819575767 165 
 
Germany 0.818297755 166 
 
Ireland 0.817009705 167 
 
Netherlands 0.816994602 168 
 
United States 0.81301747 169 
 
Australia 0.808715063 170 
 
New Zealand 0.806958099 171 
 
Qatar 0.802762861 172 
 
Finland 0.793628017 173 
 
Canada 0.778118775 174 
 
Austria 0.775351574 175 
 
Iceland 0.774207029 176 
 
Sweden 0.773894945 177 
 
Denmark 0.760626331 178 
 
Bermuda 0.758655337 179 
 
Luxembourg 0.740073362 180 
 
Switzerland 0.734803274 181 
 Norway 0.696877237 182 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on data from USEIA (2018), World Development 
Indicators (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank (2018b) 
Table B.3: Ranking and classification of countries (for which data are available) according 
to their Modified Electricity Supply Disruption Risk Index (MESRI) (Average 2011-2015) 
Level of overall performance as 
related to electricity supply 
disruption  
Countries 
Average MESRI 
 (2011-2015) 
World 
ranking 
Very high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is in the interval [2, 
2.5[) Niger 2.225437266 1 
 
Liberia 2.202497974 2 
 
Benin 2.132814665 3 
 
Burundi 2.102525658 4 
 Togo 2.045730524 5 
High level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is in the interval [1.5, 2[) Chad 1.893196024 6 
 
Madagascar 1.891541179 7 
 
Burkina Faso 1.878838442 8 
 
Guinea-Bissau 1.873979825 9 
 
Malawi 1.848984528 10 
 
Central African Republic 1.837616989 11 
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Congo (Kinshasa) 1.799327872 12 
 
Haiti 1.770313729 13 
 
Sierra Leone 1.758559475 14 
 
Rwanda 1.750305986 15 
 
Mozambique 1.726889583 16 
 
Tanzania 1.721383781 17 
 
Afghanistan 1.679885887 18 
 
Uganda 1.658225438 19 
 
Gambia, The 1.641927961 20 
 
Ethiopia 1.618884016 21 
 
Mali 1.56337743 22 
 
Cambodia 1.546450664 23 
 
Guinea 1.545755187 24 
 
Zimbabwe 1.504454766 25 
 
Mauritania 1.502884237 26 
Medium level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is in the interval [1, 
1.5[) Yemen, Rep. 1.471120985 27 
 
Bangladesh 1.46905552 28 
 
Kenya 1.46404513 29 
 
Cameroon 1.463592717 30 
 
Comoros 1.455184658 31 
 
Senegal 1.449664267 32 
 
Papua New Guinea 1.439315874 33 
 
Solomon Islands 1.436252358 34 
 
Nepal 1.433968994 35 
 
Lesotho 1.432648835 36 
 
Macedonia, FYR 1.399460384 37 
 
Zambia 1.391499095 38 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.38800356 39 
 
São Tomé and Principe 1.387002599 40 
 
Botswana 1.367234517 41 
 
Myanmar 1.355199023 42 
 
Sudan 1.34910083 43 
 
Pakistan 1.329846883 44 
 
India 1.319039734 45 
 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1.315808361 46 
 
Kiribati 1.311159483 47 
 
Swaziland 1.304850343 48 
 
Vanuatu 1.304691593 49 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.301135886 50 
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Tajikistan 1.293197263 51 
 
Nigeria 1.288693643 52 
 
Ghana 1.274999372 53 
 
Moldova 1.264766849 54 
 
Nicaragua 1.256636854 55 
 Uzbekistan 1.250549338 56 
 
Vietnam 1.244604874 57 
 
Angola 1.243959794 58 
 
Namibia 1.243942995 59 
 
Honduras 1.24312696 60 
 
Lao PDR 1.232291884 61 
 
Mongolia 1.219884548 62 
 
Guyana 1.214554811 63 
 
Libya 1.205203235 64 
 
Bolivia 1.204828448 65 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.203530427 66 
 
Philippines 1.202086896 67 
 
Morocco 1.200901517 68 
 
Belize 1.174825317 69 
 
Ukraine 1.172773885 70 
 
Jordan 1.17224932 71 
 
Jamaica 1.162006634 72 
 
Iraq 1.155830624 73 
 
Tonga 1.152220169 74 
 
Cape Verde 1.149742427 75 
 
Indonesia 1.148995455 76 
 
Tunisia 1.141112418 77 
 
Algeria 1.138185982 78 
 
Cuba 1.136244766 79 
 
Guatemala 1.135078043 80 
 
Sri Lanka 1.12743816 81 
 
Albania 1.126802047 82 
 
El Salvador 1.111552382 83 
 
Samoa 1.109953989 84 
 
Armenia 1.098510552 85 
 
Thailand 1.092342947 86 
 
Belarus 1.090577538 87 
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.084836923 88 
 
Azerbaijan 1.081582667 89 
 
Dominican Republic 1.0794525 90 
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Fiji 1.077522944 91 
 
Turkmenistan 1.077138217 92 
 
Lebanon 1.075412489 93 
 
South Africa 1.072194465 94 
 
Georgia 1.071388112 95 
 
Serbia 1.068304028 96 
 
Bhutan 1.067033655 97 
 
China 1.064667888 98 
 
Grenada 1.058456816 99 
 
Nauru 1.05833533 100 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.057796124 101 
 
Ecuador 1.055965156 102 
 
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 1.050477399 103 
 
Maldives 1.048914264 104 
 
Peru 1.045019739 105 
 
Saint Lucia 1.042461767 106 
 
Montenegro 1.041906528 107 
 
Dominica 1.035391299 108 
 
Bulgaria 1.019453798 109 
 
Mexico 1.014539548 110 
 
Kazakhstan 1.008513323 111 
 
Malaysia 1.003625078 112 
 
Mauritius 1.001565455 113 
 
Gabon 1.001231834 114 
 Paraguay 1.000457149 115 
Low level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is in the interval [0.5, 1[) Colombia 0.995569668 116 
 
Argentina 0.992189641 117 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.988946122 118 
 
Romania 0.988314583 119 
 
Hungary 0.987420319 120 
 
Suriname 0.987161007 121 
 
Equatorial Guinea 0.9861079 122 
 
Seychelles 0.984425425 123 
 
Russian Federation 0.980669564 124 
 
Panama 0.979577998 125 
 
Turkey 0.967307055 126 
 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.962155082 127 
 
Costa Rica 0.957311854 128 
 
Oman 0.956868314 129 
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Poland 0.954922656 130 
 
Barbados 0.949194342 131 
 
Brazil 0.942779938 132 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.941994428 133 
 
Estonia 0.933170038 134 
 
Lithuania 0.930536022 135 
 
Saudi Arabia 0.926950313 136 
 
Chile 0.925878979 137 
 
Bahrain 0.9210716 138 
 
Slovak Republic 0.915720536 139 
 
Czech Republic 0.910745379 140 
 
Malta 0.910583242 141 
 
Uruguay 0.910304665 142 
 
Croatia 0.906147997 143 
 
Korea, Rep. 0.902011098 144 
 
Bahamas, The 0.890382673 145 
 
Puerto Rico 0.888057913 146 
 
Macao SAR, China 0.88650407 147 
 
Greece 0.883237232 148 
 
Portugal 0.879778706 149 
 
Cyprus 0.876678895 150 
 
Guam 0.875223812 151 
 
Israel 0.874139459 152 
 
Kuwait 0.874012093 153 
 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0.873637972 154 
 
Latvia 0.871552129 155 
 
Slovenia 0.870493351 156 
 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.868079314 157 
 
Brunei Darussalam 0.867408514 158 
 
United Arab Emirates 0.857814509 159 
 
France 0.851896184 160 
 
Spain 0.849248062 161 
 
United Kingdom 0.838411342 162 
 Belgium 0.835209307 163 
 
Italy 0.824212325 164 
 
Luxembourg 0.822045234 165 
 
Netherlands 0.820635968 166 
 
Japan 0.818453082 167 
 
Singapore 0.817553438 168 
 
Ireland 0.814933512 169 
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United States 0.813762233 170 
 
Germany 0.810358193 171 
 
Australia 0.805222568 172 
 
New Zealand 0.802413885 173 
 
Canada 0.80090301 174 
 
Qatar 0.798057171 175 
 
Finland 0.79699411 176 
 
Iceland 0.795056822 177 
 
Greenland 0.786234133 178 
 
Austria 0.779325759 179 
 
Sweden 0.764031436 180 
 
Denmark 0.749499872 181 
 
Switzerland 0.735915036 182 
 Norway 0.698889047 183 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on data from USEIA (2018), World Development 
Indicators (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank (2018b). 
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